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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on selected issues in regard to the mathematical
modeling of electricity markets. In a first step the interrelations of elec-
tric power market modeling are highlighted a crossroad between operations
research, applied economics, and engineering. In a second step the devel-
opment of a large-scale continental European economic engineering model
named ELMOD is described and the model is applied to the issue of wind
integration. It is concluded that enabling the integration of low-carbon tech-
nologies appears feasible for wind energy. In a third step algorithmic work
is carried out regarding a game theoretic model. Two approaches in order
to solve a discretely-constrained mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints using disjunctive constraints are presented. The first one refor-
mulates the problem as a mixed-integer linear program and the second one
applies the Benders decomposition technique. Selected numerical results are
reported.
If you want to build a ship, don’t drum
up people to collect wood and don’t as-
sign them tasks and work, but rather
teach them to long for the endless im-
mensity of the sea.
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry
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IEA International Energy Agency
IL Illinois
ISO Independent System Operator
k Kilo
KKT Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
km Kilometer(s)
km2 Square Kilometer(s)
kV Kilovolt(s)
LCP Linear Complementarity Problem
LMP Locational Marginal Pricing
LP Linear Program
MCP Mixed Complementarity Problem
MILP Mixed-Integer Linear Program
MINLP Mixed-Integer Nonlinear Program
MLCP Mixed Linear Complementarity Problem
mn Million
MP Master Problem
MPCC Mathematical Program with Complementarity Constraints
MPEC Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints
MTI Merchant Transmission Investment
MW Megawatt(s)
MWh Megawatt Hour(s)
NJ New Jersey
NOx Nitrogen Oxides
NP Nondeterministic Polynomial
NUTS Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques
NY New York
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPF Optimal Power Flow
OR Operations Research
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xiv
PA Pennsylvania
PIPA Penalty Interior Point Algorithm
PJM Pennsylvania New Jersey Maryland Interconnection Associa-
tion
PNP Proactive Network Planning
PSE Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne Operator S.A.
PSP Pumped Storage Plant
PTDF Power Transfer Distribution Factor
RAM Random Access Memory
ROI Return on Investment
s.t. Subject to
SFE Supply Function Equilibrium
SMD Standard Market Design
SO System Operator
SP Subproblem
SQP Sequential Quadratic Programming
strat Strategic
t Ton(s)
TCC Transmission Congestion Contract
TSO Transmission System Operator
U.S. United States
UC Unit Commitment
UCTE Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity
UK United Kingdom
USA United States of America
VDEW Vereinigung Deutscher Elektrizitätswerke e.V.
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Overview
1
Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
1.1 Introduction
Electricity was painful to regulate; there is no reason to be-
lieve that it can easily be deregulated (Smeers, 2003a, p. 172).
Electricity markets around the world are still in a state of flux, even two
decades (the UK market), one decade (for some U.S. markets) or a couple of
years (continental Europe) into the reform process. In Europe, the reform
momentum has accelerated in the second half of this decade. In fact, the
‘Acceleration Directive’ (2003/54/EC) has been followed by a more coherent
attempt of moving toward a single European market. Yet central reform
steps such as vertical unbundling, incentives for cross-border transmission
investment, and the integration of large-scale renewable electricity into the
network are still in the making. Evidence of this process is provided by the
discussions of the ‘3rd Energy Package’ of the European Union, providing
energy policy guidelines for the next decade.
In general, the objective of electricity market reforms is to replace monop-
olistic structures with competition and - where natural monopolies prevail
- with more efficient regulation. In Europe, several Directives were issued
since 1996 to advance on this reform path. In addition, the discussion of
climate change has added further elements to energy policy, such as the
European Emissions Trading System (ETS), and the ambitious targets for
electricity from renewable energy sources, mainly wind. Thus, Germany
and Spain have introduced generous feed-in tariffs for onshore and offshore
wind energy that the network operators have to integrate in their network
management.
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All of the mentioned aspects in the course of restructuring the electricity
industry are accompanied by the development of different models that in-
tend to represent a certain aspect of the overall picture. Due to the time lag
between the liberalization process in the U.S. and continental Europe, the
developments of adequate scientific European market models is also delayed.
Many models are ‘imported’ from the U.S. and adjusted to the European
situation. However, some of the continental European specifics such as dif-
fering regional congestion management combined with different interregional
coordination schemes can not easily be modeled based on experiences from
abroad. Moreover, a reconsideration of sophisticated existing models and
their usefulness for larger-scale applications currently takes place which is
due to technological advances of computation capacities. All in all, there
is a strong interest of firms, regulators and scientists in electricity market
models taking into account the new challenges of liberalization as well as
changing generation and demand structures.
Part II of this thesis develops ELMOD, a large-scale perfect competition
economic engineering model of the continental European electricity market
taking into account technical restrictions in terms of power plant start-up
and load flow calculation (Chapter 3). ELMOD is then applied to the ques-
tion of transmission expansion in combination with additional wind energy
generation (Chapter 4). Also other study results applying ELMOD are re-
ported.
Part III of this thesis turns towards the issues of game theoretic modeling.
Two different algorithmic approaches are developed to solve a MPEC prob-
lem resulting from a Stackelberg game in an electricity market. The first
approaches applies techniques in order to transform the problem in a MIP
problem (Chapter 5). The second approach applies Benders decomposition
technique (Chapter 6) to the same problem.
1.2 Summary
1.2.1 Classification and Research Area
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the field of mathematical modeling
and the various fields of research in electricity markets. It is shown that
modeling electricity markets is a melting pot of researchers from different
disciplines that all bring their own methods and skills such as operations
research, applied economics, and engineering. According to this result, the
work at hand can can be located in the area of deterministic partial equi-
librium oriented fundamental market modeling approaches under technical
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constraints.
The chapter concludes that under the assumption of perfect competition,
there is need for large-scale economic engineering models that includes the
entire potentially integrated European market in order to contribute to the
ongoing discussions on congestion management and investments. Concern-
ing the modeling under the assumption of imperfect electric power markets,
there is need for new algorithms that contribute to overcome numerical
difficulties in solving medium- and larger-scale strategic models. Hence,
the thesis takes on some of this challenges by firstly developing a large-
scale economic engineering network model of the EU named ELMOD and
secondly carrying out algorithmic work in order to solve a discretely con-
strained MPEC representing a Stackelberg game in an electric power market
including transmission constraints.
1.2.2 Large-Scale Perfect Competitive Economic Engineer-
ing Modeling
ELMOD - A Model of the European Electricity Market
Throughout Chapter 3, a structured procedure is elaborated to establish a
well working electric power market model that produces meaningful scien-
tific results. First of all, an economic market model is defined that allows to
analyze the identified research objectives. The objective function ELMOD
is welfare maximization. Then, the representation of the technical specifics
are included which constrain the economic model in some way. The tech-
nical constraints defined the required technical data. ELMOD is capable
of including various types of technical constraints such as transmission con-
straints (using the DC Load Flow model) and unit-commitment of power
plants. Third, the degree of detail had to be defined. On the one hand, the
degree of aggregation of data is supposed to be detailed enough to produce
meaningful results for a defined research objective. On the other hand, the
technical effort to solve the complete model decreases with the degree of
aggregation which is an incentive to keep the model as small as possible. In
order to thoroughly include all regions of a potentially integrated European
electricity market, ELMOD embraces the entire UCTE grid and gathers data
that is required to do this reliably. Hence, the demand is modeled in the
detail of EU NUTS 2 and 3, respectively, varying by country. Consumption
is divided in three load types: households, small businesses, and industry.
The demand distribution is conducted by weighting different regions with
their GDP and applying standard load profiles. Supply is represented by
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power plants above 100 MW installed capacity as well as a detailed data set
of existing wind turbines.
On the basis of selected existing studies using ELMOD, it is shown that
ELMOD is a valuable tool in terms of analyzing the effect of offshore wind
power on the North-West European electricity market, and the effects of
congestion between countries and within the German grid. In addition,
ELMOD can also be applied to generation investment issues, namely, the
siting of new power plants under grid constraints.
When the Wind Blows over Europe
Chapter 4 provides a large-scale application of ELMOD to the issue of wind
expansion in Europe. The ELMOD model is complemented by a grid ex-
pansion algorithm based on economic principles.
The analysis shows that efforts to prepare Europe’s high voltage grid for
large amounts of wind generation appear to be rather modest. Develop-
ing the network at existing bottlenecks - mainly cross-border connections -
should be encouraged by regulatory authorities. With a more moderate wind
expansion of 114.5 GW, the optimal grid investments are smaller. However,
if the additional wind capacity becomes too great (181 GW), the needed
grid extensions will increase compared to the actual situation. ‘Greening
the grid’, i.e. enabling the integration of low-carbon technologies, appears
feasible for wind energy.
1.2.3 Game Theoretic Economic Engineering Modeling
Solving Discretely-Constrained MPEC Problems Using Disjunc-
tive Constraints and Discrete Linearization
Chapter 5 moves away from the assumption of a perfect competitive Euro-
pean electricity market. It argues that several models and algorithms have
been developed in order to simulate the outcomes of imperfect electricity
markets. These models include approaches using game theory. It is stated
that existing modeling efforts have achieved some success but there is still
room to handle larger-scale or more realistic models as might be found in the
EU, North America or in other parts of the world. Hence, a new approach
to solve two-stage Stackelberg games with one leader based on disjunctive
constraints and discrete linearization is presented. The approach replaces
the equilibrium constraints of a mathematical problem with equilibrium con-
straints by integer restrictions in the form of disjunctive constraints. Also, a
bilinear objective function of an electricity market model stemming from the
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product of both price and generation variables is linearized using additional
binary and continuous variables and new constraints. The result is that the
mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints can be replaced by a
mixed-integer linear program. This allows for a host of important applica-
tions such as: discrete generation levels, fixed cost problems involving binary
variables, if-then logic relative to ramping constraints, discrete investment
levels, and so on. A second advantage of using the presented method is to
be able to solve larger-scale problems in electric power markets than previ-
ously attempted. Lastly, a detailed formulation of the DC load flow model
is used in order to model physical flows which facilitates a greater flexibility
for changing the network topology.
The numerical results on two illustrative problems are promising. Particu-
larly, it is shown that network effects have a significant effect on the strategic
behavior of a generator. If the strategic output decision produces too high
prices, those competitive fringe companies have an incentive to produce at
marginal cost that are located at the same nodes as the strategic player.
Otherwise, competitive players can be excluded via gaming over network
effects. However, for the time being the calculation times for a 15-node
network can become high depending on the number of discrete/binary vari-
ables.
Solving Discretely-Constrained MPEC Problems Using Disjunc-
tive Constraints and Benders Decomposition
Chapter 6 starts from the same assumptions, mathematical model, and net-
work as used in Chapter 5. The aim is now to find a new algorithmic
approach that can handle larger models computationally better than the
one presented in Chapter 5. The approach taken in this chapter applies the
Benders decomposition technique. In order to apply the Benders technique,
the mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints is decomposed into
a linear master problem and a mixed integer linear subproblem. These two
problems are then solved sequentially in order to find a solution to the orig-
inal problem. This approach is applied to a three-node network also used in
a first step of Chapter 5. First calculations are promising. Both approaches
can be calibrated to produce the same results. However, due to the subprob-
lem structure of the considered Benders approach, the convergence cannot
be guaranteed in general. An enumeration approach is applied for illustra-
tive reasons to evaluate the robustness of the numerical example results.
Enumeration is normally not doable for larger-scale problems. Hence, the
development of a (dynamic) domain decomposition method is required to
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make the approach work in general which is, however, out of the scope of
this thesis.
1.2.4 Outlook
There are several directions for valuable further research. The most obvi-
ous one is the further development of the Benders decomposition approach
for solving a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints based on
Chapter 6. Speeding up the problem of Chapter 5 could contribute to the
solving of large-scale strategic models. Also, one of these approaches might
help to solve equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints. On the per-
fect competition side, it could be worthwhile to include stochastic elements
into ELMOD in order to make the modeling of wind input more realistic.
Chapter 2
Literature on Modeling
Electricity Markets
This chapter addresses the issue that energy market research cannot be
easily classified according to the standard disciplines by simply looking at
its research objectives and methods. Hence, the different disciplines involved
in electricity market research are discussed building a general framework for
the present work.
2.1 General Framework
2.1.1 Modeling
Research is a way to create or apply new knowledge. In his survey on the
research theoretic rationale of modeling, Wierzbicki (2007) argued that the
world economy is on a way towards a knowledge-based economy. Building
on this trend, the verification and structuring of information become in-
creasingly important but is very often still an unsolved issue. According to
Wierzbicki (2007), there are several forms of representing knowledge. Apart
from mathematical and computerized models, there are the traditional form
of a text with illustrations, and the more contemporary multimedia form.
Out of these three forms, particularly mathematical modeling has gained
disproportionate greater importance over the last decades.
According to Murthy and Rodin (1987, p. 17), the nature of a model can
be defined as following:
A model is a representation of a system (or object, or phe-
nomenon). The model is called an adequate one if it is appropri-
8
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ate for the purpose (or goal) in the mind of the model builder.
Otherwise it is called an inadequate model.
Moreover, a mathematical model makes use of patterns and logic rules (com-
plemented by other elements) in order to serve its purpose. Hence, a mathe-
matical model is a representation of a real system (or object, or phenomenon)
that is described using the mathematical methodology. A mathematical
model is made up of a symbolic model representation including an abstract
mathematical formulation (Murthy and Rodin, 1987). Figure 2.1 shows in
a simplified manner the process of mathematical model building. An im-
portant issue is that the system to be considered has to be characterized
first in terms of variables, parameters and relationships. These relation-
ships describe interdependencies between the variables of a system, e.g. in
the form of mathematical functions. Then a mathematical model can be
formulated by means of abstract mathematical formulations - if necessary
in an iterative procedure - that is able to adequately represent the system
under observation.
The link between mathematical modeling and electricity market research,
becomes evident considering the literature described subsequently. There,
mathematical models of various types play a major role. A large part of
the literature specified in Section 2.2 builds, uses or applies mathematical
models; reviews different models and their applications; develops and tests
algorithms for solving mathematical problems in order to produce adequate
model results.
2.1.2 Delimitation
There are three groups of researchers involved in the research on electricity
markets: mathematicians, engineers, and economists. In order to under-
stand how the different disciplines interact, one can make use of the idea
of linear one-point perspective in painting. The challenge of an adequate
perspective is to project a three dimensional real object onto a two dimen-
sional canvas. There is one point in which all lines intersect and that is the
position from which the object is beheld. However, if the painter changes its
position, the painting can look very different even though the object itself
has not changed. The similar is true for electricity market research. The
research object is the same but it is approached from different disciplines
which have different viewpoints. Furthermore, all researchers involved have
to cope with the challenge to represent the (higher dimensional) reality by
a simplifying (lower dimensional) model.
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Figure 2.1: The process of mathematical model building
Source: Murthy and Rodin (1987, p. 18).
Mathematics
Applied Mathematics is a branch of mathematics that transforms recent
methodical and systematic mathematical knowledge into algorithms and
models for real applications. Accordingly, the notion, methods and tools
developed in applied mathematics are widely used in other disciplines. A
relevant field within applied mathematics is Operations Research1 (OR).
The definitions of OR are manifold. A general common denominator is that
OR applies scientific methods in order to facilitate decision making (Hillier
and Lieberman, 1986; Neumann and Morlock, 1993; Ravindran, 2007). For
this purpose, OR develops and applies appropriate algorithms. Murthy and
Rodin (1987) structured the topics associated with building an applicable
1The term Operational Research is a synonym for Operations Research and can be used
interchangeably. Furthermore, the author could not find significant differences between the
fields of Management Science and Operations Research with regard to research contents
and methodologies (compare Ravindran, 2007). Hence, the same argumentation provided
for OR also applies for the field of Management Science.
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mathematical model and emphasize two topics: different types of mathe-
matical formulations and the analysis of mathematical formulations. They
identify three different types of formulations:
∙ Nondynamic formulations (deterministic/probabilistic)
∙ Dynamic deterministic formulations
∙ Dynamic stochastic formulations
whereby the term dynamic indicates whether the formulation includes a
process, i.e. time interdependencies (Gellert et al., 1975). Furthermore,
stochastic formulations include the uncertainty of parameters within the
model, e.g., via probability distributions. The types of the mathematical
formulations result in different mathematical problems steaming from real
applications, e.g., from the electricity industry. Throughout this thesis,
a certain terminology for mathematical problems will be maintained that
bases upon the mathematical and OR terminology:
LP
Linear programs (LP) are optimization problems that aim to mini-
mize2 a linear function with n variables constrained by a set of linear
equalities and/or inequalities (Castillo et al., 2002).
Definiton 2.1 (Following Castillo et al., 2002) Let F be a map-
ping from Rn into R. The general form of a linear programming prob-
lem is to minimize
F (x) =
n∑
j=1
cjxj (2.1a)
subject to
A1x = b1 (2.1b)
A2x ≤ b2 (2.1c)
where A1, A2 are matrices of suitable size conformal with the vector x
and right-hand sides b1, b2. ■
2Note that each minimization problem can be converted into a maximization problem
by multiplication with -1. The same is true to convert a ‘≥’ into a ‘≤’ constraint. See
Castillo et al. (2002, chap. 13) for more conversions of this type.
CHAPTER 2. MODELING ELECTRICITY MARKETS 12
NLP
Nonlinear programs (NLP) are the general form of optimization prob-
lems that aim to minimize a mathematical function constrained by a
set of equalities and/or inequalities. For the problem to be nonlin-
ear, at least one of the functions involved in the formulation must be
nonlinear (Castillo et al., 2002).
Definiton 2.2 (Following Castillo et al., 2002) Let F be a map-
ping from Rn into R. The general form of a mathematical program-
ming problem is to minimize
F (x) (2.2a)
subject to
H(x) = 0 (2.2b)
G(x) ≤ 0 (2.2c)
where x is the vector of decision variables, F (x) is the objective func-
tion, H(x) are the equality constraints, and G(x) are the inequality
constraints. ■
MIP
Mixed-integer programs (MIP) can be linear or nonlinear optimiza-
tion problems including continuous and discrete (integer) variables.
However, mixed-integer nonlinear programs (MINLP) are normally
unfavorable in their numerical behavior and are, thus, often subject
to reformulations and simplifications. Hence, here the focus will be on
mixed-integer linear programs (MILP).
Definiton 2.3 (Following Castillo et al., 2002) Let F be a map-
ping from Rn into R. The general form of a mathematical mixed-
integer programming problem is to minimize
F (x) =
n∑
j=1
cjxj (2.3a)
subject to
A1x = b1 (2.3b)
A2x ≤ b2 (2.3c)
xj ∈ N; for at least one j = 1, ..., n (2.3d)
where N is the set of natural numbers {0, 1, 2, ...}. ■
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MCP
A mixed complementarity problem (MCP) is a special case of a com-
plementarity problem which in turn is a special case of a variational
inequality (VI).3
Definiton 2.4 (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, chap. 1) Let G and H
be two mappings from Rn1 ×Rn2+ into Rn1 and Rn2, respectively. The
MCP(G,H) is to find a pair of vectors (u, v) belonging to Rn1 ×Rn2
such that
G(u, v) = 0, u (free) (2.4a)
0 ≤ v ⊥ H(u, v) ≥ 0 (2.4b)
where the notation ⊥ in (2.4b) means ‘perpendicular’ which determines
the complementarity of the elements of the two vectors v and H(u, v):
0 ≤ v (2.5a)
H(u, v) ≥ 0 (2.5b)
viHi(u, v) = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n2. (2.5c)
■
KKT
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions are necessary
optimality conditions in mathematical programming. They are the
basis for the development of many computational solution algorithms
(Castillo et al., 2002).
Definiton 2.5 (Castillo et al., 2002, chap. 8) The vector x̄ ∈ Rn
satisfies the KKT conditions for the NLP (2.3) if there exists a pair
3The following definitions can be found in Facchinei and Pang (2003, chap. 1): Given
a subset K of the Euclidean n-dimensional space Rn and a mapping F : K → Rn, a VI
is to find a vector x ∈ K such that (y − x)TF (x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K. When K is a cone, a
complementarity problem is to find a vector x ∈ K satisfying the following conditions:
K ∋ x ⊥ F (x) ∈ K∗, where K∗ is the dual cone of K defined as: K∗ ≡ {d ∈ Rn : T d ≥
0, ∀ ∈ K}; that is, K∗ consists of all vectors that make a non-obtuse angle with every
vector in K.
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of vectors  ∈ Rn1 and  ∈ Rn2 such that
∇F (x̄) +
n2∑
k=1
k∇Hk(x̄) +
n1∑
j=1
j∇Gj(x̄) = 0 (2.6a)
Hk(x̄) = 0, ∀k (2.6b)
Gj(x̄) ≤ 0, ∀j (2.6c)
jGj(x̄) = 0, ∀j (2.6d)
j ≥ 0, ∀j (2.6e)
■
MPEC
A mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) is an
optimization problem with two different sets of variables where one set
of these variables is a solution to another mathematical problem. In
other words, a MPEC is an optimization problem that is constrained
by another mathematical problem. The actual optimization is called
the upper problem or upper level problem whereas the constraining
problem is called lower problem, lower level problem, or inner problem
(Luo et al., 1996). Specifically, a MPEC is an optimization problem
that is constrained by a VI. More formally:
Definiton 2.6 (Following Luo et al., 1996; Ehrenmann, 2004)
Let F be a mapping from Rn1 × Rn2 into R. The general form of a
MPEC is to minimize
F (x, y) (2.7a)
subject to
(x, y) ∈ Z (2.7b)
y ∈ S(x) (2.7c)
where F (x, y) is the objective function that depends on a vector of
design variables x and a vector of state variables y. Z is a nonempty
and closed set describing the feasible space of the upper level while S(x)
is the solution set of a VI (Q(x, ⋅), C(x)). Q is the equilibrium function
of the lower level and C is a set valued mapping that maps x onto a
non-empty closed convex subset of Rn2. ■
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The KKT system (2.6) has the same structure as a complementar-
ity problem laid out in (2.5). Hence, an optimization problem can
be expressed as a set of complementarity conditions (Hobbs and Hel-
man, 2004). Consequently, one can replace the VI constraints in the
MPEC by a complementarity problem which is a special case of a VI.
Ehrenmann (2004) refers to the resulting problem as a mathematical
program with complementarity constraints (MPCC). However, as this
is a special case of a MPEC, in this thesis the term MPCC is not used.
EPEC
Equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) can be un-
derstood as mathematical problems where more than one MPEC has
to be solved at the same time. Hence, the aim is to find an equilib-
rium point that solves several MPECs that share the same equilibrium
constraints. Refer for example to Ehrenmann (2004) for a deeper dis-
cussion.
The descriptions of different types of mathematical problems above are solely
definitions. However, in order to challenge real applications, one must also
analyze and solve these problems. Murthy and Rodin (1987) distinguished
that the analysis of the mathematical formulations can make use of three
different types of methods:
∙ Analytical methods
∙ Computational methods
∙ Simulation methods
whereby the required method is often already determined by the type of the
mathematical problem. Hence, not all methods can be applied to solve all
possible problem types. Particularly analytical methods require functions
that can be solved in closed form otherwise numerical methods have to be
applied (e.g., Castillo et al., 2002). These numerical methods split up into
computational and simulation methods. However, the notation is not al-
ways consistent. Neumann and Morlock (1993) defined simulation as the
imitation of the reality using computers. According to this definition a dif-
ferentiation between computational and simulation methods is fuzzy. This
definition describes the broader and rather common sense of the term simu-
lation which could also be described as producing numerical model results.
In contrast, Hillier and Lieberman (1986) provided a narrower definition of
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simulation. In their sense a simulation model describes the overall behavior
of a complex system in terms of the individual components of a system and
their interrelationships. One can conceive these components as a type of
black boxes (for the simulation itself) that receive certain inputs which are
transformed into certain outputs. The transformation processes can be de-
scribed by mathematical functions. Hence, simulation in the narrow sense
is to define interesting states of the system and simulate them in terms of
inputs and outputs which can be seen as a sampling of experimental results.
The latter is necessary if the entire system is too complex to compute or
enumerate all required solutions.4
Engineering
Christie et al. (2000) stated that still in the year 1988 basically all electricity
markets around the world were structured in the same way as regional mo-
nopolies: a centralized utility operated the entire power system (generation,
transmission, and distribution) within a fixed geographic area. According
to Stoft (2002), this monopolistic structures stemmed from the pioneering
days of electricity at the end of the 19th century and were at that time more
efficient than competition. During these 100 years of ‘efficient monopolies’,
Engineers have defined the agenda for modeling needs and topics in the
energy industry. The engineering disciplines involved in energy modeling
are mainly mechanical and electrical engineering whereas one can roughly
distinguish that mechanical engineers focus on generation aspects, and elec-
trical engineers focus on the transmission aspects. The entire chain from
electricity production to serving the final customer is subsumed under the
term power systems including mechanical and electrical engineering top-
ics (compare Bergen and Vittal, 2000; Machowski et al., 2008) as well as
economic considerations (Stoft, 2002). The engineering research objectives
include a wide range concerning the description, development and modeling
of apparatuses, machines and components required to maintain and operate
the power system based upon physical laws. Specific foci are (Bergen and
Vittal, 2000):
∙ Physical parameters of technical components
∙ Transmission-line modeling
∙ Transformer modeling
4Due to a huge variety, specific algorithms and applications shall not be discussed here.
They will be mentioned throughout the thesis where applicable.
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∙ Generator modeling
∙ Voltage control systems
∙ Network calculations and power flow analysis
∙ System stability and protection
As the electricity is in a constant state of flux - for several reasons such as
the permanent requirement to balance supply and demand as well as the
oscillating nature of alternating current (AC) - the modeling of a power sys-
tem is characterized by dynamic formulations. Thereby, Machowski et al.
(2008) distinguished different states of system operation. The steady state
describes the state of normal operation (at a constant frequency), the tran-
sient and the subtransient states describe oscillating processes with decreas-
ing amplitudes over time at high and very high frequencies that interfere
with the normal operation. Accordingly, one branch of engineering models
of power systems emphasizes the modeling of the effect of unforeseen events
on the steady state, and the technical management of these effects. For this
purpose, engineers must often make use of real-time models of the system
in order to maintain system stability. As these models include dynamic ele-
ments and trigonometric functions, engineering models for realistically large
applications can normally not be solved analytically. Therefore, engineers
and mathematicians have developed a variety of reduction and transforma-
tion techniques to simplify power system models (Machowski et al., 2008,
chap. 14) such that they can be solved by computation and simulation
methods (Machowski et al., 2008, chaps. 11-13). These modeling efforts
require a deep understanding of the technical and physical foundations of
electricity.
Economic aspects in this context were subsumed under the rather simple
idea of a cost minimization and cost reduction. One day ahead, a system
cost minimizing unit commitment (UC) was carried out by the central utility.
Unit commitment describes the process of predefining which generation units
will be connected to the grid in a certain point of time taking into account the
technical specifics of different plant types and forecasted load and network
situations (Wood and Wollenberg, 1996). After the UC had taken place,
the economic dispatch could then be defined assigning an optimal output
level to each plant that is online. Long-term cost reductions were primarily
expected to be achieved by technological progress leading to higher degrees of
efficiency. However, with the liberalization of electricity sectors around the
world, other economic aspects became increasingly important. One major
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change was the shift from a cost focus towards a price focus. Hence, the
cost-based UC of a single entity had to be replaced by a price-based UC of
several different companies which in turn raised new requirements regrading
system security and price forecasting (Shahidehpour et al., 2002).
Economics
As pointed out in the previous subsection, engineers had to understand the
concepts of economics and the meaning of price signals in the course of elec-
tricity market liberalization. Of course, the same is true for Economists that
had to include technical specifics into their models, too. Early economic en-
ergy models were initiated after the oil crises in the 1970s and focused on
the aspects of scarce resources and resource pricing within energy systems
(Bergman, 1988). These models were mainly policy models considering the
dependencies on certain energy sources. Amongst these models, Bergman
(1988) distinguished partial equilibrium and computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models. Partial equilibrium models focus on a single sector of an
economy whereas CGE models take into account the mutual interdependen-
cies of the single sector and the rest of the economy. This differentiation is
still valid for the time being. Hence, it should be stated that this thesis and
the here reviewed literature solely focuses on a partial equilibrium modeling
of the electricity sector which allows a more detailed modeling in terms of
the representation of the single components of the chosen sector.
Economists were the actual driver of the deregulation process starting in the
late 1980s in the United Kingdom (UK) by questioning whether the monopo-
listic structures were still efficient (Christie et al., 2000). Economists argued
that the power system had undergone some change and particularly improve-
ments in transmission had removed the natural monopoly character of the
wholesale electricity markets in many locations (Stoft, 2002). However, elec-
tricity networks largely still remained local natural monopolies. The ideal
deregulation was supposed to liberalize the competitive links of the value
chain and regulate the networks as monopolistic bottlenecks.5 Anyway, it
occurred that network aspects remain an essential ingredient of electricity
market models as will be shown in Section 2.2. As laid out earlier the
focus of the electricity companies shifted from cost-based to price-based ap-
proaches. Associated with this shift several mathematical models borrowed
5See Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) for an overview of the history and elements of the lib-
eralization process in the EU. In addition, Sioshansi (2006) reported policy conclusions of
different deregulation processes from a global perspective. The single steps of deregulation
based upon the corresponding theories of competition and regulation are not subject of
the work at hand.
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from finance, financial mathematics, and econometrics were introduced for
the purpose of modeling and forecasting of electricity prices. Burger et al.
(2007) distinguished these statistics oriented models from fundamental mar-
ket models. Fundamental market models use cost-based bid and offer curves
in order to calculate market equilibrium prices. For this purpose, fundamen-
tal market models require a sufficiently detailed modeling of each link of the
value chain (compare Section 3). In contrast to statistical models, the aim of
fundamental models is not necessarily the forecasting of prices but rather to
gain insights into fundamental price drivers and market mechanisms (Burger
et al., 2007).
Conclusions
Based on the explanations above, one can now range the work at hand into
the area of deterministic partial equilibrium oriented fundamental market
modeling approaches under technical constraints that interacts within the
described creative interdisciplinary tension context of applied economics,
engineering and operations research. However, one must be aware that
within this context, there is no clear line of demarcation. For example,
there are publications of operations researchers dealing with the same topics
and using the same methods as work carried out in economics literature.
Hence, the approach taken here is further referred to as economic engineering
modeling.
2.2 Modeling Liberalized Electricity Markets
Concerning the modeling of electricity market, there are some recurring
issues along which one can structure the relevant literature. Important
model assumptions to classify a model are: the network representation,
the type of competition, the assumed market architecture, short-term vs.
long-term considerations, deterministic vs. stochastic models. Figure 2.2
illustrates some of these interrelations.
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Figure 2.2: Fundamental features of electric power market equilibrium and
optimization models
Source: Own presentation.
2.2.1 Background
Although the need for a deregulation of electricity markets is nowadays
widely accepted, the controversies of the structure and required elements of
a functional liberalized market are still ongoing. According to Stoft (2002)
these controversies center on the following topics:
1. Bilateral vs. centralized market organization
2. Exchanges vs. pools
3. Zonal pricing vs. nodal pricing
The first point (bilateral vs. central markets) concerns the role of the system
operator (SO).6 Certain ancillary services must be provided in electricity
markets in order to maintain system reliability. A system operator must
ensure that these services are provided but the question is whether the SO
provides them itself or buys them on the market. The second point (ex-
changes vs. pools) focuses on the question which market player should be
6One can distinguish an independent system operator (ISO) and a Transco. The ISO
is a nonprofit system operator that operates but does not own the network (Stoft, 2002).
Hence, the ISO must only be regulated minimally as it does not have the incentive to
abuse its monopoly power. A Transco is a for-profit system operator that normally owns
the grid and is subject to extensive regulation (Stoft, 2002).
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responsible for the UC and dispatch. In an exchange-based system, each
of the players assigns the status of it’s plants based on the market clearing
results of the exchange. This may lead to inefficient results and a lack of
reliability (Stoft, 2002). Within a pool-based system, the market players
provide the SO with information about their available generation capacities
and costs. Based on this information, the SO conducts a centralized market
clearing. One weakness of this system is that it produces nontransparent
results (Stoft, 2002) which is similar to the situation prior to the liberaliza-
tion.
The third point concerns the efficient management of the existing grid in-
frastructure and is described as congestion management. Schweppe et al.
(1988) showed that efficient electricity prices differ by location and over time
due to the network’s physical characteristics and the different demand sit-
uations. Their seminal work defining nodal pricing or locational marginal
pricing (LMP) has since then become an essential ingredient. Based on
Hogan’s work (1992) on contract networks, LMP is used as a pricing tool
for several types of market studies.
LMP guarantees theoretically and practically the highest utilization of an
existing grid because both generation and transmission constraints are con-
sidered when calculating electricity prices. The price for energy at a node
represents the incremental cost incurring for delivering one more MWh of
energy to exactly this node. The energy price is, thus, a scarcity signal for
electricity at a specific node incorporating the marginal cost of generation,
the scarcity price of generation, the marginal cost of transmission losses,
and the scarcity price for transmission capacity.7 Thus, LMP prices nor-
mally vary from node to node. The largest LMP-based market worldwide is
currently PJM8 in the USA which manages more than 8000 different nodes.
In Europe, however, the introduction of efficient congestion management
is somewhat delayed; greater market integration requires coordination from
several sovereign countries that tend to emphasize national interests. Hence,
in Europe other concepts are still on the agenda that might be considered
outdated elsewhere. In general, the European markets finally move away
from non flow-based towards flow-based congestion management methods.9
7Some of these summands can become zero at a certain point in time. Hence, prices
are equal for each node in case of no congestion. In case of congested lines, transmitting
electricity becomes a scarce commodity. The price for this commodity produces an extra
charge on top of the energy price according to supply and demand at each node.
8Compare: http://www.pjm.com/.
9Not flow-based methods do not take into account physical power flows that result from
commercial power transactions. This can lead to a distorted utilization of the physically
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Boucher and Smeers (2002) analyzed the future organization of cross-border
trade in the European market and concluded that the economic principles
proposed by the European Commission in 2001 were not sufficient. Ehren-
mann and Smeers (2005) presented the following different approaches in the
European context. Within the market splitting approach, injections and
withdrawals of several nodes are represented by a single zone. For this zone,
there is only one energy price. Zones can be interpreted as sub-markets
that, ideally, form according to network congestion. In most cases, however,
zones are defined by political borders. Moreover, there are two alterna-
tive ways to merge nodes together as a zone. Within the first method, the
entire network is considered physically; including the lines within a zone.
The difference is that there is an additional constraint that forces the prices
for the nodes within a zone to be equal. Within the second method the
inner-zone network is neglected. The nodes of a zone are treated as if they
were located upon one big copper plate. Hence, congestion within a zone is
not regarded. Zones are linked by interconnections. Ehrenmann and Smeers
(2005) referred to the first alternative as the ideal market splitting, whereas,
the second one is a second-best approach. In addition, there is the market
coupling approach. This approach assumes that sub-markets already exist
and cannot be merged to one integrated market in a short- or medium-
term. Therefore, market coupling tries to interlink sub-markets as far as
possible. Both market splitting and market coupling can be referred to as
zonal pricing approaches.
Another important issue in designing and modeling competitive electricity
markets is the combination of short-run and long-run efficiencies. The basic
assumption in modeling short-run markets is that the locational investment
decisions have been made (Hogan, 2007). Hence, the efficient congestion
management is that customers pay and generators receive the short-run
marginal cost which have to be determined according to the time and loca-
tion dependent load and congestion situation within the network. However,
there is an ongoing debate whether marginal cost pricing leads to sufficient
investment incentives, too (e.g., Hogan, 2002; Joskow, 2008). Joskow and Ti-
role (2005) pointed out that transmission investment decisions are amongst
others influenced by the congestion management scheme. Hence, both issues
should not be considered independently.
In order to align the issues of transmission and generation investment with
efficient congestion management and due to the existence of a great variety
available capacity (Chao et al., 2000). In contrast, flow-based methods take into account
the physical flows that result from commercial transactions.
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of market designs both Hogan (2003) and Ma et al. (2003) described the de-
velopment towards a standard market design proposed and used in various
regions (e.g., already implemented in PJM). Market designs and electricity
market models drifted in into two independent directions: on the one hand
reliability-driven and on the other hand pricing-driven. After this partial
co-existence an optimal Standard Market Design (SMD) was proposed claim-
ing a coordinated spot market for energy and ancillary services. The SMD
framework included bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch im-
plementing LMP, and in particular the introduction of financial transmission
rights (Hogan, 2002). Joskow (2005) argued in a similar manner that pure
economic models have to be expanded to take the complexity of electrical
constraints accurately into account. Adding a European focus Pérez-Arriaga
and Olmos (2006) examined the compatibility of investment signals in trans-
mission and generation. They emphasized that agents should face the real
network cost incurred by their location decision and propose to apply beside
the nodal energy price a locational transmission tariff, which should serve
as long-term signal for network users. They provided criteria to how such a
nodal transmission tariff should be determined.
2.2.2 Perfect Competition Modeling
The concept of perfect competition is one of the fundamental concepts of
economics. A perfect competitive market is characterized by the fact that
market players are price takers which means that they cannot influence the
market price by individual decisions. Hence, price equals marginal cost
at the equilibrium point. In contrast to that in the case of market power,
players can charge mark-ups on top of marginal costs by individual decisions.
Perfect competition models can either focus on aggregated measures such as
social welfare or on individual objectives. In the latter case a player is price
taker but its decisions are in some way constrained, e.g., by uncertainty.
Smeers (1997) considered perfect competition models as the technically eas-
iest approach. He considered them useful in order to analyze markets. Per-
fect competition models can be used for an ex post appraisal of deviation
of real market results from the economic efficient point. Hence, they can
be used to assess market imperfections. According to Smeers (1997), these
imperfections in a European context often result from quantitative restric-
tions and market power. Quantitative restrictions limit the market result
by restricting arbitrage opportunities. They can be included in perfect com-
petition models by using an equilibrium formulation. The same is true for
including market power if the strategic mark-ups are defined as exogenous
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parameter which is of course a simplification particularly useful in ex post
considerations.
Modeling trends regarding perfect competitive congestion management are
manifold. In the U.S., LMP is an accepted concept to efficiently price elec-
tricity in a geographically distributed network. Hence, in the U.S. context
the focus is to sufficiently complete the mapping of the various technical
complexities of the industry, e.g., in terms of UC modeling and security
constraints. Sioshansi et al. (2008) focused on the different payoffs to indi-
vidual generators resulting from the fact that ISOs use different algorithms
to solve their large-scale UC models (MIP formulations). In detail, they
compared Lagrangian Relaxation and Branch & Bound algorithms. Fisher
et al. (2008) developed a cost minimization MIP for a 118-node network
in order to examine the effect of optimal transmission switching and found
that savings of 25% in system dispatch cost can be achieved. Hedman et al.
(2008) used the same approach and conducted a sensitivity analysis show-
ing that changing the topology to cut costs results in lower load payments
and higher generation rents for their test network. O’Neill et al. (2008)
moved away from the paradigm of economic engineering models using a DC
approximation of the AC flow and present a new market design including
admittance pricing.10
Particularly in Europe, however, there is an ongoing debate about which
pricing concept should be implemented. Hence, European models focus
on the analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the different proposals
applying stylized and larger-scale network models. Two studies of Smeers
(Smeers, 2003a,b) analytically examined the impact of incompleteness of re-
gional electricity market designs on market results using a VI formulation.
Smeers (2003a) first focused on the forward market and concluded that an
energy market without a market for transmission services is incomplete and
that nodal and flowgate models can complete the market. Smeers (2003b)
then turned to a two stage process where first the forward market is cleared
and then the real time (spot) trades take place. In this case nodal pricing
provided more efficient results than the flowgate approach. However, Smeers
(2003b) stated that the market is still financially incomplete for market play-
ers cannot fully trade the risks that they are subject to. Completing the
market by defining the right set of tradable financial transmission contracts
could make the nodal and flowgate approaches equivalent. Ehrenmann and
Smeers (2005) analyzed EU Regulation 1228/2003 using welfare maximiz-
ing NLP formulations applying a stylized six-node network and implemented
10The need for reactive prices was already advocated by Hogan (1993).
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examples for nodal pricing, market splitting, market coupling, and explicit
auctions concluding that European market integration is entirely possible,
but that making allowances for political reasons will result in economic in-
efficiencies.
Stigler and Todem (2005) provided one of the very few large-scale economic
engineering (cost minimizing) optimization model in the European context
including 165 nodes and 136 lines for Austria which is solved as a sequence
of a MIP and a NLP problem. The MIP formulation determined the UC
whereas the NLP model calculated nodal prices based on an economic dis-
patch including transmission losses. They used their calculation in order to
show that the construction of a planned 380 kV line contributes to overcome
congestion problems in terms of high price differences between South and
North Austria. The calculated annual costs of managing the congestion were
higher than the expected annual costs for the extension project. Another
application of congestion management on a realistic data set is the work
of Green (2007) who calculated nodal prices for a stylized medium-scale
13-node network of England and Wales using a NLP formulation. Green
(2007) showed that nodal prices increase social welfare and is less vulner-
able to market power than uniform and a type of zonal pricing. Leuthold
et al. (2008a) confirmed the result that nodal pricing is more efficient than
uniform pricing for a large-scale NLP model of the German and BeNeLux
electricity market using a parent of the ELMOD model presented in Chap-
ter 3. It seems noteworthy to state that all of the mentioned models used
some form of the DC load flow model (DCLF) for calculating the optimal
power flow (OPF) as introduced to the economic engineering literature by
Schweppe et al. (1988).11
A major focus of investment models is the aspect of risk and uncertainty and
ways to hedge those. Concerning efficient transmission expansion analytical
models prevail for the time being. A major research debate is about who
should carry out the investment: a regulated entity (centralized transmission
planning, or CTP), or the market (merchant transmission investment, or
MTI). The objective of a standard CTP approach is to maximize (expected)
social welfare, whereas under MTI the investor should be incentivized by
positive return on investment (ROI). Also, the investor should participate
in the effect that the investment has in the light of network externalities,
thus, the question how to deal with the risk that comes with a transmission
investment for both the new investor and the existing transmission owner
11A description of the DCLF and its adequacy for economic engineering modeling can
be found in Section 3.2.3.
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is still unanswered. Bushnell and Stoft (1996b) distinguished contracts for
differences (CFD) to hedge temporal price risks and transmission congestion
contracts (TCC) that pay the owner the locational price difference between
the two nodes specified in the contract. Bushnell and Stoft based their
analysis on a contract network regime as proposed by Hogan (1992) using a
three-node network and showed analytically that in this case TCCs provided
the correct incentives for network investments.
Chao and Peck (1996) used the nodal pricing methodology for a three-node
network and designed tradable transmission capacity rights that are able to
combine a competitive market for transmission services and a competitive
spot market for electricity. They suggested a trading rule for these trans-
mission capacity rights that combine a Coasian property right approach
to transmission congestion and the Pigouvian principle to account for net-
work externalities. Numerical modeling efforts in the field of transmission
expansion look at an investor’s risk associated with a MTI decision under
uncertainty using simulation models and (stochastic) dynamic programming
(e.g., Saphores et al., 2004; Salazar et al., 2007).
Taking a look at generation investment models, one can state that they are
also mainly concerned with the uncertainty aspect of the investment from an
investor’s point of view. Several optimization and simulation models have
been applied to model these stochastic aspects focusing amongst others on
real options (e.g., Wickart and Madlener, 2007; Roques, 2008; Kumbaroglu
et al., 2008; Auerswald and Leuthold, 2009) and mean variance portfolio
(e.g., Roques et al., 2008) approaches. Pokharel and Ponnambalam (1997)
develop a straightforward cost minimization model in order to analyze the
planning for power plant expansion under deterministic and stochastic de-
mand. They find that under the assumption of a deterministic demand, the
installed capacity would be higher than if stochasticity in demand is taken
into account. In contrast, Smeers (2006) is concerned with the discrete na-
ture of generation location decisions and suggests a multi-part tariff in the
context of the regional market within Europe. He developed a model in-
corporating a separation of short- and long-term prices which is analyzed
analytically. As these prices were discriminatory, he concluded that the
three criteria economic efficiency, cost reflectiveness and non-discrimination
cannot be achieved at the same time and some trade-off has to be made.
Accordingly, there is some literature on generation investment that includes
the transmission aspect of electrical networks. Bushnell and Stoft (1996a)
stated that efficient TCCs support generation investments. Rious et al.
(2008) analyzed the impact of a two-part tariff in order to manage electric-
ity networks efficiently in a short- and in the long-run perspective using an
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agent-based (simulation) model. They find that a joint implementation of
nodal pricing and the average participation tariff is the best combination to
coordinate the generation and transmission investments as efficiently as pos-
sible. However, the optimal set of generation and transmission investments
may not be carried out because of transmission lumpiness.
2.2.3 Imperfect Competition Modeling
Ventosa et al. (2005) provided a detailed overview of electricity market mod-
eling tendencies. They defined three trends: optimization models, equilib-
rium models and simulation models. Optimization models can either apply
a profit maximization of a single firm or a welfare maximization approach
under perfect competition (compare Section 2.2.2). Ventosa et al. (2005) dis-
tinguished two types of models for a single-firm optimization problem: either
the price is an exogenous parameter (perfect competition) or determined via
a function of the demand supplied by the firm (imperfect competition). The
partial equilibrium electricity market modeling literature has emerged to
emphasize the latter type of modeling as market power is a serious concern
in most electric power markets (Smeers, 1997).
One approach to research how individuals or groups of people interact in-
troduces game theory to electricity sector modeling (compare Shahidehpour
et al., 2002). The term strategic behavior or strategic interaction (Hogan,
1997) describes the fact that one or many market incumbent(s) do not act as
price taker(s). Hence, these players are able to influence the market equilib-
rium by their decisions. Strategic interaction in the present context is mostly
modeled as noncooperative game which means that each firm behaves in its
own self-interest (compare Tirole, 1988). According to Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), the basic solution concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium
which is the equilibrium point from which a firm cannot deviate without
being worse off given that the decisions of all other firms are fixed. Smeers
(1997) distinguished the Cournot and the Bertrand paradigms. In a Cournot
competition firms compete via quantity decisions. In a Bertrand competi-
tion the price is the strategic information. The latter concept was used at
times arguing that electricity cannot be stored which leads to short-term
price competition (Hobbs, 1986). However, strategic behavior in electricity
markets is often understood as Cournot competition with few oligopolistic
firms (Willems et al., 2009). Another type of strategic interaction is the as-
sumption of Stackelberg games. A Stackelberg game is a two-stage game12
12The term bilevel game can be alternatively used to describe two-stage games.
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where at the first stage output decisions are made by a leader (or a group of
leaders) which in turn are taken as fixed for the decision on the second stage
(Day et al., 2002; Metzler et al., 2003). The described types of games allow
for a large variety of different game theoretic models that are often referred
to as equilibrium problems as they can not be solved as mathematical pro-
grams in contrast to most perfect competition models (compare Day et al.,
2002, and Section 2.1.2).
As in Section 2.2.2, one can start to focus on short-run markets where in-
vestment decisions have been made already. In a classical arbitrage-free
Cournot game for a LMP-based market, generation firms behave as strate-
gic (oligopolistic) players each assuming that the generation decision of the
rivals is fixed (Metzler et al., 2003). Thereby, the SO is assumed to act as
disinterested efficient entity that does not interfere with the game (Hobbs
and Helman, 2004). These models can be formulated and solved as MCPs
(Hobbs, 2001; Hobbs and Helman, 2004) in order find a Nash-Cournot equi-
librium. Hobbs (2001) complemented such a Cournot game by arbitrage
- for an exemplary three-node network - where generators recognized that
arbitragers use price differences for trades where they exceed the cost of
transmission. Hobbs (2001) found that in the presence of arbitrage, Cournot
competition in a bilateral market leads to the same equilibrium as Cournot
competition among generators in a pool system.
The pure Cournot assumption can be adjusted in some ways. Day et al.
(2002) presented the approach of a conjectured supply function. The under-
lying assumption is there that the generators do not take the competitors’
decisions as fixed but conjecture their reaction to an own output decision.
Day et al. (2002) solved a conjectured supply function model for a 13-node
network model as MCP. However, one drawback of this method is that ap-
propriate parameters for the conjectures are not observable. Furthermore,
the assumption that a generator acts strategically with regard to the output
decision of its competitors but acts as price-taker with respect to transmis-
sion prices seems to be unrealistic. Taking into account that the generators
are able to game over the transmission prices, too, leads to a Stackelberg
type of competition with the strategic players as leaders and the SO as
follower. This results in a MPEC problem for each strategic player with
the players’ objective in the upper level and the ISO problem in the lower
level (Hobbs et al., 2000). Hence, if there are more than only one strategic
player, the entire problem becomes an EPEC (Daxhelet and Smeers, 2001;
Hobbs and Helman, 2004) which is inherently nonconvex and difficult to
solve (Neuhoff et al., 2005). (Hobbs et al., 2000) solved such an EPEC (on
a 30-node network) using a Penalty Interior Point Algorithm (PIPA) for the
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single MPECs and a diagonalization algorithm for the multi-firm problem.
However, there are some problems associated with the PIPA which are dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. In addition, Hu and Ralph (2007) promisingly solved
an EPEC for a 39-node network with a similar setting by transforming the
single MPECs into NLPs from which they determined the KKT conditions
and, thus, replace an EPEC by a complementarity problem.
Another example for the extension of the classical Cournot that can lead to
a Stackelberg problem structure is if the strategic suppliers anticipate the
trades of arbitragers due to the strategic output decisions (Metzler et al.,
2003). Moreover, Daxhelet and Smeers (2007) applied a two-stage approach
to the question of cross-border trade of electricity in Europe. In contrast
to the models described above, they assume that the regulators are on the
upper-level and the energy market game is on the lower-level. In case the
regulators cooperate this leads to a MPEC formulation. In case they do not,
it becomes an EPEC. In order to solve the latter Daxhelet and Smeers (2007)
also used a diagonalization approach where the MPECs of a single regulator
is solved separately, holding the decision variables of all other players fixed;
then solve and conduct the same for each other player until the sequence
converges. The MPECs are solved by rewriting them as NLPs.
Other types of equilibrium models that attempt to solve similar problems as
described above are Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) models. Due to the
fact of having few oligopolistic players and short-term demand elasticities,
Cournot mark-ups on marginal costs can become very high (Willems et al.,
2009). Thus, within the SFE approaches generators compete by bidding
complete supply functions instead of one single quantity as in the case of
Cournot which is supposed to provide a more realistic view on real mar-
ket results (Green and Newbery, 1992). Demand uncertainty is a crucial
element of this assumption. However, the results of Willems et al. (2009)
indicated that Cournot and SFE models can be calibrated in order to pro-
duce the same results. Other types of models shall also only be mentioned
in the following. There is a significant and growing number of simulation
models using agent-based modeling (Metzler et al., 2003). Weidlich and
Veit (2008) conducted an extensive survey on these types of models. Agent-
based computational economics focuses on the simulation of individual and
collective behavior under the assumption of learning. These models simulate
marketers’ behavior in an iterative process. From iteration to iteration the
agents learn how to improve their objective. One example for these simu-
lation types are generic algorithms. Agent-based models can be classified
according to the learning function of their agents (Weidlich and Veit, 2008).
Concerning transmission investment decisions and imperfect competition,
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Joskow and Tirole (2000) focused on the concept of transmission capac-
ity withholding. They distinguished two types of tradable rights: financial
transmission rights (FTRs)13 and physical transmission rights. FTRs are
financial instruments that entitle or oblige the holder to receive or make
payments in case of congestion. Physical rights give the holder the right
to transmit electricity even in congestion scenarios. The two authors found
analytically that in instances of loop flow effects for a three-node network
physical rights can be withheld and thus are likely to be misused in order to
exert market power. Thus, they favored FTRs where physical withholding
is not possible.14 Borenstein et al. (2000) also focused on the interaction
between imperfect markets and transmission capacity. Based on an ana-
lytical analysis and a numerical example, they concluded that transmission
constraints are a major driver of market problems.
Léautier (2001) analytically confirmed these result on a three-node network
looking at strategic behavior of generators. Brunekreeft and Newbery (2006)
focused on the welfare effects of a must-offer provision of physical line capac-
ity in the case of MTI. They exploited their model analytically concluding
that the regulatory instrument of a must-offer provision, has positive short-
term welfare effects but may lead to underinvestment in network assets.
They did not recommend to apply must-offer provisions. Among the CTP
approaches, Vogelsang (2001) analyzed transmission cost and demand func-
tions assuming rather general properties assuming that an ISO intends to
maximize its individual profit. He adopted regulatory adjustment processes
based on a two-part tariff cap for transmission. Hogan et al. (2007) and
Rosellón and Weigt (2008) extended this two-part tariff approach account-
ing for loop-flow properties of an electricity network by building and solving
a small-scale MPEC.
In addition, Sauma and Oren (2006) analyzed analytically and computation-
ally a three-period proactive network planning (PNP) model and compared
it to a combined generation-transmission operation and investment plan-
ning as well as to a transmission-only planning model. They concluded that
PNP can correct some of the shortcomings of transmission-only planning
and claimed that it is a valuable economic assessment methodology. They
were able to construct and solve a 30-node MPEC. The expected social
13According to Joskow and Tirole (2005), the terms TCC and FTR are interchangeable.
14Baldick (2007) picked up the issue of financial transmission rights and argued that
border flow rights (BFRs) make FTRs dispensable. He stated that BFRs resolve the
property-rights issues for existing and new transmission capacity arising from new invest-
ments. However, in the paper it remained unclear whether this ia a general result or only
true for the case of perfect competition.
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gains by the PNP methodology should be distributed to all market players
through side payments (Sauma and Oren, 2007). Taking - again a brief -
look at generation-only investments under imperfect competition, one can
state there are only few models combining generation investment and net-
work congestion. Murphy and Smeers (2005) provided a valuable overview of
this generation investment literature not taking into account transmission
congestion and focused on the effects of imperfectly competitive markets
on generation investment decisions. They extensively analyzed analytically
different types of Cournot models and found that the complexity of the
investment decision process increases along with the complexity of the elec-
tricity market structure. Zoettl (2008) models optimal investment decisions
of strategic firms in a liberalized electricity market. He concluded using ana-
lytical and numerical methods that under imperfect competition firms have
strong incentives to invest into capacities with low marginal costs taking
into account the effect of the generation expansion on the output decision
of the competitor. At the same time, the total capacities are chosen too low
from a welfare point of view.
2.3 Conclusions
Modeling electricity markets is a melting pot of researcher from different
disciplines that all bring their own methods and skills. Concerning the
modeling under the assumption of perfect competition, there is need for
large-scale economic engineering models that include the entire potentially
integrated European market in order to contribute to the ongoing discus-
sions on congestion management and investments. Concerning the modeling
under the assumption of imperfect electric power markets, there is room and
need for new algorithms that contribute to overcome numerical difficulties
in solving medium- and larger-scale strategic models. This thesis takes on
some of the challenges described above by firstly developing a large-scale
economic engineering network model of the EU named ELMOD (Part II)
and secondly carrying out algorithmic work in order to solve a discretely
constrained MPEC representing a Stackelberg game in an electric power
market including transmission constraints (Part III).
Part II
Large-Scale Perfect
Competitive Economic
Engineering Modeling
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Chapter 3
ELMOD - A Model of the
European Electricity Market
3.1 Introduction
Taking a closer look at large-scale modeling as valuable research topic iden-
tified in Part I, the need to develop a model that is capable to represent
the European electricity market becomes obvious. Therefore, in the course
of this thesis, a structured procedure was elaborated in order to establish a
well working model that produces meaningful scientific results while taking
into account that particularly simulations of short-term (i.e. spot) market
equilibria in electricity have to consider technical specifics due to the nature
of the electricity industry (Stoft, 2002). First of all, an economic (i.e. mar-
ket) model had to be defined that allowed to analyze the identified research
objectives. The underlying economic model defined which economic data
were actually needed. Then, the representation of the technical specifics
had to be included which normally constrain the economic model in some
way. The technical constraints defined the required technical data. Third,
the degree of detail had to be defined. On the one hand, the degree of ag-
gregation of data was supposed to be detailed enough to be able to produce
meaningful results for a defined research objective. On the other hand, the
technical effort to solve the complete model normally decreases with the
degree of aggregation which is an incentive to keep the model as small as
possible. This chapter describes the scientific work carried out with the goal
to develop the large-scale economic engineering model ELMOD (European
Electricity Market Model) which was initiated by the author of this thesis.
As mentioned earlier this chapter summarizes the current structure of
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ELMOD and provides an in-depth description of model assumptions and
specifics. Section 3.2 starts with the technical and economic details of
ELMOD. Section 3.3 presents the used data and sources as well as the
underlying assumptions. In Section 3.4 an overview about existing research
results is given including congestion management issues and generation ca-
pacity extension. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter and sketches out possible
topics for further developments.
In addition, it must be stated that large-scale models are subject to per-
manent adjustments and refinements until they are fully applicable. In the
course of this process, several different studies were carried out and helped
to improve the functioning of ELMOD (Figure 3.1). First modeling steps
were reported by Leuthold et al. (2005) for the German electricity market.
Weigt et al. (2006) continued this work and extended the model by including
France, Benelux, Western Denmark, Austria and Switzerland. Weigt (2006)
broadened the scope to a time-frame of 24 hours to simulate variable demand
and wind input as well as unit commitment, start-up and pumped storage
issues. The model was subsequently extended to cover the entire European
UCTE electricity markets (essentially Central and Western Europe).1
3.2 Model Description
In its basic formulation, ELMOD can be classified as a non-linear opti-
mization model maximizing social welfare under the assumption of perfect
competition taking into account technical constraints. It is solved in GAMS.
ELMOD is based conceptually on the work of Schweppe et al. (1988) and
Stigler and Todem (2005). Subsequently, first the objective function and
the constraints are explained in more detail. Then the DCLF and further
modeling specifics such as the representation of demand, time constraints,
and unit commitment are elaborated.
1The subsequent chapter relies on the working paper Leuthold et al. (2008b).
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Figure 3.1: ELMOD representation of the European high voltage grid
Source: Own presentation.
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3.2.1 Mathematical Notation
Indices:
l ∈ L line within the network
n, j, k ∈ N nodes within the network
s ∈ S power plant unit
t,  ∈ T time periods
Sets:
L set of all lines
N set of all nodes
S set of all power plants
T set of all time periods
Parameters:
Bjk series susceptance between two adjacent nodes j and k
gns available maximum generation level of plant s at node n
g
ns
required minimum generation level of plant s at node n
Gjk series conductance between two adjacent nodes j and k
ℎ height above ground
psn maximum working capacity of a PSP at node n
P l maximum available power flow capacity over line l
Rjk series resistance between two adjacent nodes j and k
∣Unt∣ absolute value of the complex voltage vector
at node n in time period t
wint wind input at node n in time period t
(ℎ) wind speed depending on the hight above ground ℎ
#s minimum online duration of plant type s
#s minimum offline duration of plant type s
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Variables:
cnst(gnst) generation cost of plant s at node n in time period t
as a function of gnst
gnst generation of plant s at node n in time period t
Ljkt transmission losses between two adjacent nodes j and k
in time period t
nint net grid input at node n in time period t
onnst binary variable describing status of plant s at node n
in time period t
pnt(qnt) linear inverse demand function at node n in time period t
pslevelnt filling level of a PSP at node n in time period t
P̃jkt power flow between two adjacent nodes j and k
in time period t
Plt power flow over line l in time period t←−psnt energy produced by a PSP at node n in time period t−→psnt energy demanded to fill a PSP at node n in time period t
qnt demand quantity at node n in time period t
Θjkt phase angle difference between two adjacent
nodes j and k in time period t
3.2.2 Optimization Problem
ELMOD uses a welfare maximizing approach taking into account line flow,
energy balance and generation constraints. Welfare is obtained using a lin-
ear demand and a supply function and is calculated subtracting the cost of
generation from the area below the demand function (Figure 3.2 and Equa-
tion (3.1)). At each node reference demand, reference price and elasticity
(see Section 3.3.3) are estimated in order to identify demand via a linear
demand function. Generation cost are determined by an individual cost
function for each node. The actual generation costs depend on external pa-
rameters such as the fuel price or different efficiency levels of plants which
in turn are determined by the age or construction type of the power plant,
the actual level of output and others.
In order to include technical network limits, a line flow constraint, an energy
balance, and a generation constraint are integrated into the model. Through
the line flow constraint (Equation (3.2)), a maximum amount of power Plt
transported on line l during period t is determined, constrained by the ther-
mal limit of each line P l given a 20% reliability margin. The reliability
margin indicates that a line can only be loaded up to 80% of the thermal
line capacity thus implementing the so-called (N-1)-criterion in a simpli-
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Figure 3.2: Welfare in an electricity market
Source: Own presentation based on Todem (2004).
fied manner. The energy balance (Equation (3.3)) states that at a node n
the difference between total generation and demand has to be balanced by
injections into or withdrawals from the grid, respectively, adjusted by the
amount of incurring losses. Generation consist of the sum of fossil generation∑
s(gnst) and wind input wint. Pumped storage plant generation is added if
the pumped storage plant generates electricity ←−psnt. If the pumped storage
needs to be filled with water this required electricity −→psnt is subtracted (see
also Section 3.2.5). Generation equals all withdrawals made up of demand
qnt and net input nint defining whether a node injects or withdraws energy
from the grid. The generation constraint in Equation (3.4) assures on the
one hand that a power plant s will be turned off if generation is below a
minimum generation g
ns
necessary to obtain workable technical conditions
and on the other hand that it does not exceed its maximum capacity gns.
Each of the constraints must hold for each hour t. Welfare is derived over
all hours:
max
gnst,qnt
⎧⎨⎩W = ∑
n,t
⎛⎝ qnt∫
0
pnt(qnt) dqnt −
∑
s
gnstcnst(gnst)
⎞⎠⎫⎬⎭ (3.1)
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subject to
∣Plt∣ ≤ P l ∀ l, t (3.2)∑
s
gnst + wint +
←−psnt −−→psnt − qnt − nint = 0 ∀n, t (3.3)
onnstgns ≤ gnst ≤ onnstgns ∀n, s, t (3.4)
cnst ≥ 0 ∀n, s, t (3.5)
gnst ≥ 0 ∀n, s, t (3.6)
←−psnt ≥ 0 ∀n, t (3.7)
←−psnt ≥ 0 ∀n, t (3.8)
qnt ≥ 0 ∀n, t (3.9)
onnst ∈ [0, 1] ∀n, s, t (3.10)
3.2.3 DC Load Flow Model
Schweppe et al. (1988) showed that the DCLF can be used for an economic
analysis of electricity networks. They apply it to their nodal price approach
for electricity pricing. Overbye et al. (2004) come to the conclusion that the
DCLF is adequate for modeling nodal prices even though there are some
buses with a certain price deviation. The latter occurs particularly on lines
with high reactive power and low real power flows. Stigler and Todem (2005)
describe the way from the physical fundamentals to the DCLF equations.
Equation (3.11) of the so-called ‘decoupled’ AC model builds the foundation
of all further assumptions and calculations. Power flow2 P̃jkt depends on the
conductance Gjk, the susceptance Bjk, and the voltage angle difference Θjkt
between nodes j and k as well as on the voltage magnitudes ∣U jt∣ and ∣Ukt∣:
P̃jkt = Gjk ∣U jt∣2 −Gjk ∣U jt∣ ∣Ukt∣ cos Θjkt +Bjk ∣U jt∣ ∣Ukt∣ sin Θjkt
(3.11)
Schweppe et al. (1988) assume that the voltage angle difference Θjkt is very
small and that the voltage magnitudes ∣U ∣ can be standardized to per unit
2The power flow Plt on a line l can be derived from the power flow P̃jkt between two
nodes j and k using a mapping, e.g. a network incidence matrix, stating which lines l
connect nodes j and k. For a more detailed description see Schweppe et al. (1988).
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calculations.3 ∣U jt∣ and ∣Ukt∣ are thus assumed to be equally 1 at each node
n during all time periods t. Using the first order terms of the Taylor series
approximation the following simplification can be made:
cos Θjkt ≈ 1 (3.12)
sin Θjkt ≈ Θjkt (3.13)
Equation (3.11) can then be simplified to become:
P̃jkt = BjkΘjkt (3.14)
Line losses have not been considered, yet. However, in real networks the
sum of total generation does not equal the sum of total demand due to
transmission losses. Thus, transmission lines are stressed by demand plus
losses. In order to approximate the losses on a line, Equation (3.12) must be
complemented by the second order term of the Taylor series approximation:
cos Θjkt = 1−
(Θjkt)
2
2
(3.15)
Then, after some further assumptions and conversions following Stigler and
Todem (2005) transmission losses can be calculated via the power flow P̃jkt
and the line series resistance Rjk:
Ljkt = Rjk(P̃jkt)
2 (3.16)
3If the model includes more than one voltage level as it is the case within ELMOD, the
standardization works by choosing a reference voltage level and then convert all other line
parameters by a conversion factor. For example, the factor to express 220 kV parameters
in 380 kV terms would be approximately 0.58. Hence, resistances and reactances of the
220 kV lines would have been divided by this factor. However, as the maximum power
capacity has to be converted, too, one could also define a reference power flow level, relate
a line’s power capacity to this predefined level, and convert all parameters accordingly. In
any case, regarding the conversion factors, one has to be aware that the power capacity is
a quadratic function of the voltage magnitude.
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3.2.4 Time Constraints, Unit Commitment, and Optimal Dis-
patch
In order to model electricity markets various idiosyncracies have to be con-
sidered. Electricity cannot be stored at a large-scale. Therefore demand
and generation always have to equal each other. Demand is not constant
over time, but varies in the course of the day, the week and the season. In
Europe, demand is higher in winter than in summer mainly influenced by
the weather. On workdays more electricity is consumed than on weekends
because of a decrease of industrial demand and changed household behavior.
To incorporate those characteristics ELMOD is capable to model a 24 hours
time-frame.
To respond to the varying demand pattern over a day, power plants are
divided into three types according to their load type: base load plants supply
the grid with a constant output covering thus the base load which is always
demanded. Medium load plants provide the increasing electricity demand
during the day and are switched on in the morning hours and shut down
during the night. Peak load plants are crucial to satisfy various demand
peaks during the day. Peak load plants can be turned on within a short
time frame.
Unit commitment describes the decision process on whether and when a
power plant is running in order to contribute to the satisfaction of demand.
Unit commitment identifies those plants available for the following dispatch
process in which the output of each plant is determined exante according to
the actual electricity demand, technical needs and the plants cost function.
As plants need time to be launched ranging from some minutes for small gas
turbines up to several days for large nuclear plants, timing is essential for
obtaining a cost minimal dispatch as well as maintaining system stability.
ELMOD solves unit commitment within the social welfare optimization pro-
cess. The optimal output for each plant is determined taking into account
the minimal output level to be reached to put a plant online and a certain
time for starting up the plant. This introduces a binary variable onnst to
the calculation process to determine whether a plant is online or offline.
Following Takriti et al. (1998), a minimum online and offline constraint can
then be defined:
onnst − onns(t−1) ≤ onns ,  = t+ 1, ...,min{t+ #s, T} (3.17)
onns(t−1) − onnst ≤ 1− onns ,  = t+ 1, ...,min{t+ #s, T} (3.18)
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Equations (3.17) and (3.18) link the hours of the day in order to include
online and offline constraints for power plants, respectively. Since the time
increment in ELMOD is one hour, it is reasonable to only include the offline
constraint (Equation (3.18)). Hence, it is assumed that each plant can be
shut down after the end of each hour. Once a plant was shut down, it cannot
be turned on again immediately depending on the plant type. Therefore,
conditions are introduced to keep plants switched off for a certain time
interval #s. Further, in order to reduce the calculation effort, each plant is
assigned to one group out of three possible groups following Voorspools and
D’haeseleer (2003): the must-run units, the peak units and the test group
for which the unit commitment process is crucial. Within the 24 hour model,
base load plants such as nuclear and lignite plants are constantly producing
at least their minimum required output which basically means that they are
by definition online over all time periods. Hydro plants and gas turbines are
supposed to be able to go online within one hour. Hence Equation (3.18) is
not binding for them. For the remaining plant types (hard coal plants, oil
and gas steam plants, and combined cycle gas turbine plants) the start-up
decisions are made endogenously during the optimization.
Start-up can be distinguished in cold, warm and hot start-up, according to
the time since the last shut down. If a plant has recently gone offline, it can
be started much faster than a ‘cold’ plant. This is due to the remaining heat
level in the plant, while a ‘cold’ plant has to entirely build up the necessary
starting heat.
For the time being, the maximum considered time period within the model
is one day (24 hours). Therefore the necessary information to decide on
the right kind of start-up may not be available. Also, the calculation effort
increases as logic operations have to be considered. Thus for those plants
where Equation (3.18) applies, the start-up is supposed to be a warm start-
up. For gas plants, all start-ups are supposed to be cold start-ups.4 The
start-up times #s are based on Schröter (2004). Taking these constraints
into account, the model calculates the status and the output for each plant
in each hour.
3.2.5 Modeling Pumped Storage and Wind Energy Plants
Pumped storage hydro plants (PSP) as well as wind energy plants cannot
be modeled as normal thermal plants. In the case of PSPs it has to be
considered that energy can either be injected to or withdrawn from the
4This is irrelevant for the time constraint but important for the cost estimation.
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grid. The peculiarity of wind energy is its priority in feed-in. Subsequently,
the implementation of these production types in ELMOD is explained in
further detail.
Regarding PSPs, it is important to state that PSPs constitute the only way
to store larger amounts of electrical energy. These plants can run either in
pumping mode, filling a storage basin by using electricity, or in generation
mode, using the stored water like a classical hydro plant. The electrical
energy is thus actually stored in form of potential energy within the water.
These PSP facilities are crucial for system stability, as they can start-up
rapidly and therefore cancel out fluctuations. In general they pump water
during night time and weekends and start producing electricity generation
during the peak periods. Within the model, PSPs can either demand elec-
tricity −→psnt and fill their storage or use the stored energy and generate elec-
tricity ←−psnt. In the model, PSPs start with an empty storage at 8pm. An
overall degree of efficiency is implemented in Equation (3.19) by only adding
75% of that energy −→psnt to the storage pslevelnt that is actually withdrawn
from the network. In return, the model treats pump storage production as
lossless. Consequently, pump storage plants are assumed to have an overall
degree of efficiency of 75% for pumping and generating, together5:
pslevelnt = 0.75
−→psnt −←−psnt + psleveln(t−1) (3.19)
−→psnt +←−psnt ≤ psn (3.20)
←−psnt ≤ psleveln(t−1) (3.21)
Equations (3.20) and (3.21) define the capacity constraints of the storages.
The pumped or generated amount is limited by the plant’s working capacity
psn. Moreover, the storage level psleveln(t−1) of a PSP facility at the end of
a previous period t− 1 defines the upper bound for the available generation
from that facility ←−psnt for the current period t.6
5According to Müller (2001), modern PSPs have an average efficiency between 70%
and 80%.
6Since only one day is simulated, the storage behavior may not be properly modeled,
as the storage process largely takes place at weekend nights. Also, the hourly interval
may result in a biased representation of PSPs, as one of their main tasks is to react in
case of rapidly changing conditions. Since these short time situations are not modeled for
the time being, their importance may be underestimated in the model output. However,
these shortcomings can be included within the model framework easily by extending the
time-frame beyond 24 hours.
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Turning towards wind energy it should be mentioned that wind has become a
major part of renewable energy produced in the German generation mix with
20.6 GW installed capacity by the end of 2006 (DEWI, 2007). Also on the
European level, wind energy is the fastest growing renewable energy source
with 48 GW installed in 2006 (EWEA, 2007). Due to the dependence of wind
turbines upon wind speed, there is no active control of energy output like in
a fossil plant. Only by setting a turbine offline, a minimal active control can
be achieved. Because of the feed-in guarantees provided by the Renewable
Energy Act in Germany, wind energy has to be accepted as priority energy
source by the TSO and is thus a fixed exogenous parameter for the model.
Wind speeds change over time according to meteorological conditions and
so does the energy input from wind turbines. In times of high generation by
wind turbines, fossil plants must reduce output, while in times of low wind
input fossil plants have to compensate the shortfall. A consequence could
be additional line flows within the transmission grid, particularly in times
of high wind input and low demand.
Wind forecasts play a major role in determining the wind input and there-
fore the plant schedule for the next hours or day. The differences between
forecasted wind input and realized input have to be compensated in order
to maintain system stability. The operating reserve that must be provided
is not considered in the model. While fossil plants are running in constant
mode at an optimal load level whenever possible, wind turbines often run in
partial load mode and can change output within hours up to 100%. These
changes cause an increased need of backup plants to be able to start-up or
reduce output according to the wind input. Within the model, the wind in-
put is calculated for each hour and node and given as an external parameter
included in the energy balance (see Equation (3.2)).
This constraint can become critical if the grid is not capable of transporting
all wind energy. Then the only way to fulfill the energy balance constraint
is the increase of local demand even if prices become negative. For the time
being, in reality other measures are taken in order to avoid such situations.
Possibilities in order to manage such extreme cases are the shut-down of
certain wind parks and other technical measures. Such short-term measures
are not included in ELMOD.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Network
The underlying network is based on the European high voltage grid (UCTE,
2004; VGE, 2005). Substations, line voltage level and line length were up-
loaded into a digital map, making it possible to add and remove additional
lines and nodes. An underestimation of line length can occur, since alti-
tude differences have not been considered. Since no data about the system
state is publicly available, all lines connected to a node are assumed to be
connected with one another. Also, no information about the transformation
capacities of the substations is available. Security constraints are considered
by a 20% transmission reliability margin. Thus, no line within the modeled
grid will be stressed with more than 80% of their thermal capacity limit.
Germany
The most detailed region mapped in the model is Germany with 365 nodes:
336 regular nodes representing substations and 29 auxiliary nodes. Three
different reference line characteristics, one for each voltage level, are con-
sidered based on Fischer and Kießling (1989). Three main technical factors
are included: maximum thermal limit, line resistance and line reactance.
The values differ significantly for the three voltage levels. To obtain the
values for lines with more circuits, the impedances have been calculated ac-
cording to a parallel combination. Thus, the interaction of multiple circuits
has been neglected. The data source for the line characteristics is based on
the UCTE-network map (UCTE, 2004). As cross-border flows and transac-
tions play an important role in electricity markets, nine country nodes are
added, representing the neighboring countries and 81 cross-border nodes to
simulate the import and export, as well as cross-border flows. The model
contains 271 lines of the 220 kV and 309 lines of the 380 kV level as well
as six lines with 110 kV. In addition, 50 country tie-lines with unlimited
capacity are included, connecting the cross-border nodes with the country
node and representing the grid of the respective country. Cross-border lines
between countries are modeled according to their length and voltage level.7
7It must be noticed that the implementation of neighboring countries has an impact on
the welfare calculation. As they are part of the overall optimization problem, their demand
and generation adds to the total system welfare. Due to energy exports and imports, it
is not possible to calculate the welfare for Germany only when including neighboring
countries. This must be taken into account while regrading welfare effects. However, as
long as only Germany is modeled in detail and the other countries are aggregated to a few
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The European Grid
The European UCTE-grid is modeled in a similar way, though with a slightly
lower level of detail concerning demand estimations, installed generation
capacity, and wind facilities. The entire high voltage grid in Europe is
contained in ELMOD based upon the UCTE-network map (UCTE, 2004)
as well. The model then covers Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Western Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Austria,
Italy, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. This ac-
counts for about 2120 substations (nodes) and about 3150 lines of the three
highest voltage levels. Regarding line characteristics, the same assumptions
as for Germany are made.
3.3.2 Generation
Capacities
Generation is divided into eight plant types: nuclear, lignite, coal, oil and
gas steam plants, combined cycle gas turbines plants, hydro, pumped storage
and combined heat power plants. Wind capacity is addressed separately in a
paragraph subsequently (Section (3.3.2)). Power plant capacities are based
on VGE (2005). The current database includes all active plants for 2006
with a generation capacity greater than 100 MW. Each plant is assigned to
one node. In the case of unclear grid integration, plants are allocated to the
geographically closest node. A node can have more than one plant feeding
into the grid.
Since thermal plants need a certain heat level to produce electricity, a mini-
mal capacity is defined for each plant class according to DEWI et al. (2005).
These values are identical for every thermal power plant. If output drops
below this level, the plant has to be turned off. These values are used for
defining the binary plant condition variable indicating whether the plant is
on- or offline.
Combined heat and power plants (CHPs) often deliver long-distance heat
or are integrated in a thermal production process in industries, thus pro-
ducing electricity as a byproduct. These cogeneration plants were grouped
corresponding to their primary output in heat- and power-operated plants.
Due to legal guidelines an additional must-run condition was implemented
in ELMOD to take into account that energy produced by this type of plant
has to be fed-in prior to other energy types. The generation behavior of the
nodes, the values should largely reflect changes in Germany.
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‘heat-operated’ power plants follows the same criteria as other power plants
of the same type but they are assumed to be like base load plants in terms of
unit commitment. Thus they constantly produce at least at their minimum
output levels which is assumed to correspond to the specific required heat
levels.8 This may lead to an overestimation of output during night times
and an underestimation during day times.
Costs
For each plant type a reference efficiency value and marginal cost are es-
timated based on different fuel types. Depending on the output level a
mark-up is added if the output is lower than the reference efficiency value
in order to allow for efficiency losses. The mark-ups have been transformed
into quadratic polynomials. An additional cost block is added if a ther-
mal plant has to start-up. Hence, cost functions vary between the different
plant classes. Also, costs of plants from the same type differ since efficiency
levels are not identical. In general, modern plants have a higher efficiency
than older ones. However, the construction of the power plant cycle, the
actual level of output and external conditions like cooling water availability
influence the efficiency as well.
The actual generation costs are calculated on a marginal cost basis. If the
output is lower than maximal output, a mark-up is considered to account for
efficiency losses. Three mark-ups are defined: one for steam plants, one for
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants and one for gas turbines. The
mark-ups depend on the output level in relation to the maximal output. The
increase of specific heat consumption due to operating below the optimal
output is referred to as partial load conditions (Figure 3.3). Efficiency can
be represented by specific heat consumption.
The impact is rather low for classical steam plants, but becomes important
for peak load units like gas turbines and therefore is crucial in times of
rapidly changing wind input conditions. The mark-up for CCGT-plants is
based on VDI (2000) assuming reference efficiency at maximum output of
52.5 % (Müller, 2001). The efficiency of gas and oil fired gas turbines de-
pend on the compressor inlet temperature. Based on a reference efficiency
of 34.5% (Müller, 2001) and a temperature level of 15 ∘C, the partial load
efficiency is taken from Kehlhofer et al. (1984). For steam plants, a func-
tional interrelationship of specific heat consumption and partial load can be
obtained from Baehr (1985). Nuclear plants may have additional drawbacks
8Heat demand curves are not included in ELMOD. The actual output is approximated
via seasonal factors.
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Figure 3.3: Partial load efficiency
Source: Own presentation based on Kehlhofer et al. (1984), Baehr (1985),
and VDI (2000).
due to the necessary security constraints that are not considered within the
model formulation.
Based on the above described assumptions it is possible to estimate the
impact of varying wind energy on the total system costs. Although wind
energy has no marginal generation costs inherently, it causes fossil plants to
reduce generation and therefore operate under partial load conditions thus
increasing their costs.9 ELMOD uses the simplified partial load curves in
9A simple example reveals the impact: Assume a 1000 MW fossil plant with generation
costs of 10 d/MWh that has to reduce its output because 200 MW wind energy are
available and need to be fed into the grid. Running at 80% of optimal output causes
the efficiency to drop and thereby the costs to rise to 10.07 d/MWh. The cost reduction
therefore is not 2000 d/h, but only 1944 d/h. The difference could be considered as the
indirect marginal cost of wind energy. In reality, a clear cost allocation of wind energy
is not possible, because changes in demand modify the operation of the fossil plants.
Furthermore, the indirect cost of wind generation is not constant but changes with the
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order to calculate the cost of wind energy and neglects further wind specific
additional costs. Nonetheless the overall impact on welfare is considered.
Moreover, prices for CO2 allowances are included into the generation costs.
Therefore the plant specific CO2 emissions are calculated based on efficiency
and plant type according to Gampe (2004). Prices for CO2 allowances are
exogenous to the model are adjusted according to most recent data for dif-
ferent applications of ELMOD (compare Chapter 4).
Additional costs occur if a thermal plant has to start-up or go offline. Fossil
plants generate electrical energy through transforming heat energy. This
heat has to reach a certain level before generation can start and has to be
cooled down in a controlled process after generation is stopped. The cool-
down phase is assumed to be mainly affected by fixed cost parameters. Since
ELMOD uses a marginal cost approach, it does not take into account cooling
down specifically in its optimization. The start-up costs are mainly driven
by fuel prices, as a certain amount of fuel has to be consumed before the heat
level is high enough to start electricity generation. The cost estimations for
start-up are taken from DEWI et al. (2005). These costs are added as a cost
block within the hour of start-up. As base load plants are assumed to be
must-run plants they do not have start-up costs.10
Wind
Since wind turbines have relatively small installed capacities, not all of them
can be considered individually. To obtain a realistic distribution of wind ca-
pacities in Germany a map representing the installed capacity based on 10
km2 squares is used (ISET/IWES, 2002). Each square - meaning a certain
capacity value - is attached to the geographical closest node. This has been
done for each federal state separately to obtain a percentage distribution
which can then be updated with the actual wind capacities of the federal
state. This distribution mechanism makes it also possible to increase the
installed capacities without the necessity to reallocate each node individu-
ally assuming that installed capacities represent the suitability of a region
for the use of wind turbines. As wind input depends on the wind speeds
and largely differs between regions, a simplified classification scheme is used.
Therefore six different wind zones have been defined using hourly wind speed
information covering the time from 2002 to 2004 from seven representative
stations (DWD, 2005). Since these reference stations are located approx-
load situation of the fossil power plants.
10This may lead to biased results in the long run, but should not influence the price
and welfare calculation within the modeled reference time-frame.
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imately 10 meter above ground (ℎref ), an approximation about the speed
values in the turbine height is applied. In general, wind speed and height
follow a logarithmic function (Hau, 2003):
(ℎ) = ref
ln
(
ℎ
z0
)
ln
(
ℎref
z0
) (3.22)
Wind speed (ℎ) depends on the absolute height of the turbine above ground
ℎ and the local conditions like the building density, hillsides or forests that
influence the roughness length z0. To obtain average values a roughness
length of 0.2, representing farm land with trees and bushes but without
surrounding buildings, is defined for all nodes. The height of all turbines
is assumed to be 60 meters, based on average values for mid-sized turbines.
Calculating the speed values for all zones shows a clear separation between
the coastal area in the North and the Southern areas.
For wind capacities in Europe, the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2007) and
the Wind Force 12 study (Greenpeace International and EWEA, 2005) are
chosen. Although both studies analyze the energy sector developments on
a global level and for different time horizons it is possible to extract data
for continental Europe. Further data are derived from EMD (2005), EWEA
(2005), IGW (2005), and WSH (2005). Wind capacities are allocated accord-
ing to to federal states or similar administrative areas taking into account
political, geographical and meteorological framework conditions.
3.3.3 Demand
In order to derive a node-specific demand, ELMOD assumes a positive corre-
lation between economic income and total electricity demand. This relation
is modeled in greatest detail for Germany, where demand is differentiated
into consumption of industries, services and households: electricity is con-
sumed to around 46% by the industrial sector, 27% by households and 21%
by services (Eurostat, 2004).11 Standard load profiles for households (H0)
and services (G0) as specified in VDEW (1999) are applied and calculated
for typical winter and summer workdays. Since various different load profiles
exist in the industry sector, the industry consumption is approximated by
11The remaining electricity consumption is used by agriculture, transportation, the
energy sector and others. Since these sectors amount only for a small part of the overall
consumption, they are not taken into account separately.
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taking real electricity consumption of a typical winter and summer workday
from UCTE (2006) and discount power of households and services accord-
ing to the standard load profiles. Consequently, the difference indicates the
industry consumption. Load profiles are calculated on an hourly basis and
are normalized to the overall consumption of electricity made by each sector
as stated above.
To weight the sector specific consumption with the amount of this sector
on a specific node, the gross value added of industry and services and the
gross domestic product of households are used. The gross value added is
available at Euro NUTS 3 level for larger countries and Euro NUTS 2 for
smaller countries. Each district is assigned to a node. In case there are dif-
ferent nodes in one district, the entire gross value is divided by the number
of nodes. In case there is no node in the district, the gross value added is
distributed to all neighboring districts with nodes. The share of a node of
the whole gross value added is calculated and applied to the overall elec-
tricity consumption by industry and services, respectively. Regarding the
node-specific consumption of households, they are deduced distributing the
inhabitants of an administrative district to the node in the same manner as
the gross value added for industry and services are assigned to. In a second
step, the annual energy consumption of the households is assigned to the
nodes according to the node’s share in the whole gross domestic product.
This, subsequently, yields a reference demand per node. On the basis of this
reference demand, a reference price (e.g. average EEX price for Germany)
and the assumption of a demand elasticity at this reference point12, a linear
demand function can be estimated.
For the remainder of Europe, demand is based on UCTE data. For ELMOD
applications with focus on Germany the neighboring countries are condensed
in single nodes, thus a separation of demand according to industry, com-
merce and residential is not necessary. Reference prices are taken from the
national electricity exchanges.13 A linear demand behavior is obtained in
the same way as for Germany. For calculations covering more countries a
node specific demand is derived by using the gross value added as key for a
distribution of load to different districts. Thus, a separation of household,
service and industrial demand is not considered for the rest of Europe.
12Green (2007) includes different assumptions about demand point elasticities in his
nodal pricing analysis of a simplified network of the UK. Based on his study, the default
demand elasticity in ELMOD is -0.25. However, this value can be altered easily for
different model applications - normally between 0 and -0.25.
13In case no national price is available, a European average price is calculated based on
the existing national prices.
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3.4 Applications of ELMOD
3.4.1 Network Constraints and Offshore Wind
ELMOD was initially used in order to study different congestion manage-
ment schemes for the German electricity market, particularly the problem
of integrating large scale offshore wind projects as presented in DEWI et al.
(2005). Leuthold et al. (2005) demonstrated that nodal pricing is superior to
uniform pricing and conclude that when using nodal pricing, 8 GW offshore
wind capacities can be implemented without grid extension and additional
5 GW if the North West German grid will be extended. As the underlying
model is time static, varying demand and wind input are considered through
different reference cases. Also, cross-border flows and unit commitment de-
cisions are neglected. Weigt et al. (2006) continued the work and extended
the model by including France, Benelux, Western Denmark, Austria and
Switzerland in order to examine cross-border flow issues. They point out
that even under status quo conditions, the price situation in Benelux is
affected by high wind input in Germany. This situation is bound to aggra-
vate if the planned wind capacity extension will be realized without proper
grid adjustments. The work of Weigt et al. (2006) was the first approach
to model the effects of nodal pricing in combination with increased wind
energy on the North-Western European grid. Weigt (2006) extended the
model by including a time-frame of 24 hours to simulate variable demand
and wind input as well as unit commitment, start-up and pump storage is-
sues. He shows that for the German market a nodal pricing system would
yield significantly lower prices during peak times on average. The impact
of wind energy under current conditions is mainly predictable and leads to
price decreases in North and East Germany. However, in specific load and
wind input cases congestion situations can lead to price increases in South
Germany. The planned wind capacity extensions based on a forecast for
2010 led to significant price reductions in North Germany but increased
price differences particularly between the Netherlands and Germany as well
as between South and North Germany. Leuthold et al. (2008a) built on the
aforementioned work in order to recommend nodal pricing as a valuable tool
for electricity market analyses particularly also in a European context.
The problem of grid extensions due to increased wind input is taken up
by Jeske (2009). He analyzed the possibility of integrating large scale off-
shore capacities using high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines in order to
transport the energy to demand centers in the South and West of Germany.
He found that when applying welfare criteria and considering congestion,
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the HVDC-approach is more efficient than other grid extension measures.
Another application by Leuthold et al. (2009) focusing on large-scale wind
integration is presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
3.4.2 Locating Generation Investments
Dietrich et al. (2009) applied ELMOD in order to model optimal investment
behavior up to the year 2012 based on realistic data of planned genera-
tion investments. They represent an average year in terms of demand and
wind levels. Twelve cases are defined to simulate off-peak, mid-load and
peak demand in winter and summer as well as high and average wind in-
put. Analyzing locations of plants yielded different results for different grid
extension scenarios. While the projected locations were mainly along the
North-Sea coastline and the Ruhr area, the optimal model results for loca-
tions varied significantly with assumptions regarding the grid situation. To
put it in a nutshell, Dietrich et al. (2009) showed that transmission expan-
sion is a critical condition for generation investment locations, particularly
in a European context.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, ELMOD an economic engineering model of the European
electricity market was presented. ELMOD is based on a DC Load Flow
approach and captures the essentials of the European electricity markets,
even though it lacks some idiosyncrasies of some national markets. On the
basis of existing studies using ELMOD, it could also be shown that ELMOD
is a valuable tool in terms of analyzing the effect of offshore wind power on
the North-West European electricity market, and the effects of congestion
between countries and within the German grid. Additionally, ELMOD can
also be applied to generation investment issues namely the siting of new
power plants under grid constraints.
Chapter 4
When the Wind Blows over
Europe: An Application of
ELMOD
4.1 Introduction
An essential issue in electricity markets is network congestion. As stated
earlier, network congestion impacts on the market equilibrium according
to geographical characteristics. In case of network congestion, transmis-
sion capacity becomes a scarce resource for which scarcity rents apply. The
ELMOD model described in Chapter 3 is able to capture these effects based
on regional demand and supply data as well as the relevant technical pa-
rameters of an electricity grid.
While being a potential source that can influence the congestion situation
within the network, renewable energy sources are also a major driver in
the debate about the future development of electricity networks. An often-
stated objective in the discussion about integrating renewable energy into
the transmission network which is referred to as ‘greening the grid’. Partic-
ularly wind energy is considered to provide significant amounts of electricity
in a lower-carbon world. Given the ambitious, politically-driven objectives
for wind energy in some U.S. states, in Europe, and elsewhere, an adequate
regulatory framework is required to provide the proper incentives for ad-
ditional generation capacities and network expansion. Some instruments,
such as uniform pricing of network access, simply do not provide adequate
signals for investment and usage.
Initially, the issue of additional wind generation was discussed in purely po-
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litical terms. Proponents hailed it as a clean, sustainable resource, while
opponents insisted on the infeasibility of integrating intermittent wind into
regular dispatch of electricity. However, recent experience with feeding-in
large amounts of wind has shown that the operational issues are manage-
able, and the resource can be addressed with less ideological pathos, since
regulatory decisions mandate wind’s role as a key player in the development
of European electricity markets. Another aspect of the new debate concerns
how additional wind capacities may be efficiently integrated. In the past,
wind generation was decentralized and its impacts on the grid were gen-
erally quite minor. However, factoring in onshore and, more importantly,
projected construction of offshore capacities, gives rise to questions about
wind’s growing impacts, especially whether the existing grid is still capable
of reliably securing energy supply in the integrated network or whether an
expansion of the existing network capacities is necessary.
This in turn raises the question how efficient transmission expansion can be
carried out. A debate that is reviewed in detail in Section 2.2. However,
the existing expansion literature has not yet explicitly included increasing
renewable energy production as driver for grid investments. To date, the
research on electricity network investments and renewables is dominated
by technical issues related to network integration and expansion. A study
commissioned by the German Energy Agency (DEWI et al., 2005) that
analyzed the costs of integrating additional wind capacity in the German
grid found that extensions to resolve emerging network bottlenecks would be
cost-intensive. Other technical studies with similar results looked at Poland
(PSE, 2003), France (Verseille, 2003), the Netherlands (Hondebrink et al.,
2004), Austria (Haidvogl, 2002), Denmark (Woyte et al., 2005, 2007) and
Spain (IDAE, 2005).
Additionally, the economic investment literature in Section 2.2 focuses on
rather small two- or three-node example networks. On contrast, the men-
tioned technical reports have a larger view. However, results from large-scale
economic engineering models on network investments due to wind input have
not yet been reported to the knowledge of the author. Thus, rather than
modeling two- or three-node networks, this chapter considers the larger scale.
An economic algorithm to calculate the optimal extension of electricity net-
works taking into account additional capacities of wind energy (onshore and
offshore) is developed and implemented into ELMOD. Within the present
chapter, the CTP approach is taken and it is assumed that a centralized
network operator desires to maximize welfare under perfect competition.
Furthermore, nodal pricing is suggested to be the adequate regulatory frame-
work to facilitate the integration of wind, because it provides price signals
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and indicates potential congestion; thus, the impact of additional wind en-
ergy can be estimated by analyzing price situations. Strong price differences
between neighboring nodes help to identify highly congested lines in differ-
ent scenarios. A special grid-extension algorithm allows the model to extend
the grid incrementally until an economically optimal grid status is identified
that is capable of carrying the additional wind.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents
the model based on the ELMOD model of Chapter 3. The network topology,
the data set and the scenarios are described in Section 4.3.1 Section 4.4
presents the results of the model runs, scenario analysis and offers according
interpretations. The analysis is able to identify socially valuable investment
locations. Interestingly, most of the necessary line extensions are not due
to the large increase of wind energy in the next decade but are necessary to
overcome already existing bottlenecks particularly at the country borders.
The overall investment amount required to cope with increasing wind energy
is low compared to the resulting welfare gain. Furthermore, a more equalized
increase of wind capacities in the European countries can help to cancel out
current local network problems. The chapter concludes in Section 4.5 that
the efforts to prepare the European grid for large amounts of wind generation
capacities appear rather modest.2
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Mathematical Notation
Indices:
it ∈ I iteration
l ∈ L line within the network
n, j ∈ N nodes within the network
s ∈ S power plant type
1Choosing Europe as the study area is bases particularly on data availability and the
ambitious goals for wind expansion in many European countries, such as Germany, Spain,
the UK, and France.
2The subsequent chapter is based on the working paper Leuthold et al. (2009).
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Sets:
I set of all iterations
L set of all lines
N set of all nodes
S set of all power plants
Parameters:
ANF annuity factor
ANnj annuity for upgrading the line between n and j
E equity
gns available maximum generation level of plant s at node n
Icost cumulated annuity for conducted grid investments
k given period for grid investment
P l maximum available power flow capacity over line l
r weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
rDC interest on debt capital
rE equity yield rate
t tax rate
TC total capital
unj number of circuits of the line between n and j
win wind input at node n
Variables:
citns generation cost of plant s at node n after iteration it
gitns generation of plant s at node n after iteration it
niitn net grid input at node n after iteration it
pitn (q
it
n ) linear inverse demand function at node n after iteration it
as a function of qitn
P itl power flow over line l after iteration it
qitn demand quantity at node n after iteration it
4.2.2 Assumptions
This chapter examines the impact of wind energy on the grid for the fore-
casted scenarios in 2020. It is a ceteris paribus consideration which assumes
that the conventional power plant fleet does not change from today to 2020.
The research focus is to simulate feeding-in the forecasted wind into the ex-
isting electricity system. Therefore, a feed-in guarantee for wind is assumed.
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Feed-in guarantees are the dominant schemes applied in Europe (e.g. in Ger-
many and Spain). An optimization problem is formulated that calculates
the welfare for the electricity system regardless of country or state borders.
This presumes either a single entity managing the grid or perfect coordi-
nation between different entities, and neglects imperfect market functioning
(i.e. a perfect competition approach).
4.2.3 Optimization Problem
To calculate the scenarios, ELMOD - a model of the European electricity
market - described in Chapter 3 is applied. However, compared to the model
description in Equations (3.1)-(3.10), ELMOD is adjusted within this chap-
ter by disregarding the time component t. There are two reasons for this
simplification. First, the extension algorithm described in Section 4.2.4 re-
quires several welfare runs (one per iteration it). Hence, the model must
be as simple as possible in order to achieve manageable calculation times.
Second, the focus of the analysis is on wind extensions for the year 2020.
Thus, short-term inter-temporal constraints such as start-up conditions for
plants are negligible. The time component can be replaced by different load
and wind scenarios (compare Section 4.2.4). The objective functions for
all considered scenarios is maximizing social welfare W that equals total
consumer benefit minus the cost of generation needed to satisfy demand
(Equation 4.1a). There is a liner inverse demand function pn(qn) for each
node where pn is the nodal price at node n and qn is the demand quan-
tity at node n. Optimal dispatch is determined respecting physical laws
and technical conditions, namely an energy balance (Equation 4.1b), a line
capacity (Equation 4.1c), and a maximum generation capacity (Equation
4.1d) constraint:
max
gitns,q
it
n
⎧⎨⎩W it =
∑
n
⎛⎜⎝ q
it
n∫
0
pitn (q
it
n )dq
it
n −
∑
s
(cnsg
it
ns)
⎞⎟⎠− Icostit
⎫⎬⎭ (4.1a)
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subject to ∑
s
gitns + win − qitn − niitn = 0 ∀n, it (4.1b)
∣P itl ∣ ≤ P l ∀l, it (4.1c)
gitns ≤ gns ∀n, s, it (4.1d)
gitns ≥ 0 ∀n, s, it (4.1e)
qitn ≥ 0 ∀n, t, it (4.1f)
Another simplification compared to the model in Chapter 3 is the assump-
tion that marginal costs cns are constant for each generation gns at a node
n depending on plant type s. Additional costs, such as those arising from
network operation and maintenance as well as start-up costs and ramping
conditions are not considered. Power flow Pl and transmission losses are
obtained using the DC Load Flow network model (DCLF) described by
Schweppe et al. (1988) and Stigler and Todem (2005). Transmission losses
are included by splitting them between the start and end nodes of a line
l as presented by Todem (2004). Hence, losses are represented within the
net input that defines the amount of energy that is injected or withdrawn
from the network at node n. To account for the (N-1)-constraint, a trans-
mission reliability margin of 20% is introduced; thus the P l of each line l is
80% of the full thermal limit. The reference period is one hour. Since the
approach is time static, the analysis includes different scenarios in order to
simulate changing external conditions. The optimization is coded in GAMS
and solved on an Intel Xeon CPU E5420 (8 cores) with 16 GB RAM.
4.2.4 Grid Extension Algorithm
The objective of this heuristic algorithm is to approximate the amount of
necessary grid extensions to cope with increasing wind energy inputs. The
developed algorithm gradually extends the grid (upgrading existing lines).
In a first step the model calculates the weighted average nodal prices for each
node out of four representative standard load and wind generation cases (low
wind and low load, low wind and high load, high wind and low load, high
wind and high load) for each extension scenario: high load corresponds to
the average value of the highest 33% of hourly demand in 2006 and low load
to the average level of the remaining 67%. High wind corresponds to a wind
input level of 80% of available installed capacities and low wind to a level
of 20%.
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Next, the model identifies the most severely congested line (identifying the
line between the two nodes with the highest price difference). This line is
then extended by adding another circuit of the same kind at the same link,
simulating a line extension in the form of adding one additional parallel
line to an existing connection. It is assumed that this type of extension
measure is possible on each circuit of the model. However, our model does
not allow for more than four parallel circuits on one connection. If this
constraint becomes binding, the line with the second highest price difference
is extended and so on.
After each extension step it, the model performs a new run and determines
the new welfare value and the welfare change ΔW it = W it −W it−1. The
model then compares the welfare change to the investment effort required
to implement the respective grid extension. If the costs are higher than
the change of welfare, the line is not considered for further extensions. The
model automatically stops if no welfare gain is obtained for 50 different
extension steps.
∙ Step 0: Initialization. Set iteration counter 1 = 0 and stopping
counter 2 = 0. Icost = 0. Solve the optimization problem (4.1).
W = W it.
∙ Step 1: Grid extension. Set iteration step it to 1. Determine
prices pitn and price differences Δp
it
nj between all interconnected nodes.
Determine Δpitn∗j∗ = max(∣Δpitnj ∣). If uitn∗j∗ < 4 set uitn∗j∗ = uitn∗j∗ + 1.
Set Icost = Icost+ANn∗j∗ . Recalculate all line parameters and go to
next step. Otherwise fix Δpitn∗j∗ = 0 and repeat Step 1.
∙ Step 2: Economic dispatch. Update iteration counter 1 = 1 + 1.
Solve the optimization problem (4.1). W = W it. If W it ≥ W it−1 go
to Step 1. Otherwise undo changes (Icost = Icost− ANn∗j∗ , uitn∗j∗ =
uitn∗j∗ − 1, and W it = W it−1) and fix Δpitn∗j∗ = 0; set stopping counter
2 = 2 + 1. If 2 = 50, stop. Otherwise continue with Step 1.
4.2.5 Investment Costs
According to the procedure described by standard finance literature (e.g.
Buckley et al., 1998), the model calculates the discounted value of the annual
depreciation of the investment costs for the particular extension measure.
The discounted annual depreciation value is received by multiplying the
initial costs for the particular extension measure with the annuity factor
ANF :
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ANF =
r(1 + r)k
(1 + r)k − 1
(4.2)
where r represents the weighted average capital costs (WACC) and k the
given period regarding the invested commodity. The WACC is calculated
as:
r =
(
E
TC
)
rE +
(
DC
TC
)
rDC(1− t) (4.3)
with E for equity, TC for total capital, rE for equity yield rate, DC for debt
capital, rDC for interest on debt capital and t for tax rate. The rate rE is
determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):
rE = rf + (m − rf ) (4.4)
with rf for the risk-free rate of return, m the market rate of return and
 the risk factor. The time value of money is thereby represented by the
risk-free rate rf and compensates the investors for dedicating money to any
investment over a period of time. The second term of the equation represents
risk and calculates the amount of compensation the investor needs for taking
on additional risk. This is calculated by applying a risk measure  that
compares the return of the asset to the return of the market over a certain
period of time to the market premium, i.e. the differential of average market
returns m and the risk-free rate. Thereby,  is defined as function of the
covariance between the considered portfolio (investment) and the market
portfolio, divided by the variance of this market portfolio. The CAPM says
that the expected return of a security or a portfolio equals the rate on a
risk-free security plus a risk premium. For the analysis in this chapter, the
following values were chosen: a given period (k) of 12 years, 25% equity ratio(
E
TC
)
, 6% interest on debt capital (rDC), 40% tax rate (t), 3.5% risk-free
rate of return (rf ), 13% market rate of return (m) and 0.9 as risk factor
(). The latter is a conservative estimation based on the assumption that
network investments are carried out by large grid companies (compare Table
4.1). Based on the mentioned assumptions, the annuity factor ANF yields
11.75%.
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RWE EON EnBW
 0.74 0.85 0.80
Table 4.1: Beta factors of selected German energy companies
Source: Own calculations based on EnBW (2008), EON (2008), and RWE
(2008).
According to DEWI et al. (2005), the investment required to upgrade a
150kV/220kV and a 380kV is 70,000 d/km and 120,000 d/km respectively.
The capital expenditure for upgrades to be compared with the welfare in-
crease is calculated by multiplying the specific price per km with the length
of the upgraded line divided by 8760 hours.
4.3 Data and Scenarios
4.3.1 Data
The model data is based on the UCTE extra high voltage grid (UCTE, 2004)
of the European Union and Switzerland. It includes Portugal, Spain, France,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland,
Austria, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.
The basic model consists of 2120 substations (nodes) and 3143 lines. Three
voltage levels - 380kV, 220kV and 150kV - are considered.
In order to apply the DCLF, different line parameters are required: voltage
levels, thermal limits, line resistances and line reactances. For each voltage
level a reference line type is selected, neglecting impacts of the wide range of
different lines. For 380 kV, four cables per wire, for 220 kV, two cables per
wire, and for 150 kV, one cable per wire are assumed and the thermal limits
are derived accordingly (Fischer and Kießling, 1989). In the model those
maximal power flows are multiplied by the number of circuits, neglecting
impacts of influence between multiple circuits. Values for the resistances
and reactances of high voltage circuits are subject to empirical experience.
Therefore, average values based on Fischer and Kießling (1989) are adopted.
Generation capacities are based on VGE (2005). Eight types of conventional
power plants are classified and each plant is assigned to one class according
to the main fuel type (Table 4.2). Base case wind capacity information is
derived from several sources. For Germany a pro rata distribution is used
for the nodes in each federal state based on ISET/IWES (2002). For other
countries the wind capacity distribution is based on publicly available infor-
mation, mainly from national wind energy associations. For Italy, Portugal
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and the new European Union member states, apart from Poland, no such
data is available. Hence, the regional allocation of existing wind energy ca-
pacity is approximated, taking geographical and meteorological conditions
into account. For Poland, the Polish Wind Energy Association (PWEA)
provides detailed information about the locations of the existing 150 MW
installed wind capacity (PWEA, 2006).
The node-specific generation costs are calculated on the basis of marginal
costs, including fuel costs, but not accounting for operating and service
costs. Wind power generation is assumed to have no marginal generation
costs. Thus indirect costs of stochastic wind input causing higher balancing
and response power costs are neglected. Pumped storage is assumed to store
during night hours (from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m.) by purchasing electricity on the
stock exchange. Marginal costs of conventional plant types are adopted for
two reference cases (see Section 4.3.2).
To obtain a node-specific reference demand, the regional GDP (Eurostat,
2005) is used as proxy for electricity demand. It is assumed that provinces
with high economic output - and, respectively, with a high share in the
countries’ GDP - have a high electricity demand. Consequently, the total
electricity consumption is divided according to the GDP share. Within a
province, the demand is distributed equally over all nodes.
Fuel Installed Fuel Installed
Capacity [GW] Capacity [GW]
Coal 99.2 Natural gas 49.0
Lignite 44.2 Fuel oil 62.4
Nuclear power 107.3 Water 36.0
CCGT 13.7 Pumped storage 23.3
Total 435.1
Table 4.2: Conventional power plant capacities in Europe
Source: VGE (2005).
4.3.2 Three Scenarios
Three scenarios are considered: Benchmark, WEO (World Energy Outlook),
and WF12 (Wind Force 12). The Benchmark scenario uses 2006’s installed
wind energy capacity according to DEWI (2006). WEO applies the wind
extensions according to the World Energy Outlook 2006 (IEA, 2007) of 114
GW. WF12 includes the alternative wind extension scenario according to
the study WF12 (Greenpeace International and EWEA, 2005). Although
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both extension studies analyze the energy developments on a global level
and for different time horizons, it is possible to extract data for Europe.
The studies use the same geographical sectioning, namely OECD Europe
which includes the EU-15 countries as well as the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. The countries of OECD
Europe that are not included in the UCTE grid are Finland, Sweden, Nor-
way, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the UK. Taking into
account political, geographical and meteorological conditions, it is assumed
that 22% of the forecasted wind energy capacities will be installed in the
countries that are not in the UCTE grid (with a high amount being allocated
to high wind resource countries, e.g., the UK and Scandinavia). The time
horizon is not identical in both studies; WF12 projects to 2020 and WEO
to 2015 and 2030. In the latter case a linear growth is assumed in order
to make a linear interpolation possible. In 2020, Greenpeace International
and EWEA (2005) forecast 180 GW total installed wind capacities and IEA
(2007) forecasts 114 GW total installed wind capacities under the described
assumptions. Since the forecast studies do not give detailed regional infor-
mation but the model uses accurate regional wind capacities, the additional
capacities are allocated onto federal states or similar administrative areas.
Table 4.3 shows the obtained wind capacities.
Changes in the demand or generation structure are not considered. Thus
the approach is a ceteris paribus analysis. However, two different generation
cost cases with respect to the price of emission allowances (EU ETS) are
included: an average CO2 price of 20 d/tCO2 and a high CO2 price of 50
d/tCO2 . Since wind generation has approximated marginal costs of zero
the welfare effect increases with higher costs for those fossil fuels that are
replaced by wind input. Respectively, with higher CO2 prices it is expected
to observe a larger amount of economic feasible grid extensions. Table 4.4
summarizes the applied generation costs.
4.4 Results and Interpretation
4.4.1 Price Results
First, the results assuming an average emission allowance price of 20 d/tCO2
are presented. Given the modeled situation of 2006 an intermediate price
level in Central and Eastern Europe, low prices in France due to the large
share of nuclear generation, and high prices in Italy and the Iberian Penin-
sula can be observed. If the grid is extended a general price convergence in
Europe takes place. However, now the low-price regions encounter higher
CHAPTER 4. WHEN THE WIND BLOWS OVER EUROPE 65
Installed Wind Capacity [GW]
Benchmark WEO WF12
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Austria 1.0 5.2 8.0
Belgium 0.2 0.2 0.3
Czech Republic 0.0 3.3 5.0
Denmark 3.1 2.6 4.0
France 1.6 11.7 18.0
Germany 20.6 31.3 48.0
Hungary 0.1 6.5 10.0
Italy 2.1 9.8 15.0
Luxembourg 0.0 0.1 0.1
Netherlands 1.6 3.6 6.0
Poland 0.2 10.7 18.5
Portugal 1.7 3.3 5.0
Slovakia 0.0 1.3 2.0
Slovenia 0.1 0.7 1.0
Spain 11.6 24.1 40.0
Switzerland 0.0 0.1 0.1
Total 43.9 114.5 181.0
Table 4.3: Wind generation capacities in 2020 forecasts per scenario
Source: Greenpeace International and EWEA (2005), EWEA (2006), IEA
(2007), and own calculations.
prices, which is particularly striking for France (Figure 4.1). The first exten-
sion scenario WEO results in lower prices in Europe compared to 2006. On
average the projected 115 GW wind capacities have a positive effect on elec-
tricity prices. The highest benefit is observed in the Spanish and Portuguese
markets. After the grid extension again a price convergence within Europe
can be observed, although the price level in Italy remains higher. The same
is true for the WF12 scenario. A small further price decrease compared to
the WEO case and a price convergence in Central Europe can be observed.
Second, the price developments are analyzed, given a high price for emission
allowances of 50 d/tCO2 . Starting with the modeled situation in 2006 the
results show a similar price pattern as in the 20 d/tCO2 case. However, the
absolute price level is about 10 to 20 d/MWh higher, corresponding to the
increase in generation costs. After the grid extension the prices tend towards
a more common level in Europe, although regional differences remain. In the
two wind extension scenarios the price level further decreases particularly
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CO2 Price CO2 Price
Fuel 20d/tCO2 50d/tCO2
Nuclear Power 15.15 15.15
Natural Gas 67.00 83.50
Lignite 37.14 67.14
Fuel oil 94.71 114.21
Coal 37.54 61.54
Running Water 0.00 0.00
CCGT 42.64 53.14
Pumped Storage 40.00 40.00
Table 4.4: Generation costs in d per MWh
Source: BAFA (2008).
in Spain and Portugal, with a reduction of about 20 d/MWh. Also in East
Europe a significant reduction is observable (Figure 4.2). The extended grid
results are quite similar to the case with the lower emission price leading to
further reduced prices in southern Europe and a more equalized price level
in central Europe. Given the price developments it can be concluded that
an increase of installed wind capacity in the years ahead leads to electricity
price reductions as wind partially replaces conventional generation. This is
of particular concern in Spain and Portugal where a doubling of the current
installed wind capacity significantly reduced prices. It can be noted that
the benefits of increased wind are less striking in the remaining countries.
However, grid expansion will not lead to a reduced price level in all Euro-
pean countries. The present situation is characterized by congestion at the
borders and a market separated into several price zones. If increased net-
work capacity removes some bottlenecks and brings prices closer together,
formerly low-price regions (e.g., France) will likely encounter higher prices.
4.4.2 Comparison
The results of the scenario runs are presented in Table 4.5. The extension
of wind capacities leads to a lower average electricity price. In the case of
an average emission allowance price the reduction is about 5 to 8 d/MWh,
depending on the installed wind capacity. If a higher emission price is as-
sumed, the positive price impact of wind increases to 18 and 22 d/MWh.
However, as already noted, this does not mean that each region profits from
increased wind input in a similar fashion. One surprising outcome is that
the benchmark model shows the highest amount of grid extension for both
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Figure 4.1: Average prices before and after the network extension, 20 d/tCO2
Source: Own presentation.
CO2 price scenarios. One would expect that the increased wind capacities
in 2020 lead to a greater need for grid extensions due to an increase in the
transmission volume and unintended loop flows. However, given the model
setting, the results show the opposite. The current grid conditions already
show a high level of congestion which makes an ambitious extension sched-
ule necessary. The increase in future wind generation appears to support
the overall power flow pattern. This may stem from the fact that in 2006
wind capacity clusters in Germany, Denmark, and Spain, whereas in the
two 2020 scenarios France, Italy and Poland have significant installed wind
capacity, too. Accordingly, the need for transporting wind might decrease.
The model does not differentiate for wind speeds. Thus for the high wind
input cases, wind generation is increased equally in all countries, leading
to the possibility of counter injections (e.g., between France and Germany)
reducing actual load. However, this benefit depends on the amount of wind
capacity installed. In the WF12 scenario the total grid extension is similar
to the benchmark case, while in the WEO scenario the amount is signif-
icantly lower. Hence, the positive effect of opposing wind injections may
be offset by localized problems in the case of the large capacity increase in
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Figure 4.2: Average prices before and after the network extension, 50 d/tCO2
Source: Own presentation.
the WF12 scenario. The welfare properties of the extensions are generally
positive in all cases. Given the relatively low extension costs of about 500
million Euro (less than 0.5% of the total welfare) a significant welfare in-
crease of more than 2.5 billion Euro per year is obtainable. Furthermore, a
large fraction of this welfare gain is already achieved by the first extensions.
In the benchmark case with 20 d/tCO2 , a welfare gain of 1 billion Euro is
already achieved after 20 line extensions totalling less than 50 million Euro.
The relatively low investment costs are a result of the model restriction to
line upgrades and the assumption that each line can be upgraded to four
circuits which may not always be feasible. Another remarkable outcome
is that in the case of higher emission allowance prices, the grid extension
is lower. Given the higher costs for conventional power plants one would
assume that an increase of wind reduces the need for expensive fossil fuels
and thus increases the welfare gain by wind integration. Altogether, the
resulting prices are higher because of the more expensive fossil plants that
in turn lead to a lower demand in the entire system given the modeled lin-
ear demand function. Thus, there are less extension requirements as the
transmission volume decreases. The important number in the high CO2
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price case is the welfare gain induced by grid extensions. Table 4.5 shows
that the gain is higher as the price differences between the costs of wind en-
ergy and fossil production increase. The presented approach calculates the
weighted average of four representative hours. The separated observation of
one worst-case hour with very strong wind (all wind generation capacities
produce maximum power) may lead to collapse even with grid expansion.
Because this situation will occur rarely (less than 2 to 4% of time on aver-
age), economic considerations tend to accept this ‘threat’ since additional
investment costs are not justified. Such extreme events should be managed
with technical measures other than line upgrades, such as active wind farm
management, extensive grid monitoring, and others.
4.5 Conclusions
From the perspective of economics, this chapter shows that efforts to prepare
Europe’s high voltage grid for large amounts of wind generation appear to
be rather modest. Developing the network at existing bottlenecks - mainly
cross-border connections - should be encouraged by regulatory authorities.
With a more moderate wind expansion of 114.5 GW, the optimal grid in-
vestments are smaller. However, if the additional wind capacity becomes
too great (181 GW), the needed grid extensions will increase compared to
the actual situation. ‘Greening the grid’, i.e. enabling the integration of
low-carbon technologies, appears feasible for wind energy. Further research
should address issues of stochasticity, and apply similar analysis to other re-
newables, e.g., solarthermal and photovoltaic. A study of the transferability
between Europe and U.S. experiences also appears fruitful. This conclu-
sion suggests that other research might examine the relationship between
fostering renewable energy production and the design of efficient contract
networks, e.g., resolving issues of priority network access for renewables and
transmission rights.
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Chapter 5
Solving
Discretely-Constrained
MPEC Problems Using
Disjunctive Constraints and
Discrete Linearization with
an Application in an Electric
Power Market
5.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that many of the national European Union (EU) elec-
tricity markets are characterized by market power of a single or only a few
companies. In France, Electricité de France (EDF) has a market share of
over 80%. In Germany, the two biggest players own together 55% of the gen-
eration capacities, the biggest four player have together 85% market share
(Hirschhausen et al., 2007). These numbers show that there are still nearly
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures prevailing in Europe. More-
over, these shortcomings in national competition also have an impact on
competition within the entire EU electricity market, particularly because
the national markets are separated from each other by limited transport
capacities which might enable national players to use their domestic power
72
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against foreign competitors.
In light of these facts, several models and algorithms have been developed
to simulate the outcomes of imperfect electricity markets. These models
include a broad range of approaches using game theory. Existing modeling
efforts - discussed in the subsequent literature sections - have achieved some
success but there is still room to handle larger-scale or more realistic models
as might be found in the EU, North America or in other parts of the world.
At a first glance, it seems that one-stage Nash-Cournot models can be solved
robustly for large-scale problems. If it comes to two-stage games involving
either a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) or an
equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), most algorithms
are for the most part, still in the development stage when one considers
large-scale or integer-constrained formulations.
In this chapter, a new approach to solve two-stage Stackelberg games with
one leader based on disjunctive constraints and discrete linearization is pre-
sented. The approach replaces the equilibrium constraints of the MPEC
by integer restrictions in the form of disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat
and McCarl, 1981; Gabriel et al., 2009). Also, a bilinear objective function
of an electricity market model stemming from the product of both price
and generation variables is linearized using additional binary and contin-
uous variables and new constraints. The result is that the MPEC can be
replaced by a mixed-integer linear program (MILP). This allows for a whole
host of important applications such as: discrete generation levels, fixed cost
problems involving binary variables, if-then logic relative to ramping con-
straints (Winston, 1994), discrete investment levels, and so on. A second
advantage of using the presented method in this context is to be able to solve
larger-scale problems in electric power markets than previously attempted.
Lastly, a detailed formulation of the DC load flow model is used in order to
model physical flows which facilitates a greater flexibility for changing the
network topology. The numerical results on two illustrative problems are
promising.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 the existing
literature concerning two-stage modeling and its applications in electricity
markets is discussed. Section 5.3 presents the general mathematical formu-
lation for the two-stage problem. The upper level is a quadratic program
and the lower level is a welfare maximization problem for an independent
system operator (ISO). Next Section 5.4 describes numerical results of the
developed approach for two illustrative examples. The chapter is concluded
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with summary remarks and future directions in Section 5.5.1
5.2 Literature
This chapter presents a new method for solving two-level planning prob-
lems with applications in electric power markets. The upper level involves
generation decisions for the Stackelberg leader and the lower level depicts
the rest of the market and the ISO problem. These two-level problems are
known as Stackelberg games or more generally as mathematical programs
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) (Facchinei and Pang, 2003) which are
NP-complete (Jeroslow, 1985). These problems have applications in a num-
ber of important planning areas such as: electric power management (Hobbs
and Nelson, 1992; Hobbs et al., 2000); taxation and optimal highway pricing
(Labbé et al., 1998), the government and the agricultural sector (Bard et al.,
2000); chemical process engineering (Raghunathan and Biegler, 2003); en-
gineering safety factors for a rubble mound breakwater and a bridge crane
(Castillo et al., 2003); NOx allowances markets in electric power produc-
tion (Chen et al., 2004); traffic planning (Codina et al., 2006), and network
design in transportation (Gao et al., 2004); see the annotated bibliography
(Vicente and Calamai, 1994) for related works.
Recently there has been a fair amount of research devoted to solving MPECs
with continuous-valued variables. Some examples include: implicit non-
smooth approaches (Outrata et al., 1998), piecewise sequential quadratic
programming (SQP) methods (Luo et al., 1996), and perturbation and pe-
nalization methods (Scholtes, 2001; Dirkse et al., 2002; Leyffer et al., 2006).
As noted by Leyffer (2003), these approaches require more computational
effort than standard nonlinear programming methods. However, within
the last five years, there have been some algorithmic successes. For exam-
ple, Fletcher and others (Fletcher et al., 2002; Fletcher and Leyffer, 2002,
2004) have shown that SQP methods have good numerical results as well as
some advantageous convergence properties (Anitescu, 2000). Additionally,
as noted by Leyffer (2003), interior-point methods while less reliable than
SQP are still able to solve about 80% of the mathematical programs con-
sidered with complementarity constraints (MPCCs) using default settings.
Further improvements can be gained by applying a relaxation of the com-
plementarity constraints typically found from incorporating the lower-level
optimality conditions in the upper-level (Liu and Sun, 2004; Raghunathan
and Biegler, 2002; Ralph and Wright, 2004; De Miguel et al., 2004, 2005),
1The subsequent chapter is based on the research paper Gabriel and Leuthold (2009).
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or penalizing these constraints (e.g., PIPA; Luo et al., 1996; Hu and Ralph,
2004; Anitescu, 2004). However, in the latter case, it has been shown that
the standard PIPA method (Luo et al., 1996) can fail to converge (Leyffer,
2005) to a stationary point in some cases. Lastly one can also make use of a
trust region approach applied to the nonlinear bilevel programming problem
as described in Marcotte et al. (2001).
The proposed methodology by contrast can incorporate integer and continuous-
valued variables. A few others have also considered methods for solving
MPECs with integer restrictions. These other methods can be grouped
into three categories: application-specific approaches, integer-programming
methods, or nonlinear programming-based algorithms. Methods specific to
applications include for example, a branch and bound version for a flow
shop bilevel problem (Karlof and Wang, 1996), shortest path and trans-
shipment algorithms for a modified network for special cases of a bilevel
taxation and optimal high pricing formulation (Labbé et al., 1998), and a
tree search approach (Scaparra and Church, 2008) to analyze critical in-
frastructure planning. Integer (or linear) programming methods include
for example, a Grid Search Algorithm (Bard, 1983), a simplex-like method
(Bialas and Karwan, 1984) or branch and bound (Bard, 1988; Moore and
Bard, 1990; Bard and Moore, 1990; Karlof and Wang, 1996), Tabu Search
(Wen and Huang, 1996), or genetic algorithm methods (Hejazi et al., 2002;
Nishizaki et al., 2003). For discretely-constrained bilevel optimization prob-
lems, Moore and Bard (1990) point out that it is not always possible to get
tight upper bounds using common relaxation methods and also two of three
standard fathoming rules employed used in branch and bound cannot be
fully used. Thus, the more traditional approaches may not work for these
sorts of problems.
Regarding the approach presented in the subsequent sections, it should be
noted that Barroso et al. (2006) develop a similar framework in order to sim-
ulate Nash equilibria in strategic bidding for short-term electricity markets
which they denote as ‘binary expansion’ (BE). However, a major contribu-
tion difference is the additional consideration of the physical transmission
network in the model at hand.
5.3 General Mathematical Formulation
Before describing an application in power planning, a more stylized version
of the problem at hand is presented. The general form of the problem to
be solved by the leader (e.g., strategic generator) is as follows where x ∈
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Rn, y ∈ Rm are respectively, the upper and lower-level vectors of variables:
min
x,y
{(
dx
dy
)T (
x
y
)
+
1
2
(
x
y
)T (
Mxx Mxy
Myx Myy
)(
x
y
)}
(5.1a)
subject to
A1y +B1x = b1 (1) (5.1b)
A2x = b2 (2) (5.1c)
A3x ≤ b3 (3) (5.1d)
A4y = b4 (4) (5.1e)
A5y ≤ b5 (5) (5.1f)
xi ∈ Z+, i = 1, . . . , n1 (5.1g)
xi ∈ R, i = n1 + 1, . . . , n (5.1h)
y ∈ S (x) (5.1i)
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m1 (5.1j)
y2 (free), j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m (5.1k)
where A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B1 are matrices of suitable size conformal with the
vectors x, y and right-hand sides b1, b2, b3, b4, b5. The vectors dx, dy contain
coefficients for x and y, and Mxx,Mxy,Myx,Myy are the submatrices refer-
ring to the quadratic terms of the objective function. The objective function
(5.1a) is quadratic in both the upper and lower-level variables which in the
particular power application described in Section 5.4 will involve pairwise
products of variables (e.g., generation times price) as well as linear terms
(e.g., generation times costs). Equation (5.1b) is the set of joint constraints
linking the upper and lower-level variables with 1 representing the dual
variables to these constraints (similar notation for dual variables for the
other constraints). Equations (5.1c) and (5.1d) are the constraints that only
involve the upper-level variables x whereas (5.1e) and (5.1f) are the coun-
terparts for the lower-level variables y. Equations (5.1g) and (5.1h) indicate
that a subset of the upper-level variables are integer-valued whereas con-
straint (5.1i) stipulates that y must be a solution to the lower-level problem
given x. Lastly, the vector y is partitioned into a nonnegative subvector (y1)
and the remaining variables (y2) free as shown in the last two constraints.
The lower-level problem will typically be either a convex, quadratic program
whose necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions or a Nash-
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Cournot game can be expressed as a mixed linear complementarity problem
(MLCP) (Facchinei and Pang, 2003) given as follows:
0 ≤ c1 (x) +M11(x)y1 +M12(x)y2⊥y1 ≥ 0 (5.2a)
0 = c2 (x) +M21(x)y1 +M22(x)y2 y2 (free) (5.2b)
where the dependence on the upper-level variables can be in the vector
c =
(
c1 (x)
T c2 (x)
T
)T
and/or the matrix
M =
(
M11(x) M12(x)
M21(x) M22(x)
)
Having a sufficiently large constant K, the complementarity conditions (5.2)
can be converted to disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl,
1981; Gabriel et al., 2009) as
0 ≤ c1 (x) +M11(x)y1 +M12(x)y2 ≤ Kr (5.3a)
0 ≤ y1 ≤ K(1− r) (5.3b)
0 = c2 (x) +M21(x)y1 +M22(x)y2 y2 (free) (5.3c)
where r is a vector of binary variables. In general finding a reasonable con-
stant K may take trial and error. However, in specific instances such as
the case study described below, a suitable value can be found; see Section
5.4.3 and Appendix A.2 for further guidance on how to obtain such a con-
stant. Replacing (5.1i) by (5.3) leads to the overall problem expressed in
disjunctive form:
min
x,y
{(
dx
dy
)T (
x
y
)
+
1
2
(
x
y
)T (
Mxx Mxy
Myx Myy
)(
x
y
)}
(5.4a)
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subject to
A1y +B1x = b1 (1) (5.4b)
A2x = b2 (2) (5.4c)
A3x ≤ b3 (3) (5.4d)
A4y = b4 (4) (5.4e)
A5y ≤ b5 (5) (5.4f)
xi ∈ Z+, i = 1, . . . , n1 (5.4g)
xi ∈ R, i = n1 + 1, . . . , n (5.4h)
0 ≤ c1 (x) +M11(x)y1 +M12(x)y2 ≤ Kr (5.4i)
0 ≤ y1 ≤ K(1− r) (5.4j)
0 = c2 (x) +M21(x)y1 +M22(x)y2 y2 (free) (5.4k)
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m1 (5.4l)
y2 (free), j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m (5.4m)
ri ∈ {0, 1}m1 (5.4n)
5.4 Numerical Example for an Electricity Market
In this section, the above described quadratic program with equilibrium con-
straints is specialized to an electric power market example. As pointed out
in Section 2.2.3, a Stackelberg game with only one leader is an example of
a MPEC. A Stackelberg game with several leaders is an EPEC (Ralph and
Smeers, 2006). Thus, it can be argued that an EPEC formulation is the
most appropriate way to model strategic behavior in short-term electricity
markets as EPECs allow more than one strategic player. The justification
for a MPEC approach, however, can be seen in other studies, e.g., one of
the Center of European Economic Research (ZEW) in Germany (Nikogosian
and Veith, 2009). They argued that in an increasing integrated market, the
distribution of market shares changes which might lead to fewer or even
only a single strategic actor. Furthermore, the formulation presented here
could include a simple form of a cartel. Ehrenmann (2004) stated that for
liberalized electricity markets, there are two types of models that lead to dif-
ferent types of strategic formulations. He distinguished a centralized and a
decentralized system. Within the centralized system, the energy and trans-
mission markets are cleared simultaneously, whereas, in the decentralized
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system, there are separate markets for transmission and energy which re-
quires a different complementarity formulation of the problem; the numerical
examples at hand assume a centralized system.
5.4.1 Mathematical Notation
Indices:
n, k ∈ N nodes in the network
k′ swing bus
l ∈ L line between n and k
f ∈ F firms in the market
s ∈ F firms acting strategically
j ∈ F competitive fringe firms
u ∈ U generation units
i ∈ I discrete generation steps
Sets:
F set of all firms
L set of all lines
N set of all nodes
U set of all generation units
I set of possible generation levels
Parameters:
an, bn intercept and slope of linear demand functions
(an, bn ≥ 0, ∀n)
cnfu generation cost of firm f at node n
for unit u (cnfu ≥ 0, ∀n, f, u)
ḡnfu maximum generation capacity of firm f at
node n for unit u (ḡnfu ≥ 0, ∀n, f, u)
Bnk network susceptance matrix n × k
Hlk network transfer matrix l × k
lcl physical line capacity limit of line l
swk swing bus vector, swk =
{
1 if k = k′
0 otherwise
∀k
K, K̄, K̂, K̃, Ǩ positive constants used to replace complementarities
by disjunctive constraints
M positive constant
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Variables:
dn demand at node n
gnfu generation of firm f at node n for unit u
qnsu,i, q

n binary variables for the linearization
of the objective function
qvnsu,i variable for the linearization of the objective function
k phase angle at node k
n shadow price for energy at node n
l shadow price for transmission on line l in
forward direction

l
shadow price for transmission on line l in
negative direction
nju dual variable of maximum generation constraint
per unit u of fringe firm j at node n
k dual variable for slack bus constraint
rn, r̄nfu, r̂l, r̃l, řnfu binary variables used to replace complementarities
by disjunctive constraints
5.4.2 Mathematical Formulation
The mathematical problem described subsequently is a specific form of (5.4)
specialized to strategic behavior in electric power markets where there is one
dominant player at the upper-level and several competitive fringe players
included in the lower-level ISO problem.
A similar approach as presented here is also presented by Barroso et al.
(2006). They develop a framework to simulate Nash equilibria in strate-
gic bidding for short-term electricity markets which they denote as ‘binary
expansion’. However, in contrast to Barroso et al. (2006), the model at
hand includes the physical transmission network. Considering transmission
issues is often regarded as essential feature in order to find short-term mar-
ket clearing prices for electricity markets (e.g., Stoft, 2002). In addition,
the model presented subsequently allows for a quadratic subproblem of the
MPEC whereas the model of Barroso et al. (2006) requires a linear subprob-
lem. Quadratic subproblems are useful in order to represent the expected
welfare maximizing behavior of an ISO.
Hence, the model description begins with a social welfare maximization
model assuming perfect competition (5.5) for an ISO as the lower-level prob-
lem. Afterwards the the upper-level problem is described. Given a linear
inverse demand function an − bndn, the term
(
andn − bnd
2
n
2
)
describes the
area below the (inverse) demand curve for region n, that is, the gross sur-
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plus. The production cost for region n is given by (gnfucnfu) which is then
subtracted from the first part after appropriately summing both terms.
In order to calculate the physical grid utilization, electric power market mod-
els mostly apply the DC load flow model (compare Chapters 2 and 3) in order
to obtain the line flows resulting from a certain generation-load combination
(compare Chapter 3). There are basically two different characteristics of the
DCLF. One characteristic is a network PTDF matrix (Christie et al., 2000;
Delarue et al., 2007). A PTDF matrix contains factors that quantify the
impact of an injection or withdrawal at a certain location on all lines within
the network. The PTDF can be derived from the network transfer matrix
Hlk and network susceptance matrix Bnk. However, as shown earlier one
can directly use the product of network susceptance matrix and the volt-
age angle  (5.5b) and the product of the matrix H and the voltage angle
k (5.5c-5.5d) in the mathematical problem (Schweppe et al., 1988; Stigler
and Todem, 2005) which leads to a greater flexibility, e.g., when consider-
ing models where Bnk and Hlk are not constant. In the present approach,
Equation (5.5b) represents the energy balance at node n with
∑
k (Bnkk)
corresponding to the net withdrawal/injection which must match the net
demand/supply dn−
∑
f
∑
u gnfu. Inequalities (5.5c) and (5.5d) correspond
to constraining the line flows determined by
∑
k (Hlkk). Constraint (5.5e)
provides an upper bound on generation relating to installed capacity and
lastly (5.5f) defines a slack bus. The following ISO problem is the start-
ing point for the presented modeling approach and is the precursor to the
equilibrium constraints for the subsequent MPEC.
min
dn,gnfu,k
⎧⎨⎩∑
n
(
−andn +
bnd
2
n
2
)
+
∑
n
∑
f
∑
u
(gnfucnfu)
⎫⎬⎭ (5.5a)
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subject to
dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu = 0,∀n (n) (5.5b)
−lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ 0,∀l (̄l) (5.5c)
−lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ 0,∀l (l) (5.5d)
−gnfu + gnfu ≤ 0,∀n, f, u (nfu) (5.5e)
−swkk = 0, ∀k (k) (5.5f)
dn ≥ 0, ∀n (5.5g)
gnfu ≥ 0, ∀n, f, u (5.5h)
In order to write the problem in a way that it can be applied to the approach
at hand, first the KKT conditions (5.6) of the problem are written out
(compare Section 2.1.2).
0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ⊥ dn ≥ 0, ∀n (5.6a)
0 ≤ cnfu − n + nfu ⊥ gnfu ≥ 0, ∀n, f, u (5.6b)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
−
{
k if k = k′
0 otherwise
k (free) , ∀k (5.6c)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu, n (free), ∀n (5.6d)
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ⊥ l ≥ 0,∀l (5.6e)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ⊥ l ≥ 0,∀l (5.6f)
0 ≤ −gnfu + gnfu ⊥ nfu ≥ 0,∀n, f, u (5.6g)
0 = −swkk, k (free),∀k (5.6h)
Then the KKTs are replaced by disjunctive constraints (5.7) as described in
Section 5.3. The purpose of this disjunctive form is to have mixed-integer
linear constraints at hand.
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0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ≤ Krn,∀n (5.7a)
0 ≤ dn ≤ K(1− rn), ∀n (5.7b)
0 ≤ cnfu − n + nfu ≤ K̄r̄nfu (5.7c)
0 ≤ gnfu ≤ K̄(1− r̄nfu), ∀n, f, u (5.7d)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
−
{
k if k′ = k
0 otherwise
k (free) , ∀k (5.7e)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu, n (free),∀n (5.7f)
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̂r̂l, ∀l (5.7g)
0 ≤ l ≤ K̂(1− r̂l), ∀l (5.7h)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̃r̃l, ∀l (5.7i)
0 ≤ 
l
≤ K̃(1− r̃l), ∀l (5.7j)
0 ≤ −gnfu + gnfu ≤ Ǩřnfu, ∀n, f, u (5.7k)
0 ≤ nfu ≤ Ǩ(1− řnfu), ∀n, f, u (5.7l)
0 = −swkk, k (free), ∀k (5.7m)
rn, r̄nfu, r̂l, r̃l, řnfu ∈ ⟨0, 1⟩ ∀n, f, u, l
For the purpose of including strategic behavior in the problem, it is now
assumed that the set of firms f is partitioned into two subsets. Subset s
corresponds to the firms that act strategically. Subset j is for the firms that
act as price-takers. It is assumed that the firms s decide first on their output
decisions in order to maximize individual profits which means that their
quantities are exogenous to the ISO problem. These firms know that they
influence the market equilibrium with their decisions. The output decision
of fringe firms j is determined by the ISO. The latter can be interpreted
as a pool system. The entire problem is known as Stackelberg game where
firms s are the leaders and the ISO (deciding on the quantities of firms j)
is the follower. In the problem at hand, it is assumed that only one player
acts strategically resulting in the MPEC (5.8).
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min
dn,gnsu,nju,k,k,n,l,l
{∑
n
∑
s
∑
u
(cnsu − n)gnsu
}
(5.8a)
subject to
0 ≤ gnsu − gnsu, ∀n, s, u (5.8b)
0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ⊥ dn ≥ 0, ∀n (5.8c)
0 ≤ cnju − n + nju ⊥ gnju ≥ 0, ∀n, j, u (5.8d)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(Hlkl)
−
{
k if k = k′
0 otherwise
k (free),∀k (5.8e)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu, n (free), ∀n (5.8f)
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ⊥ l ≥ 0,∀l (5.8g)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ⊥ l ≥ 0,∀l (5.8h)
0 ≤ −gnju + gnju ⊥ nju ≥ 0,∀n, j, u (5.8i)
0 = −swkk k (free), ∀k (5.8j)
The correspondence between (5.8) and the more general problem (5.1) is
shown in Table 5.1. As stated above the fringe firms’ output decisions are
determined by the ISO. Hence, the strategic generator takes into account
their reaction in terms of the equilibrium problem (5.8c-5.8j) of the ISO
within his profit maximization problem.
One computational difficulty is the bilinear terms ngnsu in the objective
function. In order to deal with the bilinear objective function in (5.8),
valid generation levels for the strategic generation ḡnsu,i are defined. One
can think of this as selecting a discrete set of possible generation levels.
Thereby, qnsu,i are taken as indicator binary variables that equal 1 when
the fixed´generation level ḡnsu,i is selected and zero otherwise. Also, q

n is a
binary variable for when the price n > 0, and q
v
nsu,i is a binary variable for
the case when the variable vnsu,i > 0 where
vnsu,i =
{
ḡnsu,in if qnsu,i = q

n = 1
0 otherwise
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Taking into account linearization constraints for the bilinear terms (ex-
plained below) as well as the replacement of complementarity conditions by
disjunctive constraints (previously described), one gets the following mixed-
integer linear problem for the MPEC in question.
min
dn,gnfu,rn,r̄nju,r̂l,r̃l,řnju,nju,k,k,n,l,l
{ ∑
n
∑
s
∑
u cnsugnsu
−
∑
i vnsu,i
}
(5.9a)
subject to
0 ≤ n ≤Mqn,∀n (5.9b)
gnsu =
∑
i
qnsu,iḡnsu,i,∀n, s, u (5.9c)∑
i
qnsu,i = 1,∀n, s, u (5.9d)⎧⎨⎩
qvnsu,i ≤ qn, ∀n, s, u, i
qvnsu,i ≤ qnsu,i, ∀n, s, u, i
qnsu,i + q

n − 1 ≤ qvnsu,i,∀n, s, u
(5.9e)
{
vnsu,i ≤ ḡnsu,in, ∀n, s, u, i
0 ≤ vnsu,i ≤Mqvnsu,i,∀n, s, u, i
(5.9f)
0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ≤ Krn,∀n (5.9g)
0 ≤ dn ≤ K(1− rn), ∀n (5.9h)
0 ≤ cnju − n + nju ≤ K̄r̄nju, ∀n, j, u (5.9i)
0 ≤ gnju ≤ K̄(1− r̄nju), ∀n, j, u (5.9j)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
−
{
k if k = k′
0 otherwise
k (free), ∀k (5.9k)
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0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu, n (free), ∀n (5.9l)
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̂r̂l,∀l (5.9m)
0 ≤ l ≤ K̂(1− r̂l),∀l (5.9n)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̃r̃l,∀l (5.9o)
0 ≤ 
l
≤ K̃(1− r̃l),∀l (5.9p)
0 ≤ −gnju + gnju ≤ Ǩřnju, ∀n, j, u (5.9q)
0 ≤ nju ≤ Ǩ(1− řnju), ∀n, j, u (5.9r)
0 = −swkk, k (free), ∀k (5.9s)
rn, r̄nju, r̂l, r̃l, řnju, qnsu,i, q

n ∈ {0, 1} , ∀n, s, u, i, j
qvnsu,i ∈ [0, 1],∀n, s, u, i
The logic of the constraints (5.9a)-(5.9e) is as follows:
1. By 0 ≤ n ≤ Mqn, when n > 0, since M is a suitably large positive
constant, this means that qn = 1. Also, qnsu,i = 1 corresponds to the
ith discrete generation value ḡnsu,i being selected via the constraints∑
i qnsu,i = 1, gnsu =
∑
i qnsu,iḡnsu,i. Thus,⎧⎨⎩
qvnsu,i ≤ qn
qvnsu,i ≤ qnsu,i
qnsu,i + q

n − 1 ≤ qvnsu,i
ensures that when both qn = 1 and qnsu,i = 1⇔ the binary indicator
variable qvnsu,i = 1 since by the three constraints above, one has 1 ≤
qvnsu,i ≤ 1. If one or both of qn and qnsu,i = 0, then these constraints
would force the nonnegative variable qvnsu,i = 0; see Williams (1999)
for this and similar logic constraints.
2. The constraints {
vnsu,i ≤ ḡnsu,in
0 ≤ vnsu,i ≤Mqvnsu,i
force vnsu,i ∈ [0, ḡnsu,in] when qvnsu,i = 1 and vnsu,i = 0 when qvnsu,i =
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0. Since the objective function has −
∑
i vnsu,i, larger values of vnsu,i
are always preferred. Thus, qvnsu,i = 1⇒ vnsu,i = ḡnsu,in so that part
of the objective function matches exactly the bilinear term.
3. Hence one can see the following
n > 0 and ḡnsu,i selected
⇒ qvnsu,i = 1
⇒ vnsu,i = ḡnsu,in
as desired. It therefore suffices to show that when either n = 0 or
ḡnsu,i is not selected that this implies that vnsu,i = 0. Clearly, vnsu,i ≤
ḡnsu,in forces vnsu,i = 0 when n = 0. On the other hand, if n > 0
then qn = 1. But if ḡnsu,i is not selected, then qnsu,i = 0 so that in⎧⎨⎩
qvnsu,i ≤ qn
qvnsu,i ≤ qnsu,i
qnsu,i + q

n − 1 ≤ qvnsu,i
,
one can see that qvnsu,i ≤ min {0, 1} = 0 and qvnsu,i ≥ 0, so that qvnsu,i =
0. Ergo, by 0 ≤ vnsu,i ≤Mqvnsu,i, vnsu,i = 0.
Hence, by transforming the mathematical problem (5.8) into (5.9), it can be
achieved to replace a bilinear term ngnsu in the objective function by the
linear term
∑
i vnsu,i and some more binary constraints. Thereby, Steps 1-3
above describe how these additional constraints work. In particular, they
ensure that the model is only able to pick one of the parameterized given
output levels. Altogether, through this procedure a MINLP is replaced by
a MILP which promises better numerical behavior.
General Form Specific Form
Equation (5.1a) Equation (5.8a)
Equation (5.1d) Equation (5.8b)
Equation (5.1i) Equations (5.8c)-(5.8j)
all other constraints vacuous
Table 5.1: Correspondence between general formulation and specific case
study formulation
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5.4.3 The Disjunctive Constraints Constants
An important issue is how to choose the constants K, K̄, K̂, K̃, and Ǩ for
the disjunctive constraints as well as the constant M in Equations (5.9b)
and (5.9f). These K-constants are critical for replacing KKTs by disjunctive
constraints. However, there is no general formula how to obtain these values
and they are specific to the application that is to be solved. As pointed out
above, it is assumed that the price-quantity relation can be modeled as a
linear inverse demand function pn = an − bndn per node with intercept an
and slope bn. Intercept an is the point of intersection of the linear demand
function and the vertical price axis. Hence it is called the “prohibitive price”
in economics as at this point demand dn falls to 0. The point of intersection
of the linear demand function and the horizontal quantity axis is referred to
as the “market saturation” quantity which shall be denoted as Dn. That is
the maximum quantity that consumers would buy at a nonnegative price.
Keeping these basics in mind, the derivation of the constant values is eco-
nomic commonsense. The constants always refer to primal (quantity) and
dual (price) information. The constant K for example refers to the demand
function price information (5.9g) and demand quantity information (5.9h).
Binary variables rn are 0 as long as there are positive demands dn. If demand
dn equals 0 for one of the nodes, its rn can either be 0 or 1. Economically,
zero demand means that the nodal price n is greater than or equal to the
prohibitive price an. For this result, it does not matter how big n becomes
as long as n ≥ an. It is economically reasonable to assume for example that
n ≤ 2an which leads us according to Equation (5.9g) to the first candidate
for K: K1 = maxn(an). Analogously, the second candidate for K can be
found by looking at the inequality dn ≤ K(1 − rn) for rn = 0. A K for
this case is identified by assuming that an economically meaningful demand
quantity can not exceed the market saturation quantity of the entire system
K2 =
∑
n(Dn). Thus, K can be defined as the maximum of these two values
K = max(K1,K2). The other constants can be derived in a similar manner.
Some advice on how to compute these disjunctive constraints constants in
a more general setting for a linear program with upper-level variables ap-
pearing in the right-hand side of the constraints is provided in Appendix
A.2.
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Figure 5.1: Three-node test network
Source: Own representation.
5.4.4 Computational Results2
Three-node network
The objective of this section is to apply two models of electric power mar-
kets. The first tests are carried out with a simple three-node example as
depicted in Figure 5.13. Afterwards the computational results for a fifteen-
node network of the Western European grid are reported. In both bases,
the models were coded in GAMS and used the CPLEX solver.
In order to run the test for the three-node example, the network parameters
have to defined. Two types of parameters can be distinguished. One type
describes the topology of the network such as the characteristics of the
lines, the information which nodes are interconnected, and so on.4 The
other type refers to the electricity market itself. The latter parameters
describe the demand, supply, and respective locations within the network.
The parameters an and bn for the linear inverse demand function described
2All calculations refer to hourly values. Hence, one MW of generation is one MWh of
energy delivered.
3Note that the arrows define the positive direction for the line flows. If the values for
the line flows are negative, the flow goes in the opposite direction.
4For this small three-node network, the reactance and resistance of all lines are taken
to be equal.
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in Section 5.4.2 of the form an − bndn are displayed in Table B.1. The
demand structure is constructed such that there is a load center at node
n3. The supply structure is specified by the marginal cost per plant and
a maximum generation capacity for this plant. In order to carry out tests
with the model, the supply side and the network parameters were varied
for five different test cases (Table B.2). It is assumed that the generation
centers are located at nodes n1 and n2, thus there is an electricity transport
required in order to balance demand and generation. For the first test cases
(Test1-Test4 in Table B.2), the network parameters are chosen in a way that
congestion is not expected. For Test5, there is congestion expected on line
l2 as the line capacity for line l2 (lcl2 in Table B.2) is decreased from 10 to
4 in this scenario.
As the presented model is supposed to simulate the result of strategic behav-
ior, a benchmark case is defined against which the impact of this behavior
(‘strat’) can be compared. The benchmark is the case of a perfect compe-
tition (‘comp’) model that is solved as an MCP (compare Equation (5.6)).
The results for Test1-Test3 shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.2 are easiest to follow:
The strategic generator only produces with its cheapest plant u2 in both
the perfect competition and the strategic gaming case. However, in perfect
competition, this generator has a profit of 0 whereas the profit is positive for
the strategic runs (Table 5.2). The strategic generator manages to increase
its profit by holding back generation. This leads to a decrease in demand
and production but maximizes its profit. However, its output decision is
constrained by the cheapest plant of the fringe (Table B.2). It cannot hold
back too much capacity since otherwise the fringe would have an incentive to
produce which would lower the profit of the strategic player. Accordingly, if
the marginal cost of the cheapest fringe generator increases (Table B.2), the
strategic firm decreases its output to the point of maximum profit i.e., 4.5
MWh. Comparing the changes in strategic output and profits from Test1 to
Test2 and from Test2 through Test4, it can be seen that the strategic result
moves from producing 7 MWh to 4.5 MWh (Test1 vs. Test2). Furthermore,
this level of 4.5 MWh is maintained from Test2 to Test4 (Table 5.3) albeit the
marginal cost of the fringe still increases (Table B.2). Hence, even increasing
marginal cost of the fringe further does not impact the results. The same
behavior can be observed for Test5. However, the difference between Test5
and the other test cases is that there is now network congestion. Hence, the
strategic player cannot satisfy enough demand with its cheapest plant. By
producing with its second (more expensive) unit, it can create counterflows
and relieve congestion which in turn facilitates higher generation with the
less expensive plant. The output decisions are chosen in the most profitable
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way (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Lastly, the problem size and calculation times5
are summarized in Tables B.3 and B.5.
Test1 Test2 Test3 Test4 Test5
profits comp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
[d] strat 14.0 20.3 20.3 20.3 12.3
Table 5.2: Profit of strategic player in the three-node network
Fifteen-node network
The second example is a more complex fifteen-node network representing
a stylized grid of the Western European market based on Neuhoff et al.
(2005). In order to obtain a linear inverse demand function, a reference
demand and an elasticity for each node in the network were assumed. (For
a deeper discussion of the data and the methodology refer to Chapter 3
and Leuthold et al. (2008a)). Demand data base upon UCTE (2006). The
network aggregates data for Belgium, France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands with Germany and France represented by one node each (n1 and n2,
respectively), Belgium by two nodes (n3 and n6) and the Netherlands by
three nodes (n4, n5, and n7). Altogether, there are 15 nodes (Figure 5.2)
of which eight are auxiliary without supply and demand (nodes n8 to n15).
These nodes are necessary for the adequate modeling of cross-border flows.
Altogether four different tests are carried out. For each of these test runs,
a different company is assigned the Stackelberg leader role. In Test EDF,
for example, the French company EDF is the Stackelberg leader and all
other companies are fringe players. The same pattern applies for Electra-
bel (Ebel) of Belgium as well as for EON and RWE of Germany in runs
Test Ebel, Test EON, and Test RWE, respectively. Table B.8 displays the
installed generation capacities per player.6 The subsequent results aim to
show that the approach presented in this chapter works for a medium-scale
test network and it is assumed that the approach is a significant modeling
advance.
The numerical example shows that network effects have a significant im-
pact on short-term market equilibria in electricity markets and cannot be
neglected. Hence, a preliminary run starts by assuming that there are no
5All tests were conducted on a Intel Pentium 4, 3.00 GHz, with 1.00 GB of RAM.
6It should be stated that the level of detail of the data and, particularly, of the network
is too low in order to draw a conclusion for the real market.
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Figure 5.2: Stylized network of the Western European grid
Source: Based on Neuhoff et al. (2005).
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network constraints within the entire network. For this case the prices are
equal at each node within the network. Also, EDF alone has the potential
to lift the price above the competitive level by holding back production and
thereby increase its own profit (Table B.9). For all other test cases, the
Stackelberg assumption for the respective other players that were tried as
Stackelberg leaders does not have a profit-increasing effect.
However, the picture changes significantly if physical network constraints
are included. The results of the fifteen-node example are then less intuitive
than in case of the previous three-node network. Nonetheless, the outcome
follows the same pattern. The Stackelberg leader is able to induce higher
prices at the relevant nodes (Table 5.5), i.e., those nodes where it has sig-
nificant production capacities, by holding back production (Tables 5.4-5.9).
As could be observed in Test5 of the three-node example, there is congestion
in the larger network, too, evidenced by market prices that differ by node
(Table 5.5). For Ebel, EDF, and RWE acting as the only strategic player
is profitable (Table 5.4). Particularly for EDF, the potential to increase
their individual profit is huge. Presumably, this is due to the fact that in
the model EDF has a greater supply of low-cost generation capacity (Table
B.8), in particular nuclear power plants, which opens the potential to enact
market power.
The important aspect is the issue of network congestion as mentioned earlier.
The model is constructed in a way that EDF is the only player at node n2
representing France in a single node. Hence, competitive players would have
to use the network in order to compete with EDF in node n2. However, by
strategically choosing output decisions, EDF can influence flow patterns
and reap the profits by itself. The situation is different in the case where
competitors have generation capacities at the same nodes as the strategic
player. In this case, the strategic player has to take into account output
decisions of competitors at the nodes with several players. If the prices
become too high, the competitive fringe companies still have an incentive
to produce at marginal cost and cannot be excluded by network effects
(compare the results of the three-node example described earlier). Hence,
in the case of the Ebel and RWE, the profit increase is less distinct due to a
more competitive situation but also due to smaller power plant fleet of these
players.
Furthermore, the results for EON seem to be surprising as EON is not able to
increase individual profit (Table 5.4). However, this result is easy to explain:
the network is structured such that that EnBW, RWE, and Vattenfall are
aggregated within the same node as EON. Hence, withholding of EON does
not have an effect as it can be entirely compensated by other competitors.
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The latter is of course strongly influenced by the simplified nature of the
network representation.
Regarding computational issues, the calculation times vary significantly for
the strategic cases. The computation times for Test EON and Test RWE
are below 20 seconds. The Test Ebel run takes about four minutes whereas
it takes five hours for the Test EDF case (Table B.11).7 The computation
times depend largely on the number of discrete variables (Table B.10) but
also to which extend the position of a companies’ generation facilities within
the network allows gaming over scarce network resources via its output de-
cisions.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a mixed-integer linear programming model for a Stackelberg
game applicable to network-constrained industries is presented. In order
to do so, the equilibrium conditions of the associated MPEC have been
converted to disjunctive constraints. This approach is then applied to two
different test networks in electricity markets: a three-node example network
and a fifteen-node model of the Western European grid. The results show
that the approach works well and is promising for solving larger-scale models
in the future.
7All tests were conducted on a Intel Xeon CPU E5420 (8 cores) with 16 GB RAM.
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Test Ebel
gn3Ebelu1 gn4Ebelu3 gn6Ebelu1 gn6Ebelu3 gn7Ebelu4
[MWh] [MWh] [MWh] [MWh] [MWh]
comp 2548 1000 3000 514 2000
strat 2000 1000 500 2000 1000
Table 5.6: Strategic generation Test Ebel
Test EDF
gn2EDFu7 gn2EDFu7
[MWh] [MWh]
comp 54209 14000
strat 31000 14000
Table 5.7: Strategic generation Test EDF
Test EON
gn1EONu1 gn1EONu2 gn1EONu3 gn4EONu3 gn4EONu5
[MWh] [MWh] [MWh] [MWh] [MWh]
comp 8000 1000 7000 3000 303
strat 8000 1000 1000 1000 0
Table 5.8: Strategic generation Test EON
Test RWE
gn1RWEu1 gn1RWEu2
[MWh] [MWh]
comp 6000 11000
strat 6000 2000
Table 5.9: Strategic generation Test RWE
Chapter 6
Solving
Discretely-Constrained
MPEC Problems Using
Disjunctive Constraints and
Benders Decomposition with
an Application in an Electric
Power Market
6.1 Introduction and Literature
This chapter presents an alternative approach to solve discretely-constrained
MPECs in electric power markets using disjunctive constraints different from
the approach presented in Chapter 5. Hence, the basic setting of the prob-
lem and the introduction to the topic of modeling strategic behavior in
mathematical terms can be found in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. However, in this
chapter a new algorithmic approach is presented to solve two-stage Stack-
elberg games with one leader based on a Benders decomposition technique.
Benders decomposition was first reported by Benders (1962)1 as a partition-
ing procedure for solving mixed-variables programming problems and was
later incorporated into the literature of large scale mathematical program-
1Benders (1962) is also available as reprint Benders (2005).
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ming by Geoffrion (Geoffrion, 1970a,b, 1972). A more recent rework of the
concept can be found in Conejo et al. (2006). Conejo et al. (2006) provide a
clear description of Benders decomposition and include exercises in electric
power markets and other infrastructure industries that help to comprehend
the Benders approach. The work of Conejo et al. (2006) was thus the ma-
jor starting point for the development of the algorithm introduced in this
chapter. The contribution of this work is several fold. First, it establishes
an important connection between Benders method and complementarity or
MPEC approaches begun by Gabriel et al. (2009) but now extended beyond
the linear objective function. Using the Benders approach has the advantage
of allowing for a bilinear objective function of the MPEC (here: strategic
profit) - that can be decomposed into two linear problems - and the subprob-
lem to be integer-constrained resulting in a discretely-constrained MPEC.
For a discussion of possible applications of this type of problems refer to
Section 5.2.
This chapter discusses a new decomposition method for solving two-level
planning problems with applications in electric power. The upper-level in-
volves generation decisions for the Stackelberg leader and the lower-level
depicts the rest of the market and the ISO problem. One of the advan-
tages of the approach combining disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat and
McCarl, 1981; Gabriel et al., 2009) and Benders decomposition (Benders,
1962; Geoffrion, 1970a,b, 1972; Floudas, 1995; Conejo et al., 2006) is that
it easily allows for integer restrictions on the upper-level variables, for ex-
ample, allowing discrete generation levels for the producer, if-then logic on
generation across time periods, or generation costs consistent with the fixed
cost problem (Winston, 1994). In this case, the integer restrictions appear
in the master problem which is itself a mixed-integer linear problem. In the
present problem the integer variables appear in the subproblem. Hence an-
other advantage of the Benders approach is exploited. This other advantage
is that it decomposes a complicated problem into two easier problems which
promises better computational behavior particularly for medium- and large-
scale problems. It is shown that this approach can potentially speed-up the
solving times compared to the pure MIP approach of Chapter 5.
All that is needed is that the optimal value function for the lower-level
problem () be piecewise convex (compare Section 6.2.1). The reason is that
within each segment, a standard Benders approach is applied which itself will
need this function to be convex. In the applications in Gabriel et al. (2009),
the -function was shown to be piecewise linear (hence piecewise convex)
since the lower-level problems considered were linear programs or linear
complementarity problems (LCPs). By contrast, in the current chapter,
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the lower-level problem has a bilinear objective function with polyhedral
constraints. The difficulty of the nonconvex objective function is avoided
since it involves fixed upper-level variables as coefficients and from that
perspective, a two-pass process is used to overcome numerical difficulties.
A few others have also considered methods for solving MPECs with integer
restrictions but have generally not made use of the Benders approach which
naturally lends itself to this type of problem via a master and subproblem
which separate key variables. These other methods can be grouped into three
categories: application-specific approaches, integer-programming methods,
or nonlinear programming-based algorithms (compare Chapter 5).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 the general
concept of the Benders decomposition technique is described (Section 6.2.1)
which is further applied to the general problem setting introduced in Chapter
5 (Section 6.2.2). The upper-level is a linear program and the lower-lower is
a welfare maximization problem for an ISO. Next in Section 6.3, numerical
results of a Benders approach for an illustrative electricity market example
is described. The numerical results are promising. However, I also point out
the limitations of the existing algorithm which leads to according summary
remarks and future directions in Section 6.4.2
6.2 General Mathematical Formulation
6.2.1 Benders Decomposition: A Primer
This section provides an introduction to the Benders decomposition tech-
nique. An example is presented in which both master and subproblem are
linear programs. Furthermore, it is assumed that the subproblem is always
feasible. One must be aware that these assumptions do not necessarily hold
for the application presented in the second part of this chapter.
According to Conejo et al. (2006) there are two different problem structures
for which decomposition techniques can be exploited: programs with compli-
cating constraints and programs with complicating variables. The first type
can be solved applying the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm which
will not be considered in detail here. The latter type can be solved apply-
ing Benders decomposition. The subsequent example is taken from Conejo
et al. (2006) in order to introduce the Benders decomposition concept be-
fore it will be applied to the problem of a two-stage game for an electricity
2The chapter is based on work carried out jointly with Prof. Dr. Steven A. Gabriel
(University of Maryland).
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market in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.
min
zi,z̃j
⎧⎨⎩∑
i
cizi +
∑
j
dj z̃j
⎫⎬⎭ (6.1a)
subject to ∑
i
alizi +
∑
j
eliz̃j ≤ b(l); l = 1, ..., q (6.1b)
0 ≤ zi ≤ zupi ; i = 1, ..., n (6.1c)
0 ≤ z̃i ≤ z̃upi ; j = 1, ...,m (6.1d)
Within problem (6.1), there are complicating variables zi and other variables
z̃j . The characteristic of the complicating variables is that if they are fixed
to given values, the problem becomes substantially simpler (Conejo et al.,
2006). Hence, it could be favorable to determine meaningful values for the
zi variables, fix them and solve the remaining problem. Obviously, there
are two challenges. First, a way to determine meaningful zi variables has
to be defined. Second, there has to be a method to adjust the fixed zi
variables such that the algorithm actually arrives at an optimal solution to
the overall problem. An algorithm that is able to manage the mentioned
challenges is Benders decomposition. Benders method defines a master and a
subproblem. The master problem includes the complicating variables and an
additional function that cuts out inferior solutions after each iteration (the
so-called -function). The subproblem is made up of a particular instance
of the original problem where the complicating variables are parameterized.
Accordingly, problem (6.1) can be rewritten as follows:
min
zi
{∑
i
cizi + (zi)
}
(6.2a)
subject to
0 ≤ zi ≤ zupi ; i = 1, ..., n (6.2b)
wℎere
(zi) = min
z̃j
⎧⎨⎩∑
j
dj z̃j
⎫⎬⎭ (6.3a)
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subject to ∑
j
eliz̃j ≤ b(l) −
∑
i
alizi; l = 1, ..., q (6.3b)
0 ≤ z̃i ≤ z̃upi ; j = 1, ...,m (6.3c)
Based on this reformulation, one can define Benders master and subproblem.
The master problem (MP) can be deduced from problem (6.2):
min
zi,
{∑
i
cizi + 
}
(6.4a)
subject to
0 ≤ zi ≤ zupi ; i = 1, ..., n (6.4b)
 ≥ down (6.4c)∑
j
dj z̃
(k)
j +
∑
i

(k)
i (zi − z
(k)
i ) ≤ ; k = 1, ...,  (6.4d)
where down is a bound that is determined exogenously according to charac-
teristics of the analyzed real-world application and k is the iteration step.3
The values for z̃
(k)
j and 
(k)
i result from the subproblem (SP) which can be
deduced from (6.3):
min
z̃j
⎧⎨⎩∑
j
dj z̃j
⎫⎬⎭ (6.5a)
subject to ∑
j
eliz̃j ≤ b(l) −
∑
i
alizi; l = 1, ..., q (6.5b)
0 ≤ z̃i ≤ z̃upi ; j = 1, ...,m (6.5c)
zi = z
(k)
i (
(k)
i ); i = 1, ..., n (6.5d)
3The constraints that are added to the master problem after each iteration through
inequalities (6.4d) are called Benders cuts (Conejo et al., 2006).
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Within the SP (6.5), the complicating variables zi are fixed. Hence, it
is assumed that the SP is much easier to solve than the original problem
(Conejo et al., 2006).4 Constraint (6.5d) forces the problem to hold the
complicating variables fixed. The dual variables 
(k)
i of (6.5d) then provide
the required information for an additional Benders cut in the MP.
In addition to the MP (6.4) and the SP (6.5), one needs a stopping criterion
in order to complete the Benders decomposition algorithm. In order to
define this criterion, the following bounds are computed:
lob(k+1) =
∑
i
ciz
(k+1)
i + 
(k+1) (6.6a)
upb(k+1) =
∑
i
ciz
(k+1)
i +
∑
j
dj z̃
(k+1)
j (6.6b)
On the one hand, the MP defines a relaxed version of the original problem
(Conejo et al., 2006). Hence, the optimal objective value of the MP displayed
in Equation (6.6a) defines the lower bound lob of the optimal value of the
original problem. The SP, on the other hand, is a version of the original
problem with additional restrictions. Hence, the optimal objective value of
the SP displayed in Equation (6.6b) defines the upper bound upb of the
optimal value of the original problem. Under the assumption of convexity
of the -function5, lob can not be greater than upb and an optimal solution
is found as soon as lob = upb. However, in most applications the algorithm
stops if the convergence gap between upb and lob is below a predefined
threshold ".
Based on the above described procedures, the Benders decomposition algo-
rithm can, thus, be implemented as follows (compare Conejo et al., 2006):
∙ Step 0: Initialization. Set iteration counter  = 1. Solve the master
problem (6.4) initially disregarding constraints (6.4d). This problem
has the trivial solution (1) = down, and either z
(1)
i = 0 if ci ≥ 0 or
z
(1)
i = z
up
i if ci < 0.
4In this example, there is only one subproblem. However, in some larger problems,
there can be several separated SPs. Benders decomposition can also be applied in this
case. However, the Benders cuts then have to be modified slightly. Refer to Conejo et al.
(2006, p. 118) for a deeper discussion.
5Compare Conejo et al. (2006) for a further discussion.
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∙ Step 1: Subproblem solution. Set iteration step k to . Solve
the subproblem (6.5). This problem has the primal variable solution
vector z̃
()
j and a dual variable solution vector 
()
i .
∙ Step 2: Convergence checking. Compute lob() and upb() accord-
ing to (6.6a) and (6.6b), respectively. If upb() − lob() < ", stop; the
optimal solution vectors are z
()
i and z̃
()
j . Otherwise, continue with
the next step.
∙ Step 3: Master problem solution. Update iteration counter  =
+1. Solve the master problem (6.4) for k = 1, ..., −1. The solution
of this problem is the vector x
()
i and 
(). Go to Step 1.
6.2.2 General Problem Setting
This section provides a more stylized general formulation of the specific
problem at hand. As the problem itself is the same as described in Section
5.3, the beginning of this section is copied from there in order to maintain
readability. Starting from this problem formulation, the Benders decompo-
sition technique described in Section 6.2.1 is then applied to the problem in
the final part of this section.
The general form of the problem to be solved by the leader (e.g., strategic
generator) is as follows where x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rm are respectively, the upper
and lower-level vectors of variables:
min
x,y
{(
dx
dy
)T (
x
y
)
+
1
2
(
x
y
)T (
Mxx Mxy
Myx Myy
)(
x
y
)}
(6.7a)
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subject to
A1y +B1x = b1 (1) (6.7b)
A2x = b2 (2) (6.7c)
A3x ≤ b3 (3) (6.7d)
A4y = b4 (4) (6.7e)
A5y ≤ b5 (5) (6.7f)
xi ∈ Z+, i = 1, . . . , n1 (6.7g)
xi ∈ R, i = n1 + 1, . . . , n (6.7h)
y ∈ S (x) (6.7i)
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m1 (6.7j)
y2 (free), j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m (6.7k)
where A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B1 are matrices of suitable size conformal with the
vectors x, y and right-hand sides b1, b2, b3, b4, b5. The vectors dx, dy contain
coefficients for x and y, and Mxx,Mxy,Myx,Myy are the submatrices refer-
ring to the quadratic terms of the objective function. The objective function
(6.7a) is quadratic in both the upper and lower-level variables which in the
particular power application described in Section 6.3 will involve pairwise
products of variables (e.g., generation times price) as well as linear terms
(e.g., generation times costs). Equation (6.7b) is the set of joint constraints
linking the upper and lower-level variables with 1 representing the dual
variables to these constraints (similar notation for dual variables for the
other constraints). Equations (6.7c) and (6.7d) are the constraints that only
involve the upper-level variables x whereas (6.7e) and (6.7f) are the coun-
terparts for the lower-level variables y. Equations (6.7g) and (6.7h) indicate
that a subset of the upper-level variables are integer-valued whereas con-
straint (6.7i) stipulates that y must be a solution to the lower-level problem
given x. Lastly, the vector y is partitioned into a nonnegative subvector (y1)
and the remaining variables (y2) free as shown in the last two constraints.
The lower-level problem will typically be either a convex, quadratic program
whose necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions or a Nash-
Cournot game can be expressed as a mixed linear complementarity problem
(MLCP) (Facchinei and Pang, 2003) given as follows:
0 ≤ c1 (x) +M11(x)y1 +M12(x)y2⊥y1 ≥ 0 (6.8a)
0 = c2 (x) +M21(x)y1 +M22(x)y2 y2 (free) (6.8b)
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where the dependence on the upper-level variables can be in the vector
c =
(
c1 (x)
T c2 (x)
T
)T
and/or the matrix
M =
(
M11(x) M12(x)
M21(x) M22(x)
)
Having a sufficiently large constant K, the complementarity conditions (6.8)
can be converted to disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl,
1981; Gabriel et al., 2009) as
0 ≤ c1 (x) +M11(x)y1 +M12(x)y2 ≤ Kr (6.9a)
0 ≤ y1 ≤ K(1− r) (6.9b)
0 = c2 (x) +M21(x)y1 +M22(x)y2 y2 (free) (6.9c)
where r is a vector of binary variables. In general finding a reasonable
constant K may take trial and error. However, in specific instances such
as the case study described below, a suitable value can easily be found; see
Section 5.4.3 and Appendix A.2 for further guidance on how to obtain such
a constant.
Replacing (6.7i) by (6.9) leads to the overall problem expressed in disjunctive
form:
min
x,y
{(
dx
dy
)T (
x
y
)
+
1
2
(
x
y
)T (
Mxx Mxy
Myx Myy
)(
x
y
)}
(6.10a)
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subject to
A1y +B1x = b1 (1) (6.10b)
A2x = b2 (2) (6.10c)
A3x ≤ b3 (3) (6.10d)
A4y = b4 (4) (6.10e)
A5y ≤ b5 (5) (6.10f)
xi ∈ Z+, i = 1, . . . , n1 (6.10g)
xi ∈ R, i = n1 + 1, . . . , n (6.10h)
0 ≤ c1 (x) +M11(x)y1 +M12(x)y2 ≤ Kr (6.10i)
0 ≤ y1 ≤ K(1− r) (6.10j)
0 = c2 (x) +M21(x)y1 +M22(x)y2 y2 (free) (6.10k)
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m1 (6.10l)
y2 (free), j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m (6.10m)
ri ∈ {0, 1}m1 (6.10n)
The problem can then be expressed solely in terms of the upper-level vari-
ables as follows:
min
x,y
dTxx+
1
2
xTMxxx+ a(x) (6.11a)
subject to
A2x = b2 (2) (6.11b)
A3x ≤ b3 (3) (6.11c)
xi ∈ Z+, i = 1, . . . , n1 (6.11d)
xi ∈ R, i = n1 + 1, . . . , n (6.11e)
where (x) is the optimal objective function to
min
y
{
dTy y +
1
2
xTMxyy +
1
2
yTMyxx+
1
2
yTMyyy
}
(6.12a)
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subject to
A1y +B1x = b1 (1) (6.12b)
A4y = b4 (4) (6.12c)
A5y ≤ b5 (5) (6.12d)
0 ≤ c1 (x) +M11(x)y1 +M12(x)y2 ≤ Kr (6.12e)
0 ≤ y1 ≤ K(1− r) (6.12f)
0 = c2 (x) +M21(x)y1 +M22(x)y2 y2 free (6.12g)
y1 ≥ 0, y2 free (6.12h)
ri ∈ {0, 1} (6.12i)
The key is to solve a sequence of subproblem and master problems in the
manner of Benders method (compare Section 6.2.1) for solving (6.10). The
MP will be (6.11) but with (x) replaced by a variable  and Benders cuts
(as well as a lower bound on the  variable) used to approximate (x).
The SP will be (6.12) but with an additional fixing constraint of the form
x = xfixed.6 The key is to estimate or know in advance, the subdomains
for (x) for which this function is convex. Then, a Benders method for
each segment is applied with the overall solution being the best from each
of the finite subdomains. In the case study below, it is required to be shown
that for this specific instance of (6.11), (x) is piecewise linear so that the
procedure is guaranteed to converge in a finite number of steps assuming
that the identification of the subdomains where (x) is convex is accurate
(Gabriel et al., 2009).
6.3 Numerical Example for an Electricity Market
To apply the decomposition method described above, the three nodes net-
work (Figure 5.1) and the corresponding data set known from Section 5.4.4
is used to provide a comparability for the results.
6Conejo et al. (2006) show for LPs that the dual variable vector to the fixing constraints
corresponds to the subgradients for the function (x). In addition, Conejo et al. (2006)
state that the convergence of the Benders method for any type of a mathematical program
is guaranteed as long as the envelope of the -function is convex.
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6.3.1 Mathematical Notation
Indices:
n, k ∈ N nodes in the network
k′ swing bus
l ∈ L line between n and k
f ∈ F firms in the market
s ∈ F firms acting strategically
j ∈ F competitive fringe firms
u ∈ U generation units
it ∈ I iteration counter within Benders decomposition algorithm
Sets:
F set of all firms
L set of all lines
N set of all nodes
U set of all generation units
I set of all iteration steps
Parameters:
an, bn intercept [d/MWh] and slope [d/MWh
2] of linear
demand functions (an, bn ≥ 0, ∀n)
cnfu generation cost [d/MWh] of firm f at node n
with unit u (cnfu ≥ 0, ∀n, f, u)
ḡnfu maximum generation capacity [MW] of firm f
at node n with unit u (ḡnfu ≥ 0, ∀n, f, u)
B network susceptance matrix n × k
H network transfer matrix l × k
lcl physical line capacity limit of line [MW] l
swk swing bus vector, swk =
{
1 if k = k′
0 otherwise
∀k
K, K̄, K̂, K̃, Ǩ constants in order to replace complementarities by
disjunctive constraints
 alpha down for Benders decomposition
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Variables:
dn demand at node n
gnfu generation of firm f at node n with unit u
k phase angle at node k
n shadow price for energy at node n
l shadow price for transmission on line l due to
binding line flow constraint in positive direction

l
shadow price for transmission on line l due to
binding line flow constraint in negative direction
nju dual variable of maximum generation constraint per
unit u of fringe firm j at node n
k dual variable for slack bus constraint
rn, r̄nfu, r̂l, r̃l, řnfu binary variables in order to replace
complementarities by disjunctive constraints
 alpha for Benders decomposition
6.3.2 Mathematical Formulation
The two formulations (6.13) and (6.14) are already known from Section
5.4. They are repeated in this section in order to maintain readability.
The Benders technique is then applied afterwards. Problem (6.13) describes
the welfare maximization problem of an ISO assuming that all generators
bid at marginal cost. In contrast, problem (6.14) assumes that there is
one Stackelberg leader that bids strategically taking into account the ISO’s
reaction.
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0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ≤ Krn,∀n (6.13a)
0 ≤ dn ≤ K(1− rn), ∀n (6.13b)
0 ≤ cnfu − n + nfu ≤ K̄r̄nfu (6.13c)
0 ≤ gnfu ≤ K̄(1− r̄nfu), ∀n, f, u (6.13d)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
−
{
k if k′ = k
0 otherwise
k (free) , ∀k (6.13e)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu, n (free),∀n (6.13f)
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̂r̂l, ∀l (6.13g)
0 ≤ l ≤ K̂(1− r̂l), ∀l (6.13h)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̃r̃l, ∀l (6.13i)
0 ≤ 
l
≤ K̃(1− r̃l), ∀l (6.13j)
0 ≤ −gnfu + gnfu ≤ Ǩřnfu, ∀n, f, u (6.13k)
0 ≤ nfu ≤ Ǩ(1− řnfu), ∀n, f, u (6.13l)
0 = −swkk, k (free), ∀k (6.13m)
rn, r̄nfu, r̂l, r̃l, řnfu ∈ ⟨0, 1⟩ ∀n, f, u, l
For the purpose of including strategic behavior in the problem, it is assumed
that the set of firms f is partitioned into two subsets. Subset s corresponds
to the firms that act strategically. Subset j is for the firms that act as price-
takers. It is assumed that the firms s decide first on their output decisions
in order to maximize individual profits which means that their quantities
are exogenous to the ISO problem. These firms know that they influence
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the market equilibrium with their decisions. The output decision of fringe
firms j is determined by the ISO. The latter can be interpreted as a pool
system. The entire problem is known as Stackelberg game where firms s
are the leaders and the ISO (deciding on the quantities of firms j) is the
follower. In the problem at hand, it is assumed that only one player acts
strategically resulting in the MPEC (6.14).
min
dn,gnsu,nju,k,k,n,l,l
{∑
n
∑
s
∑
u
(cnsu − n)gnsu
}
(6.14a)
subject to
0 ≤ gnsu − gnsu, ∀n, s, u (6.14b)
0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ⊥ dn ≥ 0, ∀n (6.14c)
0 ≤ cnju − n + nju ⊥ gnju ≥ 0, ∀n, j, u (6.14d)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
−
{
k if k = k′
0 otherwise
k (free), ∀k (6.14e)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu, n (free), ∀n (6.14f)
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ⊥ l ≥ 0,∀l (6.14g)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ⊥ l ≥ 0,∀l (6.14h)
0 ≤ −gnju + gnju ⊥ nju ≥ 0,∀n, j, u (6.14i)
0 = −swkk k (free), ∀k (6.14j)
As stated earlier the fringe firms’ output decisions are determined by the
ISO. Hence, the strategic generator takes into account their reaction in terms
of the equilibrium problem (6.14c-6.14j) of the ISO within his profit max-
imization problem. Now the two approaches described above are applied.
First, the KKTs are transformed into disjunctive constraints. Then, the
problem is decomposed according to Benders approach as presented in Sec-
tion 6.2.2 which yields the following master (6.15) and subproblem (6.16).
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min
gnsu,
{∑
n
∑
u
(cnsugnsu) + 
}
(6.15a)
subject to
−  ≤ 0 (6.15b)∑
n,s,u
−gnsun +
∑
n,s,u
 (it)nsu(gnsu − g(it)nsu)−  ≤ 0, ∀it ≥ 2 (6.15c)
gnsu − gnsu ≤ 0, ∀n, s, u (6.15d)
gnsu ≥ 0, ∀n, s, u (6.15e)
According to the description in Section 6.2.1, the algorithm is initialized
by first solving the MP which then provides the first vector of fixed master
problem variables gnsu for the SP. Hence, for the first MP a Benders cut
is not available as the Benders cuts result from the dual variable values
 
(it)
nsu which are part of the SP. This explains why constraint 6.15c is not
included into the MP for it = 1. Furthermore, the objective function of the
subproblem (6.16a) is bilinear as two factors are multiplied that are both
defined variables for the problem. Additionally, there are binary variables
in the constraints. This leads to a MINLP:
CHAPTER 6. MPEC PROBLEM: BENDERS DECOMPOSITION 114
min
dn,gnfu,rn,r̄nju,r̂l,r̃l,řnju,nju,k,k,n,l,l
{∑
n
∑
s
∑
u
−gnsun
}
(6.16a)
subject to
0 = gfixnsu − gnsu,  nsu (free), ∀n, s, u (6.16b)
0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ≤ Krn, ∀n (6.16c)
0 ≤ dn ≤ K(1− rn),∀n (6.16d)
0 ≤ cnju − n + nju ≤ K̄r̄nju, ∀n, j, u (6.16e)
0 ≤ gnju ≤ K̄(1− r̄nju), ∀n, j, u (6.16f)
0 = −swkk, k (free),∀k (6.16g)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu, n (free),∀n (6.16h)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
(6.16i)
−
{
k if k = k′
0 otherwise
k (free),∀k
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̂r̂l,∀l (6.16j)
0 ≤ l ≤ K̂(1− r̂l),∀l (6.16k)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̃r̃l,∀l (6.16l)
0 ≤ 
l
≤ K̃(1− r̃l),∀l (6.16m)
0 ≤ −gnju + gnju ≤ Ǩřnju,∀n, j, u (6.16n)
0 ≤ nju ≤ Ǩ(1− řnju), ∀n, j, u (6.16o)
rn, r̄nju, r̂l, r̃l, řnju ∈ ⟨0, 1⟩
This mixed-integer nonlinear subproblem which is hard to solve. Hence, two-
pass approach is used in order to solve the subproblem described in (6.16).
First, the set of Equations is transformed using an equivalent transformation
integrating Equations (6.16b) into the objective function (6.16a). In order
to do so, variables gnsu in (6.16a) are replaced by the parameters g
fix
nsu. The
resulting equivalent subproblem looks as follows:
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min
dn,gnju,rn,r̄nju,r̂l,r̃l,řnju,nju,k,k,n,l,l
{∑
n
∑
s
∑
u
−gfixnsun
}
(6.17a)
subject to
0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ≤ Krn,∀n (6.17b)
0 ≤ dn ≤ K(1− rn), ∀n (6.17c)
0 ≤ cnju − n + nju ≤ K̄r̄nju, ∀n, j, u (6.17d)
0 ≤ gnju ≤ K̄(1− r̄nju), ∀n, j, u (6.17e)
0 = −swkk, k (free), ∀k (6.17f)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
j
∑
u
gnju
−
∑
s
∑
u
gfixnsu, n (free),∀n (6.17g)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
−
{
k if k = k′
0 otherwise
k (free), ∀k (6.17h)
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̂r̂l,∀l (6.17i)
0 ≤ l ≤ K̂(1− r̂l),∀l (6.17j)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̃r̃l,∀l (6.17k)
0 ≤ 
l
≤ K̃(1− r̃l),∀l (6.17l)
0 ≤ −gnju + gnju ≤ Ǩřnju,∀n, j, u (6.17m)
0 ≤ nju ≤ Ǩ(1− řnju), ∀n, j, u (6.17n)
rn, r̄nju, r̂l, r̃l, řnju ∈ ⟨0, 1⟩
This problem can be solved as a MILP. However, the MILP does not pro-
vide the necessary information for solving the master problem in the set of
Equations (6.15). In order to make Benders decomposition work, Benders
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cuts (6.15c) are needed. For these cuts, the dual variable  nsu from the
SP constraint (6.16b) is needed. However, the set of conditions (6.17) do
not provide the required information. This information is received through
a second run of the subproblem. For the second run, the binary variables
rn, r̄nju, r̂l, r̃l, řnju are fixed to the values taken in the first run. Thus, the
binary variables in (6.16) are replaced by the parameters rfixn , r̄
fix
nju, r̂
fix
l ,
r̃fixl , ř
fix
nju. The resulting bilinear subproblem is as follows:
min
dn,gnju,nju,k,k,n,l,l
{∑
n
∑
s
∑
u
−gnsun
}
(6.18a)
subject to
0 = gfixnsu − gnsu,  nsu (free), ∀n, s, u (6.18b)
0 ≤ −an + bndn + n ≤ Krfixn , ∀n (6.18c)
0 ≤ dn ≤ K(1− rfixn ), ∀n (6.18d)
0 ≤ cnju − n + nju ≤ K̄r̄fixnju, ∀n, j, u (6.18e)
0 ≤ gnju ≤ K̄(1− r̄fixnju), ∀n, j, u (6.18f)
0 = −swkk, k (free),∀k (6.18g)
0 = dn +
∑
k
(Bnkk)−
∑
f
∑
u
gnfu = 0, n (free),∀n (6.18h)
0 =
∑
n
(Bnkn) +
∑
l
(Hlkl)−
∑
l
(
Hlkl
)
(6.18i)
−
{
k if k = k′
0 otherwise
k (free),∀k
0 ≤ lcl −
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̂r̂fixl ,∀l (6.18j)
0 ≤ l ≤ K̂(1− r̂
fix
l ),∀l (6.18k)
0 ≤ lcl +
∑
k
(Hlkk) ≤ K̃r̃fixl ,∀l (6.18l)
0 ≤ 
l
≤ K̃(1− r̃fixl ),∀l (6.18m)
0 ≤ −gnju + gnju ≤ Ǩř
fix
nju,∀n, j, u (6.18n)
0 ≤ nju ≤ Ǩ(1− řfixnju), ∀n, j, u (6.18o)
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This problem is solved as a NLP. However, as the two problems (6.17)
and (6.18) solve mathematically equivalent problems, the set of solutions
is exactly the same (compare Appendix C for a mathematical justification).
Additionally, the nonlinear subproblem formulation provides the necessary
information for Benders decomposition in form of the dual variables  nsu
for the master problem.7
6.3.3 Computational Results8
The objective of this section is to show that the approach can be applied
to problems that occur in electric power markets using a simple three-node
example as depicted in Figure 5.1 with the demand structure (Table B.1).
As starting point, the data set of Chapter 5 is used (Table 6.1). Test1 in
Table 6.2 shows that under the simple assumption of sufficient transmission
capacities the Benders approach yields the same results as in Test1 of Ta-
ble 5.3 using the MIP approach. The maximum profit amounts to 14.0 d
and the strategic generation is 7 MWh (Table 6.2) which is exactly that
amount of production that induces a price at which the competitive fringe
player does not produce. As displayed in Table 6.1, all of the existing plants
have a maximum generation limit of 15 MW and the transmission lines have
a limit of 10 MW. As the resulting flows are well below 10 MW, none of
the transmission constraints is binding; also the maximum generation con-
straints for the plants are not binding at the calculated production levels
(compare Table 6.2). However, carrying out a sensitivity analysis shows that
the results change if the maximum generation capacities of the plants ḡnfu
are varied from 15 to 10 (Test2 in Tables 6.1 and 6.2). This should not have
any impact as the maximum generation constraint should not become bind-
ing if the limit is at 10 MWh but the level is at 7 MWh. Hence, one would
assume that the results for Test2 are exactly the same as for Test1. However,
this is not the case. The strategic generation decreases to 6.3 MWh and the
competitive fringe at the same node starts producing 0.7 MWh (Test2 in
Table 6.2). This result is surprising as the strategic profit decreases to 12.6
d. Hence, the result for Test1 is superior as the profit there was 14.0 d.
7The reason to apply the two-pass process is a numerical one. The implementation in
GAMS did not allow to solve the problem (6.16) as MILP although the problem has the
same set of solutions as (6.17).
8All calculations refer to hourly values. Hence, one MW of generation is one MWh of
energy delivered.
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Test1 Test2
cn1su1 2 2
cn2su2 1 1
cn2j1u3 3 3
ḡn1su1 15 10
ḡn2su2 15 10
ḡn2j1u3 15 10
lcl1 10 10
lcl2 10 10
lcl3 10 10
Table 6.1: Data for tests of the three-node example using Benders decom-
position
Test1 Test2
gn1su1 0.0 0.0
gn2su2 7.0 6.3
gn2j1u3 0.0 0.7
dn1 0.0 0.0
dn2 0.0 0.0
dn3 7.0 7.0
pricen1 3.0 3.0
pricen2 3.0 3.0
pricen3 3.0 3.0
flowl1 -2.3 -2.3
flowl2 4.7 4.7
flowl3 2.3 2.3
profits 14.0 12.6
iterations 7 4
Table 6.2: Results for tests of the three-node example using Benders decom-
position
In order to further examine this problem, the different Benders iterations are
displayed in more detail. For both Test1 (Table 6.3) and Test2 (Table 6.4)
the first iterations of the Benders algorithm behave similarly. In iteration
it1, the production of the two strategic units is at the lower bound of 0. The
entire demand of 7 is served by the fringe unit. Accordingly, the negative
multipliers  nsu add a Benders cut for iteration it2 such that the strategic
generation is increased to the upper bound of 15 or 10, respectively. This,
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however, leads to a negative strategic profit. Positive multipliers  nsu in-
dicate that the strategic production should be decreased which takes place
stepwise iteration by iteration. In Test1 the algorithm arrives at the optimal
solution of gn2su2 = 7 MWh and a strategic profit of 14 d after constantly
decreasing strategic output first with the more expensive unit u1 and then
with unit u2 during iterations it2-it7. In Test2, a similar behavior can be
observed during iterations it2-it3. After iteration it3, the output of unit u2
has been decreased below the optimal solution of Test1 (gn2su2 = 7 MWh)
to gn2su2 = 6.3 MWh and profit of 12.6 d. Hence, it would be profitable
for the strategic player to increase its profit again to 7 MWh which is also
indicated by the change of sign of the multipliers  nsu (Table 6.4). How-
ever, it appears that this is not possible any more as the MP is already too
restricted such that the production of 6.3 MWh is the best it can do with
the existing Benders cuts.
Test1
Iteration step
it1 it2 it3 it4 it5 it6 it7
gn1su1 0.0 15.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
gn2su2 0.0 15.0 15.0 8.7 7.3 7.0 7.0
gn2j1u3 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 n1su1 -3.0 16.0 6.5 7.4 4.6 4.0 0.1
 n2su2 -3.0 16.0 6.5 7.4 4.6 4.0 0.1
lob -105 -45.0 -30.8 -17.4 -14.6 -14.0 -14.0
upb 0.0 225.0 36.5 -2.4 -12.5 -13.9 -14.0
profits 0.0 -225.0 -36.5 2.4 12.5 13.9 14.0
Table 6.3: Results per iteration for Test1 of three-node example using Ben-
ders decomposition
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Test2
Iteration step
it1 it2 it3 it4
gn1su1 0.0 10.0 0.8 0.0
gn2su2 0.0 10.0 10.0 6.3
gn2j1u3 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
 n1su1 -3.0 9.3 3.2 -3.0
 n1su1 -3.0 9.3 3.2 -3.0
lob -105 -30.0 -20.8 -12.6
upb 0.0 83.3 7.3 -12.6
profits 0.0 -83.3 -7.3 12.6
Table 6.4: Results per iteration for Test2 of three-node example using Ben-
ders decomposition
Beyond the tests above, additional tests with a differing data set are con-
ducted where the marginal costs of generators vary from each other by a
smaller extent (Table 6.5). Applying the Benders approach to this new data
set again provides interesting insights into the functioning of the algorithm.9
Both algorithms, the MIP approach of Chapter 5 and the Benders approach
of the present chapter are applied to the tests in Table 6.5. However, the
results of the MIP runs are not displayed here. For Test3-5 in Table 6.6 the
results of the both algorithms are identical: the strategic generator holds
back generation in order to increase the price to the level of the marginal
cost of the competitive player which leads to a positive profit in the absence
of binding maximum transmission and generation constraints. However, for
Test6-9, the results differ. In the case that playing over network effects is
excluded because the transmission constraints are not binding, it can be
seen that for the present example there are generally multiple solutions if
both generators are located at the same node and have the same marginal
costs. For this instance the strategic generator does not have the oppor-
tunity to bid strategically as its expected profit is 0 independent from his
output. This is the case for Test6. In the MIP run the strategic generator
satisfies the entire demand of 9 MWh whereas in the Benders approach the
competitive fringe satisfies the entire demand. Nonetheless, both results are
valid solutions. Beyond this result, particularly Test9 uncovers an implau-
sible behavior. While the price at node n1 increases up to 7 d/MWh, the
strategic unit with a marginal cost of 1.13 d/MWh located there does not
9The results produced can be compared if applying the MIP approach of Chapter 5 to
the same data set.
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start to produce while the strategic generator has a profit of 0.
Test3 Test4 Test5 Test6 Test7 Test8 Test9
cn1su1 1.25 1.20 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.13 1.13
cn2su2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
cn2j1u3 1.13 1.10 1.13 1.00 1.13 1.13 1.00
ḡn1su1 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
ḡn2su2 15 15 5 15 15 15 15
ḡn2j1u3 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
lcl1 10 10 10 10 2 2 2
lcl2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
lcl3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table 6.5: Data for further tests of three-node example using Benders de-
composition
Test3 Test4 Test5 Test6 Test7 Test8 Test9
gn1su1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 1.50 0.00
gn2su2 8.87 8.90 5.00 0.00 6.98 7.37 0.00
gn2j1u3 0.00 0.00 3.87 9.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
dn1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dn2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00
dn3 8.87 8.90 8.87 9.00 7.56 8.87 6.00
pricen1 1.13 1.10 1.13 1.00 4.08 1.13 7.00
pricen2 1.13 1.10 1.13 1.00 0.80 1.13 1.00
pricen3 1.13 1.10 1.13 1.00 2.44 1.13 4.00
flowl1 -2.96 -2.97 -2.96 -3.00 -2.00 -1.96 -2.00
flowl2 5.91 5.93 5.91 6.00 4.78 5.41 4.00
flowl3 2.96 2.97 2.96 3.00 2.78 3.46 2.00
profits 1.15 0.89 0.65 0.00 0.81 0.96 0.00
iterations 5 5 2 2 20 12 4
Table 6.6: Results for further tests of three-node example using Benders
decomposition
In order to explain the instable behavior of the Benders algorithm, the prob-
lem is reformulated using an integer version of the master problem in order
to enumerate the actual solution to the problem. To derive a mixed-integer
linear version of the master problem, the generation quantity variables gnsu
in problem (6.15) are defined as integer variables. Thus, the master problem
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becomes the following:
min
gnsu,
{∑
n
∑
u
(cnsugnsu) + 
}
(6.19a)
subject to
−  ≤ 0 (6.19b)∑
n,s,u
−gnsun +
∑
n,s,u
 (it)nsu(gnsu − g(it)nsu)−  ≤ 0, ∀it ≥ 2 (6.19c)
gnsu − gnsu ≤ 0, ∀n, s, u (6.19d)
gnsu ≥ 0, ∀n, s, u (6.19e)
gnsu ∈ Z+ ,∀n, s, u (6.19f)
For this problem, the result can be found by enumeration. In order to enu-
merate the feasible values, the possible combinations of gn1su1 and gn2su2 are
defined and for each pair, the subproblem is solved. Based on the nonneg-
ativity assumption and the maximum generation constraint, the following
is true for TestInt1 (Table 6.7): 0 ≤ gnsu ≤ 15 while gnsu ∈ Z. This leads
to 16 ∗ 16 = 256 possibilities. For TestInt2, the following is true (Table
6.7): 0 ≤ gnsu ≤ 10 while gnsu ∈ Z. This leads to 11 ∗ 11 = 121 possi-
bilities. By enumerating the problem, it can be shown which solutions are
optimal (Table 6.8) solutions to the overall problem (under the assumption
of integer strategic generation levels) as one solves 256 (or 121, respectively)
independent MILP for which optimality is proven by the standard solver in
GAMS.
When applying the Benders approach to the mixed-integer linear master
problem, the same problem occurs as in Test1 and Test2 of the linear MP
above (Table 6.9). Test1Int arrives at the optimal solution because the
‘communication’ between MP and SP via the multipliers  nsu works prop-
erly (Table 6.10). However, as shown in Table 6.11, TestInt2 does not even
convergence. The problem gets stuck from iteration it5 onwards. The reason
for this is that the lower bound lob becomes greater than the upper bound
upb which can never happen in case of an convex envelope of the -function
(Conejo et al., 2006). Hence, this is an indication that for the present prob-
lem structure, the Benders approach is not straightforward applicable.
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TestInt1 TestInt2
cn1su1 2 2
cn2su2 1 1
cn2j1u3 3 3
ḡn1su1 15 10
ḡn2su2 15 10
ḡn2j1u3 15 10
lcl1 10 10
lcl2 10 10
lcl3 10 10
Table 6.7: Data for tests of the integer version of three-node example using
Benders decomposition
TestInt1 TestInt2
gn1su1 0.0 0.0
gn2su2 7.0 7.0
gn2j1u3 0.0 0.0
dn1 0.0 0.0
dn2 0.0 0.0
dn3 7.0 7.0
pricen1 3.0 3.0
pricen2 3.0 3.0
pricen3 3.0 3.0
flowl1 -2.3 -2.3
flowl2 4.7 4.7
flowl3 2.3 2.3
profits 14.0 14.0
Table 6.8: Results for enumeration of the integer version of three-node ex-
ample using Benders decomposition
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TestInt1 TestInt2
gn1su1 0.0 0.0
gn2su2 7.0 6.0
gn2j1u3 0.0 0.0
dn1 0.0 0.0
dn2 0.0 0.0
dn3 7.0 7.0
pricen1 3.0 3.0
pricen2 3.0 3.0
pricen3 3.0 3.0
flowl1 -2.3 -2.3
flowl2 4.7 4.7
flowl3 2.3 2.3
profits 14.0 12.0
iterations 5 X
Table 6.9: Results for tests of the integer version of three-node example
using Benders decomposition
Test1Int
Iteration step
it1 it2 it3 it4 it5
gn1su1 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
gn2su2 0.0 15.0 15.0 8.0 7.0
gn2j1u3 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 n1su1 -3.0 16.0 6.0 6.0 4.0
 n2su2 -3.0 16.0 6.0 6.0 4.0
lob -105 -45.0 -30.0 -16.0 -14.0
upb 0.0 225.0 30.0 -8.0 -14.0
profits 0.0 -225.0 -30.0 8.0 14.0
Table 6.10: Results per iteration for Test1Int of three-node example using
Benders decomposition
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Test2Int
Iteration step
it1 it2 it3 it4
gn1su1 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
gn2su2 0.0 10.0 10.0 6.0
gn2j1u3 7.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
 n1su1 -3.0 9.3 2.7 -3.0
 n2su2 -3.0 9.3 2.7 -3.0
lob -105 -30.0 -20.0 -11.3
upb 0.0 83.3 3.3 -12.0
profits 0.0 -83.3 -3.3 12.0
Table 6.11: Results per iteration for Test2Int of three-node example using
Benders decomposition
6.3.4 Discussion
The results for the Benders decomposition approach are promising. How-
ever, the robustness of the approach is insufficient. The Benders technique
requires a convex envelope of the -function which is not the case in the
existing MIP subproblem (Equation 6.17). One possibility to overcome the
problems arising from the nonconvexity of the -function is to apply an ap-
propriate domain decomposition approach. As mentioned in Section 6.2.2,
domain decomposition works by breaking apart a nonconvex problem into
convex pieces (subdomains). For each of these subdomains the optimal so-
lution is determined. Comparing the single subdomain results yields the
optimal solution to the overall problem.
A domain decomposition technique for a Benders approach (with a piecewise
linear -function) is presented in Gabriel et al. (2009). Their approach is
static which means that they define the subdomains before solving the prob-
lem. However, they develop a sophisticated heuristic in order to avoid the
enumeration of all possible combinations. Nonetheless, using this heuristic is
computationally impossible for larger-scale problems as they are common in
electricity markets. The approach of Gabriel et al. (2009) is still associated
with a significant computational effort which might not not even be con-
ducive for the problem at hand. Hence, dynamic decomposition algorithms
could be a valuable alternative. These dynamic techniques aim to find and
define subdomains only if it is necessary during the solving procedure.
However, for the time being only little application literature for these tech-
niques exists in an electric power market context. The development of such
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an algorithm requires significant further research concerning a new research
area as presented here. Thus, the further development of the presented ap-
proaches would be out of the scope of the thesis at hand but indicates the
direction of possible related future research.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter presents a promising approach in order to decompose discretely-
constrained MPEC problems for electric power markets using Benders de-
composition technique. The developed algorithm can be applied to simple
problems of strategic behavior of generators. Furthermore, it can be simpli-
fied such that domain decomposition techniques can be applied. However,
the algorithm not yet fully applicable to capture gaming over network effects
due to an insufficient robustness of the computational behavior.
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Jährliche Daten.” Statistical Office of the European Communities. In-
ternet: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. Accessed: 20 January 2007.
Eurostat. 2005. “National Accounts (Including GDP).” Statistical Office of
the European Communities. Internet: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
Accessed: 09 January 2006.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 132
EWEA. 2005. “Large Scale Integration of Wind Energy in the Eu-
ropean Power Supply: Analysis, Issues and Recommendations.”
The European Wind Energy Association, Brussels, Belgium. In-
ternet: http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea documents/documents/
publications/grid/051215 Grid report.pdf. Accessed: 09 January 2006.
EWEA. 2006. “Powering Change - EWEA 2006 Annual Report.” Techni-
cal report, The European Wind Energy Association, Brussels, Belgium.
Internet: http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea documents/documents/
publications/reports/ewea-report2006.pdf. Accessed: 06 February 2009.
EWEA. 2007. “Wind Power Installed in Europe by the End of 2006.” The
European Wind Energy Association, Brussels, Belgium.
Facchinei, Francisco and Jong-Shi Pang. 2003. Finite-Dimensional Varia-
tional Inequalities and Complementarity Problems: Volumes I and II. New
York, NY: Springer.
Fischer, Reinhard and Friedrich Kießling. 1989. Freileitungen - Planung,
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Appendix A
Mathematical Proofs and
Remarks (Chapter 5)
A.1 Result that Shows that qvnsu,i ∈ [0, 1] is Valid
First it is shown that the variable qvnsu,i need not be specified as binary
but rather constrained to be in the range [0, 1]. The result is presented in a
slightly more general setting.1
Theorem A.1 The solution set to (A.1) and (A.2) are the same where
z ≤ x (A.1a)
z ≤ y (A.1b)
x+ y − 1 ≤ z (A.1c)
x, y ∈ {0, 1} (A.1d)
z ∈ {0, 1} (A.1e)
and
z ≤ x (A.2a)
z ≤ y (A.2b)
x+ y − 1 ≤ z (A.2c)
x, y ∈ {0, 1} (A.2d)
z ∈ [0, 1] (A.2e)
1This section is based on findings presented in the research paper Gabriel and Leuthold
(2009).
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Proof. Let (x̄, ȳ, z̄) be a solution to (A.1). Since z ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ z ∈ [0, 1]
and (A.1a)-(A.1d) exactly match (A.2a)-(A.2d) this means that (x̄, ȳ, z̄) is a
solution to (A.2). Now let (x̂, ŷ, ẑ) be a solution to (A.2). If z ∈ {0, 1} then
we are done. Thus, assume that z ∈ (0, 1) . But by (A.1a) and (A.1b) since
0 < z < 1⇒ x = y = 1. Then by (A.1c) z ≥ 1 which is a contradiction. ■
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A.2 Formal Determination of the Disjunctive Con-
stants
Having fixed values for the the upper-level vector x, the lower-level linear
programming subproblem from Chapter but with upper bounds yup on the
y variables added is of the form2:
min eT y (A.4)
s.t. My ≥ k −Nx
y ≤ yup
y ≥ 0
The necessary and sufficient KKT conditions are to find vectors (y, z, w)
such that
0 ≤ e−MT z + Iw⊥y ≥ 0 (A.5)
0 ≤My +Nx− k⊥z ≥ 0 (A.6)
0 ≤ yup − y⊥w ≥ 0 (A.7)
First note that all variables are nonnegative so that one needs only consider
upper bounds on y, z, w. Also, it is assumed that the upper level variable
x is bounded above in the upper-level problem, a reasonable assumption
given that this variable will relate to a physical quantity. Also, by design,
we have 0 ≤ y ≤ yup so that y is bounded from above. What about bounds
on the “dual” variables z and w? First, suppose that there exists a positive
constant Cw such that 0 ≤ wi ≤ Cw, ∀i. Depending on the application, the
existence of positive constants Cw and Cy (which can be taken greater than
or equal to yup) may be a reasonable assumption. For example, bounds on
the primal variables y are often employed if these variables relate to real,
physical quantities (e.g., power generation). Bounds on the dual variables
w are also reasonable in that they relate to the shadow price of capacity
constraints on the y variables. Typically these prices correspond to the
marginal cost of one more unit of capacity which itself should be bounded
due to physical considerations. Having made the assumption of bounds
on the y and w variables, the next result shows a reasonable condition to
2This section is based on findings presented in the research paper Gabriel and Leuthold
(2009).
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generate a bound Cz on the other dual variables z. This condition states
that there must be at least one column of the matrix M with all positive
entries.
Theorem A.2 Suppose that there exists a column j of M such that Mminj =
mini {Mij} > 0. Then,
z ≤ min
j:Mminj >0
{(
ej + C
w
Mminj
)}
= Cz, where Cz > 0.
Proof. From (A.5)one can see that for 1 the vector of all ones,
0 ≤ e−MT z + Iw ⇒MT z ≤ e+ Iw ≤ e+ Cw1
or
Mminj
∑
i
zi ≤
∑
i
Mijzi ≤ ej + Cw, ∀j
where Mminj is the minimum value of Mij for column j. Now if there is a
column j where Mminj > 0 , one can see that∑
i
zi ≤
ej + C
w
Mminj
Moreover, this has to hold for each column j where Mminj > 0 hence
∑
i
zi ≤ min
j:Mminj >0
{(
ej + C
w
Mminj
)}
If ej < 0 then, without loss of generality, C
w can be taken sufficiently large
so that minj:Mminj >0
{(
ej+C
w
Mminj
)}
= Cz > 0 ⇒ zj ≤ Cz for all j in light of
the fact that z ≥ 0. ■
Remark The condition that there exists a column j of M such that Mminj =
mini {Mij} > 0 may be satisfied for a large class of matrices.
Remark The other condition in (A.6) which involves the vector z namely,
(My +Nx− k)T z = 0 does not impose any additional bounds on z.
APPENDIX A. MATHEMATICAL PROOFS AND REMARKS 150
Remark Getting an appropriate value for the disjunctive constraints con-
stant is then straightforward given the above result. For example in
0 ≤ e−MT z + Iw⊥y ≥ 0
one can see that for row i we have
0 ≤ ei −
∑
j
(MT )ijzj + wi
≤ ei +
∑
j
max
i
{
(MT )ij
}
Cz + Cw ≤ Ki
So one can take any value Ki such that the above inequality holds. Then a
valid value for the disjunctive constraints constant isK = max {maxi {Ki} , Cy} >
0. A similar line of reasoning applies for the other complementarity con-
straints 0 ≤My+Nx− k⊥z ≥ 0 in light of the fact that both y and x are
bounded variables.
Appendix B
Input Data and Further
Model Results of the
Numerical Examples
(Chapter 5)
In order to improve readability in the main part some of the input data and
result tables of Chapter 5 were shifted this appendix.1
n1 n2 n3
an 1 1 10
bn 1 1 1
Table B.1: Demand structure in the three-node network
1This section is based on findings presented in the research paper Gabriel and Leuthold
(2009).
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Test1 Test2 Test3 Test4 Test5
cn1su1[d/MWℎ] 2 2 2 2 2
cn2su2[d/MWℎ] 1 1 1 1 1
cn2j1u3[d/MWℎ] 3 7 8 9 3
ḡn1su1[MW ] 10 10 10 10 10
ḡn2su2[MW ] 10 10 10 10 10
ḡn2j1u3[MW ] 10 10 10 10 10
lcl1[MW ] 10 10 10 10 10
lcl2[MW ] 10 10 10 10 4
lcl3[MW ] 10 10 10 10 10
Table B.2: Parameters of three-node network
Tests 1-5
Problem
sizes
comp
{
52 continuous variabes
0 discrete variables
}
strat
{
2801 continuous variables
939 discrete variables
}
Table B.3: Model statistics for three-node network
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Line capacity [MW] Reactance [Ω]
l1 2970 12
l2 1840 69
l3 1840 43
l4 900 28
l5 1330 25
l6 1840 33
l7 1840 50
l8 1840 29
l9 640 61
l10 640 42
l11 940 34
l12 1840 31
l13 900 55
l14 1210 45
l15 270 156
l16 2760 22
l17 1840 27
l18 3330 38
l19 1280 11
l20 3330 41
l21 ∞ 46
l22 ∞ 46
l23 ∞ 46
l24 ∞ 46
l25 ∞ 46
l26 ∞ 46
Table B.4: Parameters of fifteen-node Western European network
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Appendix C
Two-Pass Process:
Mathematical Justifications
(Chapter 6)
It can be shown that the subproblem (6.18) solved in two passes matches
the solution of the original one.1 Here the first pass relates to fixing the
generation values gnsu = g
fix
nsu and substituting the constant value g
fix
nsu into
the objective function (i.e.,
∑
n,s,u− g
fix
nsun). For clarity of presentation,
the subproblem is re-expressed in somewhat more stylized form as follows:
min{−gT} (C.1a)
1This section is based work carried out jointly with Prof. Dr. Steven A. Gabriel
(University of Maryland).
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subject to
0 ≤ Ad+Bg + Cy +Dz − b ≤ Kr (C.1b)
0 ≤
⎛⎝ dg
y
⎞⎠ ≤ K(1− r) (C.1c)
Ād+ B̄g + C̄y + D̄z = b̄ (C.1d)
g = gfix (C.1e)
g, d ≥ 0 (C.1f)
y ≥ 0 (C.1g)
z (free) (C.1h)
ri ∈ {0, 1},∀i (C.1i)
where variables are expressed in vector form with y = (T , T , ̄T )T ≥ 0, z =
(T , T , T )T , K is a vector of suitably large constants and r is a vector of
binary variables. As stated (C.1) is a mixed-integer, bilinear program. The
two-pass approach first replaces g by gfix and then solves
min{−gfixT} (C.2a)
subject to
0 ≤ Ad+Bg + Cy +Dz − b ≤ Kr (C.2b)
0 ≤
⎛⎝ dg
y
⎞⎠ ≤ K(1− r) (C.2c)
Ād+ B̄g + C̄y + D̄z = b̄ (C.2d)
g = gfix (C.2e)
g, d ≥ 0 (C.2f)
y ≥ 0 (C.2g)
z(free) (C.2h)
ri ∈ {0, 1},∀i (C.2i)
which is a mixed-integer linear program. Then, the optimal binary variables
are fixed at these values (e.g., r̄ ) and solved in the following somewhat easier
problem to solve.
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min{−gT} (C.3a)
subject to
0 ≤ Ad+Bg + Cy +Dz − b ≤ Kr̄ (C.3b)
0 ≤
⎛⎝ dg
y
⎞⎠ ≤ K(1− r̄) (C.3c)
Ād+ B̄g + C̄y + D̄z = b̄ (C.3d)
g = gfix (C.3e)
g, d ≥ 0 (C.3f)
y ≥ 0 (C.3g)
z(free) (C.3h)
Theorem C.1 Considering problems (C.1), (C.2), and (C.3), taking the
optimal binary variables’ values from (C.2) and then fixing them in (C.3)
and taking the optimal values for the other variables in (C.3) corresponds to
a solution of (C.1).
Proof. Problems (C.1) and (C.2) have the same feasible region. Thus, if
w1 is a solution to (C.1) and w2 is a solution to (C.2) with respectively,
objective function values f1 and f2, then
f1
(
w1
)
≤ f1
(
w2
) [
by optimality of w1 and feasibility of w2 in (C.1)
]
and
f2
(
w2
)
≤ f2
(
w1
) [
by optimality of w2 and feasibility of w1 in (C.2)
]
but f1 (w) = f2 (w) ∀ feasible w. Thus,
f1
(
w1
)
≤ f1
(
w2
)
= f2
(
w2
)
≤ f2
(
w1
)
= f1
(
w1
)
so that f1
(
w1
)
= f2
(
w2
)
so that the solution sets of (C.1) and (C.2) are
the same. Since the solution sets of (C.1) and (C.2) were shown to be the
same, it suffices to show that problems (C.2) and (C.3) have the same set of
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solutions. If w3 is a solution to (C.3) with corresponding objective function
f3 then
f2
(
w2
)
≤ f3
(
w3
)[
since the binary variables were fixed and w3 is
feasible in (C.2)]
≤ f1
(
w1
)
[since g is not fixed in the objective function of (C.3)]
≤ f2
(
w2
)
[from above]
Thus, the solution sets of (C.2) and (C.3) are the same as desired. ■
Appendix D
GAMS Codes
This appendix provides a print out of example implementations of the dif-
ferent models presented in the main part within GAMS. Using adequate
data sets the subsequently presented codes can directly typed into GAMS
and will run without producing errors. Data and additional codes, how-
ever, will not be displayed here. Please refer to the electronically provided
supplements.
D.1 GAMS Code for Chapter 3
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ d e c l a r a t i o n o f s c a l a r s ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
SCALARS
MVABase f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [MVA] / 500 /
VoltageBase1 f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [kV ] / 380 /
VoltageBase2 f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [kV ] / 220 /
VoltageBase3 f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [kV ] / 110 /
ReferenzBus swing bus f o r c a l c u l a t i o n / 1 /
TRM transmi s s i on r e l i a b i l i t y margin [%] / 0 .2 /
ep s i l o n demand e l a s t i c i t y / −0.1 /
;
Scalars
nuc learp nuc l ear p r i c e Euro per MWh /3/
l i g n i t e p l i g n i t e p r i c e Euro per MWh /6.3/
coa lp coa l p r i c e Euro per MWh /7.3/
gasp gas p r i c e Euro per MWh /20.5/
o i l p o i l p r i c e Euro per MWh /27.2/
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ d e c l a r a t i o n o f s e t s ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
SETS
c colums in exce l−data−she e t s / c1 ∗ c30 /
t time / t1∗ t24 /
l l i n e s in the network / Line1 ∗ Line631 /
n nodes in the network / 1 ∗ 421 /
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s p lant s in the market / s1 ∗ s461 /
snonGER( s ) p lant s in other c oun t r i e s
ausland (n) f o r e i g n coun t r i e s / 1 ,85 ,215 ,271 ,351 ,413 ,
411 ,263 ,133 /
z0 (n) s i n g l e zone f o r GER
z1 (n) zone1 as in dena
z2 (n) zone2 as in dena
z3 (n) zone3 as in dena
z4 (n) zone4 as in dena
z5 (n) zone5 as in dena
z6 (n) zone6 as in dena
l 0 ( l ) l i n e s r ep r e s en t i ng f o r e i g n coun t r i e s
l 6 ( l ) l i n e s between zones and f o r e i g n coun t r i e s
nuc ( s ) nuc l ear p lant s
l i g ( s ) l i g n i t e p lant s
coa l ( s ) coa l p lant s
steam ( s ) o i l and gas steam plant s
ccgt ( s ) ccgt p lant s
gt ( s ) gas tu rb ine s
hydro ( s ) hydro p lant s
pump( s ) pump sto rage p lant s
kwk( s ) combined heat and power p lant s
t f i r s t ( t ) f i r s t time per iode
t l a s t ( t ) l a s t time per iode
;
ALIAS (L ,LL) , (N, NN) ;
t f i r s t ( t ) = yes$ (ord ( t ) eq 1 ) ;
t l a s t ( t ) = yes$ (ord ( t ) eq card ( t ) ) ;
parameter s l a ck (n)
/1 1/
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ PARAMETER Sec t i on ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∗
∗ 1 . Dec l a r a t i on ∗
∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∗
PARAMETERS
∗ data up load . . .
LineData ( l , c ) l i n e data
NodeData ( s , c ) node data ( genera t i on c a p a c i t i e s )
d r e f (n , t ) r e f e r e n c e demand
p r e f (n , t ) r e f e r e n c e p r i c e s
WindGen(n , t ) wind energy data
Zones
Connect
∗ . . . and the r e s t
FromBus( l ) s t a r t i n g node o f l i n e L
ToBus( l ) end node o f l i n e L
LineVoltage ( l ) vo l tage l e v e l o f l i n e L (110 220 380)
Res i s tance ( l ) Res i s tance o f l i n e L
Reactance ( l ) Reactance o f l i n e L
ThermalLimit ( l ) Max . cur rent o f l i n e L [A]
PowerFlowLimit ( l ) power f low l im i t o f l i n e L [MW]
Inc idence ( l , n ) i n c id ence matrix o f the system
Inc idenceTest ( l ) checking the in c id ence matr ix fo r e r r o r s
H( l , n ) f low s e n s i v i t y matrix
B(n , nn) network susceptance matrix
BVector ( l )
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GVector ( l )
gmax(n , s ) max generat i on capac i ty
gmin (n , s ) min output to run a plant
pumpmax(n) max pump capac i ty
marg ina l co s t s (n , s ) r e f e r e n c e marginal c o s t s at max output
pcost1 (n , s ) f i r s t p a r t i a l load func t i on f a c t o r
pcost2 (n , s ) second p a r t i a l load func t i on f a c t o r
p c o s t f i x (n , s ) f i x p a r t i a l load func t i on f a c t o r
s tar tup (n , s ) s t r a t up co s t s
a (n , t ) i n t e r s e c t i o n demand func t i on
m(n , t ) s l ope demand func t i on
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Ob j e c t i v e Se c t i on ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Var i a b l e s ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
VARIABLES
w s o c i a l we l f a r e in the system
consur g ro s s consumer surp lu s
c o s t s genera t i on co s t s o f the system
s t a r tupco s t s (n , s , t ) co s t due to s t a r t i n g o f a p lant
net input (n , t ) net input at n in t
l i n e f l ow ( l , t ) l i n e f low on l in t
de l t a (n , t ) vo l tage angle d i f f e r e n c at n in t
up0 ( t ) uniform pr i c e s i n g l e zone GER
up1 ( t ) uniform pr i c e zone1
up2 ( t ) uniform pr i c e zone2
up3 ( t ) uniform pr i c e zone3
up4 ( t ) uniform pr i c e zone4
up5 ( t ) uniform pr i c e zone5
up6 ( t ) uniform pr i c e zone6
;
POSITIVE VARIABLES
PSPdown(n , t ) Pump sto rage generat i on
PSPup(n , t ) Pump sto rage ”pump i t up”
PSP Pump Storage s to rage l e v e l
g (n , s , t ) genera t i on at n o f p lant s in t
q (n , t ) demand at n in t
;
Binary variables
on (n , s , t ) p lant cond i t i on variable
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Equat ions ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
EQUATIONS
ob j e c t i v e
grossconsumer
l i n e a r c o s t s
gene ra t i oncapac i ty1
gene ra t i oncapac i ty2
input
l i n e a r i npu t
f low
l i n e c ap po s
l i n e cap neg
s l a ck f unc t
energybalance
shutdown co 1h
shutdown co 2h
shutdown co 3h
shutdown st 1h
shutdown st 2h
shutdown cc 1h
PSPcapacity
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PSPcapac itystart
PSPupdown
PSPupdown2
uniform0
l inecap pos up0
l inecap neg up0
;
ob j e c t i v e . . w =e= consur − c o s t s
;
∗ c o s t s and Co .
grossconsumer . . consur =e= sum (( n , t ) $d r e f (n , t ) ,
( a (n , t )∗q (n , t )+0.5∗m(n , t )∗ sqr (q (n , t ) ) )
/ 1000000 )
;
l i n e a r c o s t s . . c o s t s =e= sum (( n , s , t ) , marg ina l co s t s (n , s )∗g (n , s , t ) )
/1000000
;
∗ g en e r a t i on r e s t r i c t i o n s
gene ra t i oncapac i ty1 (n , s , t )$gmax(n , s ) . . g (n , s , t ) =l= on (n , s , t )∗gmax(n , s )
;
g ene ra t i oncapac i ty2 (n , s , t )$gmax(n , s ) . . g (n , s , t ) =g= on (n , s , t )∗gmin (n , s )
;
∗ l i n e f l ow eu q t i o n s
input (n , t ) . . NetInput (n , t )
− SUM(( nn ) , B(n , nn)∗Delta (nn , t ) ) ∗ MVABase
− 0 .5 ∗SUM( L$Inc idence (L ,N) , Res i s tance (L)
∗ SQR( LineFlow (L ,T) ∗ Inc idence (L ,N) ) )∗ MVABase
=E= 0
;
l i n e a r i npu t (n , t ) . . NetInput (n , t )
− SUM(( nn ) , B(n , nn)∗Delta (nn , t ) ) ∗ MVABase
=E= 0
;
f low ( l , t ) . . LineFlow ( l , t ) − SUM(N$H( l , n ) , H( l , n ) ∗ Delta (n , t ) )
=E= 0
;
l i n e c ap po s ( l , t ) . . LineFlow ( l , t ) ∗ MVABase =L= + PowerFlowLimit ( l ) ;
l i n e cap neg ( l , t ) . . LineFlow ( l , t ) ∗ MVABase =G= − PowerFlowLimit ( l ) ;
s l a ck f unc t (n , t ) $Slack (N) . . S lack (N) ∗ Delta (N,T) =E= 0
;
∗ t h e one and on l y energy ba l ance
energybalance (n , t ) . . sum( s$gmax (n , s ) , g (n , s , t ) ) + windgen (n , t )
+ PSPdown(n , t )$pumpmax(n) − PSPup(n , t )$pumpmax(n)
− q (n , t ) $d r e f (n , t ) − NetInput (n , t ) =e= 0
;
∗ c oa l p l a n t has to be o f f l i n e f o r 4h
shutdown co 1h (n , coal , t )$gmax(n , coa l ) . . on (n , coal , t−1)− on (n , coal , t ) =l=
1−on (n , coal , t+1) ;
shutdown co 2h (n , coal , t )$gmax(n , coa l ) . . on (n , coal , t−1)− on (n , coal , t ) =l=
1−on (n , coal , t+2) ;
shutdown co 3h (n , coal , t )$gmax(n , coa l ) . . on (n , coal , t−1)− on (n , coal , t ) =l=
1−on (n , coal , t+3) ;
∗ o i l / gas steam p l a n t s has to be o f f l i n e f o r 3h
shutdown st 1h (n , steam , t )$gmax(n , steam ) . . on (n , steam , t−1)− on (n , steam , t )
=l= 1−on (n , steam , t+1) ;
shutdown st 2h (n , steam , t )$gmax(n , steam ) . . on (n , steam , t−1)− on (n , steam , t )
=l= 1−on (n , steam , t+2) ;
∗ c c g t p l a n t s has to be o f f l i n e f o r 2h
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shutdown cc 1h (n , ccgt , t )$gmax(n , ccgt ) . . on (n , ccgt , t−1)− on (n , ccgt , t ) =l=
1−on (n , ccgt , t+1) ;
∗PSP mechanism
PSPcapacity (n , t+1)$pumpmax(n ) . . PSP(n , t+1) =e= PSP(n , t )
+ 0.75∗PSPup(n , t)−PSPdown(n , t )
;
PSPcapac itystart (n , t f i r s t )$pumpmax(n ) . . PSP(n , t f i r s t ) =e= 0
;
PSPupdown(n , t )$pumpmax(n ) . . PSPup(n , t)+PSPdown(n , t ) =l=
pumpmax(n)
;
PSPupdown2(n , t )$pumpmax(n ) . . PSPdown(n , t ) =l= PSP(n , t )
;
∗uniform p r i c i n g
uniform0 ( z0 , t ) $d r e f ( z0 , t ) . . ( a ( z0 , t ) + m( z0 , t )∗q ( z0 , t ) ) − up0 ( t )
=e= 0 ;
l i n e cap pos up0 ( l0 , t ) . . LineFlow ( l0 , t ) ∗ MVABase =L=
+ PowerFlowLimit ( l 0 ) ;
l i necap neg up0 ( l0 , t ) . . LineFlow ( l0 , t ) ∗ MVABase =G=
− PowerFlowLimit ( l 0 ) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ PARAMETER Sec t i on ( con t inued . . . ) ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∗
∗ Data up load ∗
∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∗
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖24 hours ∖ Input Data∖Linetable ohneDENA2010 . x l s
par=l i n eda t a rng=GAMS! a2 : g633 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin Linetable ohneDENA2010 . gdx
$load l i n eda ta
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖24 hours ∖ Input Data∖Plants sommer . x l s
par=NodeData rng=Plants ! b2 : g463 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin Plants sommer . gdx
$load NodeData
;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖24 hours ∖ Input Data∖LoadSommer . x l s
par=d r e f rng=Load ! a1 : Y431 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin LoadSommer . gdx
$load d r e f
;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖24 hours ∖ Input Data∖PriceSommer . x l s
par=p r e f rng=Pr ice ! a1 : Y431 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin PriceSommer . gdx
$load p r e f
;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖24 hours ∖ Input Data∖Wind sommer storm . x l s
par=WindGen rng=wind ! a1 : Y371 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin Wind sommer storm . gdx
$load WindGen
;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖24 hours ∖ Input Data∖Zonen . x l s
par=Zones rng=GAMS! a2 : b354 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin zonen . gdx
$load Zones
;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖24 hours ∖ Input Data∖Konnektoren . x l s
par=connect rng=GAMS! a1 : b100 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin konnektoren . gdx
$load connect
;
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∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Net Topology ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
PARAMETERS
ZBase1 Base 1 (380 kV) f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n
ZBase2 Base 2 (220 kV) f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n
ZBase3 Base 3 (110 kV) f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n
;
ZBase1 = ( VoltageBase1 ∗1E3)∗∗2 / (MVABase ∗ 1E6 ) ;
ZBase2 = ( VoltageBase2 ∗1E3)∗∗2 / (MVABase ∗ 1E6 ) ;
ZBase3 = ( VoltageBase3 ∗1E3)∗∗2 / (MVABase ∗ 1E6 ) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
FromBus(L) = LineData (L , ’ c1 ’ )
;
ToBus(L) = LineData (L , ’ c2 ’ )
;
LineVoltage (L) = LineData (L , ’ c3 ’ )
;
Res i s tance (L) = LineData (L , ’ c4 ’ ) /
( ZBase1$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 380)
+ ZBase2$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 220)
+ ZBase3$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 110))
;
Reactance (L) = LineData (L , ’ c5 ’ ) /
( ZBase1$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 380)
+ ZBase2$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 220)
+ ZBase3$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 110))
;
ThermalLimit (L) = LineData (L , ’ c6 ’ )
;
BVector (L) = Reactance (L) / (SQR( Reactance (L))+SQR( Res i s tance (L ) ) )
;
GVector (L) = Res i s tance (L) / (SQR( Reactance (L))+SQR( Res i s tance (L ) ) )
;
PowerFlowLimit (L) = SQRT(3)∗ LineVoltage (L)∗ThermalLimit (L)
∗(1 − TRM)/1E3
;
z0 (n) $ ( Zones (n , ’ c1 ’ ) ne 0) = yes ;
z1 (n) $ ( Zones (n , ’ c1 ’ ) eq 1) = yes ;
z2 (n) $ ( Zones (n , ’ c1 ’ ) eq 2) = yes ;
z3 (n) $ ( Zones (n , ’ c1 ’ ) eq 3) = yes ;
z4 (n) $ ( Zones (n , ’ c1 ’ ) eq 4) = yes ;
z5 (n) $ ( Zones (n , ’ c1 ’ ) eq 5) = yes ;
z6 (n) $ ( Zones (n , ’ c1 ’ ) eq 6) = yes ;
l 0 ( l ) $ ( connect ( l , ’ c1 ’ ) eq 1) = yes ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ In c i d ence Matr ix ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Inc idence (L ,N) = 0 ;
Inc idenceTest (L) = 0 ;
Loop(L ,
Loop(N$(ORD(N) eq FromBus(L) ) , Inc idence (L ,N) = Inc idence (L ,N) + 1 ) ;
Loop(N$(ORD(N) eq ToBus(L) ) , Inc idence (L ,N) = Inc idence (L ,N) − 1 ) ;
) ;
∗ d i s p l a y Inc i d ence ;
Loop(L , Inc idenceTest (L) = SUM(N, Inc idence (L ,N) )
) ;
∗ d i s p l a y Inc i d enc eTe s t ;
Loop(L ,
ABORT$( Inc idenceTest (L) ne 0) ” Inc idence not Balanced” ;
) ;
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∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ System Admittance Matr ix B(N,NN) ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Loop(L ,
Loop(N, H(L ,N) = BVector (L) ∗ Inc idence (L ,N) )
; )
;
B(N,NN) = SUM(L , Inc idence (L ,N) ∗ H(L ,NN) )
;
∗ d i s p l a y H,B, Inc idence , Bvec tor ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Generat ion ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Loop( s ,
Loop( n$ (ORD(n) eq NodeData ( s , ’ c1 ’ ) ) , gmax(n , s ) = NodeData ( s , ’ c2 ’ ) ) ;
) ;
Loop( s ,
Loop( n$ (ORD(n) eq NodeData ( s , ’ c1 ’ ) ) ,
marg ina l co s t s (n , s ) = NodeData ( s , ’ c3 ’ ) ) ;
) ;
nuc ( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 1) = yes ;
l i g ( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 2) = yes ;
c oa l ( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 3) = yes ;
steam ( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 4) = yes ;
c cgt ( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 5) = yes ;
gt ( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 6) = yes ;
hydro ( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 7) = yes ;
pump( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c4 ’ ) eq 8) = yes ;
kwk( s ) $ ( nodedata ( s , ’ c5 ’ ) eq 1) = yes ;
∗aus der Dena
gmin (n , nuc )=0.4∗gmax(n , nuc ) ;
gmin (n , l i g )=0.4∗gmax(n , l i g ) ;
gmin (n , coa l )=0.38∗gmax(n , coa l ) ;
gmin (n , steam )=0.38∗gmax(n , steam ) ;
gmin (n , ccgt )=0.33∗gmax(n , ccgt ) ;
gmin (n , gt )=0.2∗gmax(n , gt ) ;
gmin (n , kwk)$gmax(n , kwk)=0.3∗gmax(n , kwk ) ;
∗aus der Dena
s ta r tup (n , nuc )$gmax(n , nuc )=16.7∗ nuc learp ;
s ta r tup (n , l i g )$gmax(n , l i g )=6.2∗ l i g n i t e p ;
s ta r tup (n , coa l )$gmax(n , coa l )=6.2∗ coa lp ;
s ta r tup (n , steam )$gmax(n , steam )=6.2∗ o i l p ;
s ta r tup (n , ccgt )$gmax(n , ccgt )=3.5∗ gasp ;
s ta r tup (n , gt )$gmax(n , gt )=1.1∗ gasp ;
on . fx (n , nuc , t )$gmax(n , nuc )=1;
on . fx (n , l i g , t )$gmax(n , l i g )=1;
on . fx (n , kwk , t )$gmax(n , kwk)=1;
g . l (n , kwk , t )$gmax(n , kwk)=gmin (n , kwk ) ;
on . fx (n , pump, t )=0;
pumpmax(n)=sum(pump, gmax(n ,pump ) ) ;
gmax(n ,pump)=0;
snonGER( s ) = yes ;
Loop( z0 ,
Loop( s$gmax ( z0 , s ) ,
snonGER( s ) = no ;
) ; ) ;
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∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ demand f un c t i o n ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ parameters a and b o f t h e demand f un c t i o n : p ( q ) = a + m∗q
m(n , t ) $d r e f (n , t ) = p r e f (n , t )/ ( ep s i l o n ∗ d r e f (n , t ) ) ;
a (n , t ) $d r e f (n , t ) = p r e f (n , t)−d r e f (n , t )∗m(n , t ) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Clear i t ! ! ! ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
opt ion k i l l=NodeData ;
opt ion k i l l=LineData ;
opt ion k i l l=p r e f ;
opt ion k i l l=FromBus ;
opt ion k i l l=ToBus ;
opt ion k i l l=LineVoltage ;
opt ion k i l l=Reactance ;
opt ion k i l l=ThermalLimit ;
opt ion k i l l=BVector ;
opt ion k i l l=GVector ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ So l v e i t ! ! ! ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
q . fx (n , t ) $d r e f (n , t )=1.02∗ d r e f (n , t ) ;
g . l (n , nuc , t )=0.9∗gmax(n , nuc ) ;
g . l (n , l i g , t )=0.5∗gmax(n , l i g ) ;
g . l (n , hydro , t)=gmax(n , hydro ) ;
model MIPGermany
/
l i n e a r c o s t s
gene ra t i oncapac i ty1
gene ra t i oncapac i ty2
l i n e a r i npu t
f low
s l a ck f unc t
energybalance
shutdown co 1h
shutdown co 2h
shutdown co 3h
shutdown st 1h
shutdown st 2h
shutdown cc 1h
PSPcapacity
PSPcapac itystart
PSPupdown
PSPupdown2
l inecap pos up0
l inecap neg up0
/ ;
MIPGermany . r e s l im = 1000000000;
MIPGermany . i t e r l im = 1000000000;
MIPGermany . ho ld f i x ed = 1 ;
s o l v e MIPGermany us ing mip minimizing co s t s ;
q . l o (n , t ) $d r e f (n , t )=0;
q . up(n , t ) $d r e f (n , t )=5∗ d r e f (n , t ) ;
model MINLPGermany
/
ob j e c t i v e
grossconsumer
l i n e a r c o s t s
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gene ra t i oncapac i ty1
gene ra t i oncapac i ty2
l i n e a r i npu t
f low
s l a ck f unc t
energybalance
shutdown co 1h
shutdown co 2h
shutdown co 3h
shutdown st 1h
shutdown st 2h
shutdown cc 1h
PSPcapacity
PSPcapac itystart
PSPupdown
PSPupdown2
l inecap pos up0
l inecap neg up0
uniform0
/ ;
MINLPGermany . r e s l im = 1000000000;
MINLPGermany . i t e r l im = 1000000000;
MINLPGermany . ho ld f i x ed = 1 ;
∗ s o l v e MINLPGermany us ing minlp maximiz ing w ;
parameter on f i x ;
on f i x (n , s , t ) = on . l (n , s , t ) ;
on . fx (n , s , t )= on f i x (n , s , t ) ;
model RMINLPGermany
/
ob j e c t i v e
grossconsumer
l i n e a r c o s t s
gene ra t i oncapac i ty1
gene ra t i oncapac i ty2
input
f low
s l a ck f unc t
energybalance
shutdown co 1h
shutdown co 2h
shutdown co 3h
shutdown st 1h
shutdown st 2h
shutdown cc 1h
PSPcapacity
PSPcapac itystart
PSPupdown
PSPupdown2
l inecap pos up0
l inecap neg up0
uniform0
/ ;
RMINLPGermany . r e s l im = 1000000000;
RMINLPGermany . i t e r l im = 1000000000;
RMINLPGermany . ho ld f i x ed = 1 ;
s o l v e RMINLPGermany us ing rminlp maximizing w;
parameter genmarket , statusmarket , p r i c e ;
genmarket (n , s , t )=g . l (n , s , t ) ;
statusmarket (n , s , t )=on f i x (n , s , t ) ;
p r i c e (n , t)=a (n , t ) + m(n , t )∗ q . l (n , t ) ;
execute un load ”Dispatch som storm fx . gdx” g .L
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe Dispatch som storm fx . gdx SQ=N
var=g .L rng=marketmeritorder ! ’
execute un load ”Dispatch som storm fx . gdx” p r i c e
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe Dispatch som storm fx . gdx SQ=N par=pr i c e rng=marketpr i ces ! ’
parameter demfix ;
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demfix (n , t ) = q . l (n , t ) ;
q . fx (n , t)= 1.03∗ demfix (n , t ) ;
q . fx ( ausland , t)= demfix ( ausland , t ) ;
on . l o (n , s , t )= 0 ;
on . up(n , s , t )= 1 ;
on . fx (n , nuc , t )$gmax(n , nuc )=1;
on . fx (n , l i g , t )$gmax(n , l i g )=1;
on . fx (n , kwk , t )$gmax(n , kwk)=1;
on . fx (n , snonGER , t )$gmax(n , snonGER)= on . l (n , snonGER , t ) ;
g . fx (n , snonGER , t )$gmax(n , snonGER)= g . l (n , snonGER , t ) ;
model MIPDispatch
/
l i n e a r c o s t s
gene ra t i oncapac i ty1
gene ra t i oncapac i ty2
l i n e a r i npu t
f low
s l a ck f unc t
energybalance
shutdown co 1h
shutdown co 2h
shutdown co 3h
shutdown st 1h
shutdown st 2h
shutdown cc 1h
PSPcapacity
PSPcapac itystart
PSPupdown
PSPupdown2
/ ;
MIPDispatch . r e s l im = 1000000000;
MIPDispatch . i t e r l im = 1000000000;
MIPDispatch . ho ld f i x ed = 1 ;
s o l v e MIPDispatch us ing mip minimizing co s t s ;
q . fx (n , t)= demfix (n , t ) ;
parameter on f i x ;
on f i x (n , s , t ) = on . l (n , s , t ) ;
on . fx (n , s , t )= on f i x (n , s , t ) ;
model MINLPDispatch
/
l i n e a r c o s t s
gene ra t i oncapac i ty1
gene ra t i oncapac i ty2
input
f low
s l a ck f unc t
energybalance
shutdown co 1h
shutdown co 2h
shutdown co 3h
shutdown st 1h
shutdown st 2h
shutdown cc 1h
PSPcapacity
PSPcapac itystart
PSPupdown
PSPupdown2
/ ;
MINLPDispatch . r e s l im = 1000000000;
MINLPDispatch . i t e r l im = 1000000000;
MINLPDispatch . ho ld f i x ed = 1 ;
s o l v e MINLPDispatch us ing rminlp minimizing co s t s ;
parameter gendispatch , s t a tu sd i spa t ch t ;
gendispatch (n , s , t )=g . l (n , s , t ) ;
s t a tu sd i s pa t ch t (n , s , t )=on . l (n , s , t ) ;
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parameter genchange , s tatuschange ;
genchange (n , s , t )=gendispatch (n , s , t ) −genmarket (n , s , t ) ;
s tatuschange (n , s , t )= s t a tu sd i spa t ch t (n , s , t)−statusmarket (n , s , t ) ;
parameter d i spac thcos t s , d i spa tchs ta r tup ;
d i spa c thco s t s (n , s)= sum( t , genchange (n , s , t )∗ ( marg ina l co s t s (n , s)−up0 . l ( t ) ) ) ;
d i spa tchs ta r tup (n , s , t ) $ ( statuschange (n , s , t ) eq 1) =
gendispatch (n , s , t )∗ s ta r tup (n , s ) ;
display genchange , statuschange , d i spac thcos t s , d i spa t chs ta r tup ;
execute un load ”Dispatch som storm fx . gdx” g .L
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe Dispatch som storm fx . gdx SQ=N
var=g .L rng=red i spatchte marke tmer i to rde r ! ’
execute un load ”Dispatch som storm fx . gdx” genchange
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe Dispatch som storm fx . gdx par=genchange rng=red i spa t ch gen ! ’
execute un load ”Dispatch som storm fx . gdx” statuschange
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe Dispatch som storm fx . gdx
par=statuschange rng=r ed i s p a t c h s t a t ! ’
parameter f i r s t d i s p a t c h l ow ( s , t ) , f i r s t d i s p a t c h up ( s , t ) ;
loop ( s ,
loop (n$gmax(n , s ) ,
loop ( t$ ( up0 . l ( t ) gt marg ina l co s t s (n , s ) ) ,
f i r s t d i s p a t c h l ow ( s , t )= gmax(n , s ) − g . l (n , s , t )
) ; ) ; ) ;
loop ( s ,
loop (n$gmax(n , s ) ,
loop ( t$ ( marg ina l co s t s (n , s ) gt up0 . l ( t ) ) ,
f i r s t d i s p a t c h up ( s , t )= g . l (n , s , t )
) ; ) ; ) ;
execute un load ”Dispatch som storm fx . gdx” f i r s t d i s p a t c h l ow
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe Dispatch som storm fx . gdx
par=f i r s t d i s p a t c h l ow rng=f i r s t d i s p a t c h l ow ! ’
execute un load ”Dispatch som storm fx . gdx” f i r s t d i s p a t c h up
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe Dispatch som storm fx . gdx
par=f i r s t d i s p a t c h up rng=f i r s t d i s p a t c h up ! ’
APPENDIX D. GAMS CODES 172
D.2 GAMS Code for Chapter 4
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ s e t s = In d i c e s
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
sets
n node /1∗2120/
s p lant s /nuc , l i g , coal , ccgt , gas , o i l , hydro , pump/
l l i n e / l i n e 1 ∗ l i n e3143 /
ld ( l )
colums colums in Ecel / c1∗c20/
sc load s c ena r i o s / l s c 1 ∗ l s c 4 /
i t e r a t i o n / i t 1 ∗ i t 300 /
i t e r ( i t e r a t i o n )
i t e r 1 ( i t e r a t i o n )
onekv ( l ) 110kV l i n e s
twokv ( l ) 220kV l i n e s
fourkv ( l ) 380kV l i n e s
Alias (n , nn ) , ( l , l l ) , ( i t e r a t i o n , i t e r a t i o n s ) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ data up load ∗
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Parameter nodetable (n , colums ) ;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖ Input Data∖nodetable . x l s
par=nodetable rng=GAMS! a2 : m2122 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin nodetable . gdx
$load nodetable
;
Parameter wind (n , colums ) ;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖ Input Data∖windtable 2006 . x l s
par=wind rng=GAMS! a2 : b2122 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin windtable 2006 . gdx
$load wind
;
Parameter l i n eda ta ( l , colums ) ;
$ c a l l ”GDXXRW [ Direc tory ]∖ Input Data∖ l i n e t a b l e . x l s
par=l i n eda t a rng=GAMS! b2 : g3145 cdim=1 rdim=1”
$gdxin L ine tab l e . gdx
$load l i n eda ta
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ ” v a r i a b l e ” r e f e r e n c e v a l u e s ( f o r i t e r a t i o n s ) = Sca l a r s
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
scalars
p r e f r e f e r e n c e p r i c e at r e f e r e n c e demand / 43 /
ep s i l o n e l a s t i c i t y o f demand / −0.25 /
MVABase f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [MVA] / 500 /
VoltageBase1 f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [kV ] / 380 /
VoltageBase2 f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [kV ] / 220 /
VoltageBase3 f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [kV ] / 110 /
VoltageBase4 f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n [kV ] / 500 /
windcosts oportun i ty co s t s f o r wind / 4 .05 /
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ l i n e parameter
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Parameters
ZBase1 Base 1 (380 kV) f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n
ZBase2 Base 2 (220 kV) f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n
ZBase3 Base 3 (110 kV) f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n
ZBase4 Base 4 (500 kV) f o r p . u . c a l c u l a t i o n aux . l i n e s
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;
ZBase1 = ( VoltageBase1 ∗1E3)∗∗2 / (MVABase ∗ 1E6)
;
ZBase2 = ( VoltageBase2 ∗1E3)∗∗2 / (MVABase ∗ 1E6)
;
ZBase3 = ( VoltageBase3 ∗1E3)∗∗2 / (MVABase ∗ 1E6)
;
ZBase4 = ( VoltageBase4 ∗1E3)∗∗2 / (MVABase ∗ 1E6)
;
parameter
r e f r e s ( l )
r e f r e a ( l )
r e f l i m i t ( l )
FromBus( l )
ToBus( l )
LineVoltage ( l )
l ength ( l )
c i r c u i t s ( l )
ThermalLimit ( l )
PowerFlowLimit ( l , sc )
Re s i s t a n c e s t a r t ( l )
Reac tance s ta r t ( l )
Res i s tance ( l )
Reactance ( l )
BVector ( l )
GVector ( l )
I c o s t ( i t e r a t i o n )
I t o t a l
Inc idence
Inc idenceTest
;
I c o s t ( ’ i t1 ’ ) = 0 ;
I t o t a l = 0 ;
onekv ( l ) $ ( l i n eda t a ( l , ’ c3 ’ ) eq 110) = yes ;
twokv ( l ) $ ( l i n eda t a ( l , ’ c3 ’ ) eq 220) = yes ;
fourkv ( l ) $ ( l i n eda ta ( l , ’ c3 ’ ) eq 380) = yes ;
r e f r e s ( onekv )=0.095 ;
r e f r e s ( twokv )=0.030 ;
r e f r e s ( fourkv )=0.015 ;
r e f r e a ( onekv )=0.205 ;
r e f r e a ( twokv )=0.160 ;
r e f r e a ( fourkv )=0.130 ;
r e f l i m i t ( onekv )=472;
r e f l i m i t ( twokv )=1285;
r e f l i m i t ( fourkv )=2582;
FromBus( l )= l i n eda ta ( l , ’ c1 ’ ) ;
ToBus( l )= l i n eda ta ( l , ’ c2 ’ ) ;
LineVoltage ( l )= l i n eda ta ( l , ’ c3 ’ ) ;
l ength ( l )= l i n eda t a ( l , ’ c4 ’ ) ;
c i r c u i t s ( l )= l i n eda t a ( l , ’ c5 ’ ) ;
R e s i s t a n c e s t a r t ( l )= length ( l )∗ r e f r e s ( l )/ c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
Reac tance s ta r t ( l )= length ( l )∗ r e f r e a ( l )/ c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
parameter TRM( sc )
/
l s c 1 0 .2
l s c 2 0 .2
/ ;
ThermalLimit ( l )= r e f l i m i t ( l )∗ c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
PowerFlowLimit (L , sc ) = SQRT(3)∗ LineVoltage (L)∗ThermalLimit (L)
∗(1 − TRM( sc ))/1E3 ;
Res i s tance (L) = Re s i s t a n c e s t a r t ( l ) /
( ZBase1$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 380)
+ ZBase2$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 220)
+ ZBase3$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 110)
+ ZBase4$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 500))
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;
Reactance (L) = Reactance s ta r t ( l ) /
( ZBase1$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 380)
+ ZBase2$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 220)
+ ZBase3$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 110)
+ ZBase4$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 500))
;
BVector (L) = Reactance (L) / (SQR( Reactance (L))+SQR( Res i s tance (L ) ) ) ;
GVector (L) = Res i s tance (L) / (SQR( Reactance (L))+SQR( Res i s tance (L ) ) ) ;
Inc idence ( l , n ) = 0 ;
Inc idenceTest ( l ) = 0 ;
Loop(L ,
Loop(N$(ORD(N) eq FromBus(L) ) , Inc idence (L ,N) = Inc idence (L ,N) + 1 ) ;
Loop(N$(ORD(N) eq ToBus(L) ) , Inc idence (L ,N) = Inc idence (L ,N) − 1 ) ;
) ;
Loop(L , Inc idenceTest (L) = SUM(N, Inc idence (L ,N) )
) ;
Loop(L ,
ABORT$( Inc idenceTest (L) ne 0) ”INCIDENCE NOT BALANCED” ;
) ;
display Inc idence ;
parameter H( l , n ) ;
H( l , n ) = BVector ( l ) ∗ Inc idence ( l , n ) ;
parameter B(n , nn ) ;
B(n , nn) = SUM( l , Inc idence ( l , n ) ∗ H( l , nn) ) ;
Parameter Slack (n) r e f e r enc ebus
/1 1/
;
loop (n ,
FromBus( l ) $ ( Inc idence ( l , n ) eq 1)= ORD(n ) ;
ToBus( l ) $ ( Inc idence ( l , n ) eq −1)= ORD(n ) ;
) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ g en e r a t i on data
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
parameter g max (n , s ) maximal p lant c a p c i t i e s ;
g max (n , ’ nuc ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c1 ’ ) ;
g max (n , ’ l i g ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c2 ’ ) ;
g max (n , ’ coal ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c3 ’ ) ;
g max (n , ’ ccgt ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c4 ’ ) ;
g max (n , ’ gas ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c5 ’ ) ;
g max (n , ’ o i l ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c6 ’ ) ;
g max (n , ’ hydro ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c7 ’ ) ;
g max (n , ’ pump’)= nodetable (n , ’ c8 ’ ) ;
parameter c (n , s ) marginal genera t i on co s t s ;
c (n , ’ nuc ’)= 15 ;
c (n , ’ l i g ’)= 67 ;
c (n , ’ coal ’)= 62 ;
c (n , ’ ccgt ’)= 53 ;
c (n , ’ gas ’)= 84 ;
c (n , ’ o i l ’)= 114 ;
c (n , ’ hydro ’)= 0 ;
c (n , ’ pump’)= 40 ;
parameter wi (n) wind input per node ;
wi (n)=wind (n , ’ c1 ’ )
;
parameter windspeed ( sc )
/
l s c 1 0 .2
l s c 2 0 .2
l s c 3 0 .8
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l s c 4 0 .8
/ ;
parameter weight ( sc )
/
l s c 1 0 .25
l s c 2 0 .5
l s c 3 0 .083
l s c 4 0 .167
/ ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ demand ( l i n e a r f u n c t i o n : p = a + m∗q )
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
parameter q r e f (n , sc ) average r e f e r e n c e demand ;
q r e f (n , ’ l s c1 ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c9 ’ ) ;
q r e f (n , ’ l s c2 ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c10 ’ ) ;
q r e f (n , ’ l s c3 ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c11 ’ ) ;
q r e f (n , ’ l s c4 ’)= nodetable (n , ’ c12 ’ ) ;
parameter m(n , sc ) s l ope o f the l i n e a r demand func t i on ;
m(n , sc ) $ q r e f (n , sc ) = p r e f /( ep s i l o n ∗ q r e f (n , sc ) ) ;
parameter a (n , sc ) i n t e r s e c t i o n o f the l i n e a r demand func t i on ;
a (n , sc ) $ q r e f (n , sc ) = p re f−q r e f (n , sc )∗m(n , sc ) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ prob lem fo rmu l a t i on
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
variables
w we l f a r e
de l t a (n , sc ) vo l tage angle d i f f e r e n c e
c o s t s t o t a l genera t i on co s t s
sur area below demand func t i on
ni (n , sc ) net input at node n
l f ( l , sc ) l i n e f low on l
;
positive variables
q (n , sc ) demand at node n
g (n , s , sc ) genera t i on at node n o f p lanttype s
;
∗p . f x (n)=30;
∗q . f x (n)=0.2∗ q r e f (n ) ;
∗g . l (n , s )=0.5∗ g max (n , s ) ;
equations
we l f a r e ob j e c t i v e func t i on
concumersur consumer surp lu s
prodcos t s producer c o s t s
Capacity capac i ty l im i t o f genera t i on
net input equation f o r net input
Energybalance energybalance
f low equation f o r l i n e f low
Line f l ow pos upper capac i ty l im i t o f l i n e f l ow
Line f low neg lower capac i ty l im i t o f l i n e f l ow
Slackbus de l t a at r e f e r e n c e bus equa l s zero
consumers
l i n a e r i npu t
l i n e a rba l an c e
;
we l f a r e . . w =e= ( sur−c o s t s )
;
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concumersur . . sur =e= sum (( n , sc ) $ q r e f (n , sc ) ,
weight ( sc )∗ ( a (n , sc )∗q (n , sc )+0.5∗m(n , sc )∗q (n , sc )∗q (n , sc ) ) )
/1000000
;
prodcos t s . . c o s t s =e= sum(( n , s , sc ) $g max (n , s ) , weight ( sc )∗ c (n , s )∗g (n , s , sc ) )
/1000000
+ sum(( n , sc ) $wi (n ) ,
weight ( sc )∗windspeed ( sc )∗wi (n)∗windcosts )/1000000
+ I t o t a l /1000000
;
capac i ty (n , s , sc ) $g max (n , s ) . . g max (n , s ) =g= g (n , s , sc ) ;
;
net input (n , sc ) . . n i (n , sc )
− SUM(( nn ) , B(n , nn)∗Delta (nn , sc ) ) ∗ MVABase
− 0 .5 ∗SUM( l $ In c i d en c e ( l , n ) , Res i s tance ( l )
∗ SQR( l f ( l , sc ) ∗ Inc idence ( l , n ) ) )∗ MVABase
=e= 0
;
energybalance (n , sc ) . . windspeed ( sc )∗wi (n)
+sum( s$g max (n , s ) , g (n , s , sc ))−q (n , sc )−ni (n , sc ) =e= 0
;
f low ( l , sc ) . . l f ( l , sc ) =e=
SUM( n$Inc idence ( l , n ) , H( l , n ) ∗ Delta (n , sc ) )
;
L ine f l ow pos ( l , sc ) . . PowerFlowLimit ( l , sc ) − l f ( l , sc )∗ MVABase =g= 0
;
L ine f low neg ( l , sc ) . . PowerFlowLimit ( l , sc ) + l f ( l , sc )∗ MVABase =g= 0
;
Slackbus (n , sc ) $ s l a ck (n ) . . s l a ck (n)∗ de l t a (n , sc ) =e= 0
;
∗ l i n e a r model
consumers . . sur =e= sum (( n , sc ) $ q r e f (n , sc ) ,
weight ( sc )∗ ( a (n , sc )∗ q r e f (n , sc )+0.5∗m(n , sc )
∗ q r e f (n , sc )∗ q r e f (n , sc )))/1000000
;
l i n a e r i npu t (n , sc ) . . n i (n , sc )
− SUM(( nn ) , B(n , nn)∗Delta (nn , sc ) ) ∗ MVABase
=e= 0
;
l i n e a rba l an c e (n , sc ) . . windspeed ( sc )∗wi (n)+
sum( s$g max (n , s ) , g (n , s , sc ))−0.5∗ q r e f (n , sc )−ni (n , sc )
=e= 0
;
g . l (n , s , sc )= 0.5∗ g max (n , s ) ;
model l i n e a r
/
prodcos t s
Capacity
f low
Line f l ow pos
L ine f low neg
Slackbus
consumers
l i n a e r i npu t
l i n e a rba l an c e / ;
l i n e a r . r e s l im = 1000000000;
l i n e a r . i t e r l im = 1000000000;
l i n e a r . ho ld f i x ed = 1 ;
model t e s t
/ we l f a r e
concumersur
prodcos t s
Capacity
net input
Energybalance
f low
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Line f l ow pos
L ine f low neg
Slackbus
/ ;
t e s t . r e s l im = 1000000000;
t e s t . i t e r l im = 1000000000;
t e s t . ho ld f i x ed = 1 ;
display LineVoltage , ThermalLimit , PowerFlowLimit , q r e f , g max ;
parameter
noda lp r i c e (n , sc )
p r i c e d i f f e r e n c e ( l , sc )
a v e r a g e p r i c e d i f f ( l )
avpr i c e ( l l )
maximum
c i r c s
c i r
we l f
w e l f d i f f
p r i c e d i f f
dummy
nodal
ausbau
count
;
scalar l e i t ung ;
dummy( l ) = 0 ;
count = 0 ;
i t e r ( i t e r a t i o n ) = no ;
i t e r 1 ( i t e r a t i o n ) = no ;
Loop( i t e r a t i o n ,
I f (Ord( i t e r a t i o n ) eq 1 ,
i t e r ( i t e r a t i o n ) = yes ;
i t e r 1 ( i t e r a t i o n ) = yes ;
s o l v e l i n e a r minimizing co s t s us ing lp ;
s o l v e t e s t maximizing w us ing nlp ;
noda lp r i c e (n , sc )=energybalance .m(n , sc )∗(−1000000)∗1/ weight ( sc ) ;
p r i c e d i f f e r e n c e ( l , sc )= abs (sum(n$ (ORD(N) eq FromBus(L) ) , noda lp r i c e (n , sc ) )
− sum(n$ (ORD(N) eq ToBus(L) ) , noda lp r i c e (n , sc ) ) ) ;
a v e r a g e p r i c e d i f f ( l ) = sum( sc , weight ( sc )∗ p r i c e d i f f e r e n c e ( l , sc ) ) ;
loop ( l l , Loop( l $ (ORD( l ) eq ORD( l l ) ) , avpr i c e ( l l )= a v e r a g e p r i c e d i f f ( l ) ) ; ) ;
maximum=smax( l l , avpr i c e ( l l ) ) ;
c i r c s ( l , i t e r )= c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
we l f ( i t e r ) = w. l ;
w e l f d i f f ( i t e r ) = we l f ( i t e r ) ;
p r i c e d i f f ( l , i t e r )= av e r a g e p r i c e d i f f ( l ) ;
nodal (n , i t e r )=sum( sc , weight ( sc )∗ noda lp r i c e (n , sc ) ) ;
ausbau ( l , i t e r )=0;
i t e r ( i t e r a t i o n ) = no ;
) ;
I f ( (Ord( i t e r a t i o n ) gt 1) ,
noda lp r i c e (n , sc )=energybalance .m(n , sc )∗(−1000000)∗1/ weight ( sc ) ;
p r i c e d i f f e r e n c e ( l , sc )= abs (sum(n$ (ORD(N) eq FromBus(L) ) , noda lp r i c e (n , sc ) )
− sum(n$ (ORD(N) eq ToBus(L) ) , noda lp r i c e (n , sc ) ) ) ;
a v e r a g e p r i c e d i f f ( l ) = sum( sc , weight ( sc )∗ p r i c e d i f f e r e n c e ( l , sc ) ) ;
loop ( l l $ (dummy( l l ) eq 0) , Loop( l $ (ORD( l ) eq ORD( l l ) ) ,
avpr i c e ( l l )= a v e r a g e p r i c e d i f f ( l ) ) ; ) ;
loop ( l l $ (dummy( l l ) ne 0) , Loop( l $ (ORD( l ) eq ORD( l l ) ) , avpr i c e ( l l )=0 ) ; ) ;
loop ( l l , Loop( l $ (ORD( l ) eq ORD( l l ) ) , c i r ( l l )= c i r c u i t s ( l ) ) ; ) ;
loop ( l l $ ( c i r ( l l ) ge 4) , Loop( l $ (ORD( l ) eq ORD( l l ) ) , avpr i c e ( l l )=0 ) ; ) ;
maximum=smax( l l , avpr i c e ( l l ) ) ;
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Loop( l l $ ( c i r ( l l ) l e 3) ,
I f ( avpr i c e ( l l ) eq maximum,
i t e r 1 ( i t e r a t i o n ) = yes ;
i t e r ( i t e r a t i o n ) = yes ;
ld ( l l ) = yes ;
c i r c u i t s ( l l )= c i r c u i t s ( l l )+1;
Re s i s t a n c e s t a r t ( l )= length ( l )∗ r e f r e s ( l )/ c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
Reac tance s ta r t ( l )= length ( l )∗ r e f r e a ( l )/ c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
ThermalLimit ( l )= r e f l i m i t ( l )∗ c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
PowerFlowLimit (L , sc ) = SQRT(3)∗ LineVoltage (L)∗ThermalLimit (L)
∗(1 − TRM( sc ))/1E3 ;
Res i s tance (L) = Re s i s t a n c e s t a r t ( l ) /
( ZBase1$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 380)
+ ZBase2$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 220)
+ ZBase3$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 110)
+ ZBase4$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 500))
;
Reactance (L) = Reactance s ta r t ( l ) /
( ZBase1$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 380)
+ ZBase2$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 220)
+ ZBase3$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 110)
+ ZBase4$ ( LineVoltage (L) eq 500))
;
BVector (L) = Reactance (L) / (SQR( Reactance (L))+SQR( Res i s tance (L ) ) ) ;
GVector (L) = Res i s tance (L) / (SQR( Reactance (L))+SQR( Res i s tance (L ) ) ) ;
H( l , n ) = BVector ( l ) ∗ Inc idence ( l , n ) ;
B(n , nn) = SUM( l , Inc idence ( l , n ) ∗ H( l , nn ) ) ;
display Reactance , l ength ;
I c o s t ( i t e r ) =((8225∗ l ength ( l l ) ) $ ( LineVoltage ( l l ) eq 110)/8760
+ (8225∗ l ength ( l l ) ) $ ( LineVoltage ( l l ) eq 220)/8760
+ (14687 .5∗ l ength ( l l ) ) $ ( LineVoltage ( l l ) eq 380)/8760) ;
I t o t a l = sum( i t e r 1 , I c o s t ( i t e r 1 ) ) ;
s o l v e t e s t maximizing w us ing nlp ;
c i r c s ( l , i t e r )= c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
we l f ( i t e r )=w. l ;
ausbau ( l l , i t e r )= length ( l l ) ;
w e l f d i f f ( i t e r a t i o n )=we l f ( i t e r a t i o n )−wel f ( i t e r a t i o n −1);
dummy( ld ) = 0 ;
l e i t ung=ORD( l l ) ;
display w. l , wel f , w e l f d i f f , ausbau , l e i tung , i c o s t , I t o t a l ;
I f ( w e l f d i f f ( i t e r a t i o n ) l e 0 ,
Loop( l $ (ORD( l ) eq ORD( l l ) ) , c i r c u i t s ( l )= c i r c u i t s ( l )−1);
c i r c s ( l , i t e r )= c i r c u i t s ( l ) ;
ausbau ( l l , i t e r ) = 0 ;
I c o s t ( i t e r ) = 0 ;
I t o t a l = sum( i t e r 1 , I c o s t ( i t e r 1 ) ) ;
dummy( ld ) = 1 ;
ld ( l l ) = no ;
count = count + 1 ;
) ;
) ;
i t e r ( i t e r a t i o n ) = no ;
) ;
) ;
I f ( count ge 50 ,
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” c i r c s
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=c i r c s rng=c i r c s ! ’
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” we l f
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=we l f rng=we l f ! ’
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” w e l f d i f f
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=w e l f d i f f rng=w e l f d i f f ! ’
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” p r i c e d i f f
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=p r i c e d i f f rng=p r i c e d i f f ! ’
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” noda lp r i c e
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=noda lp r i c e rng=noda lp r i c e ! ’
Abort ”NO WELFARE INCREASE” ;
) ;
) ;
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” c i r c s
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=c i r c s rng=c i r c s ! ’
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” we l f
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=we l f rng=we l f ! ’
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execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” w e l f d i f f
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=w e l f d i f f rng=w e l f d i f f ! ’
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” p r i c e d i f f
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=p r i c e d i f f rng=p r i c e d i f f ! ’
execute un load ”2006 highc02 . gdx” noda lp r i c e
execute ’ gdxxrw . exe 2006 highc02 . gdx par=noda lp r i c e rng=noda lp r i c e ! ’
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D.3 GAMS Code for Chapter 5
Sets
co l columns f o r output /Sub1 , Sub2 , MPstat , SP1stat , SP2stat , zup , z l o /
n nodes /n1∗n15/
l l i n e s / l 1 ∗ l 28 /
u plant types /u1∗u8/
f f i rms / j1 , s1 /
s ( f ) / s1 /
j ( f ) / j1 /
i g sample va lues / i 1 ∗ i 59 /
;
Alias (n , nn ) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Some parameters
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Scalars
p r e f Reference p r i c e f o r demand func t i on / 30 /
ep s i l o n Demand e l a s t i c i t y at r e f e r e n c e po int / −0.25 /
l o ad f a c t o r Factor to d e f i n e load l e v e l s / 1 .0 /
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Line parameters
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Parameter cap ( l )
/ l 1 2971
l 2 1842
l 3 1842
l 4 896
l 5 1326
l 6 1842
l 7 1842
l 8 1842
l 9 641
l10 641
l11 936
l12 1842
l13 898
l14 1207
l15 267
l16 2762
l17 1842
l18 3329
l19 1282
l20 3329
l21 20000
l22 20000
l23 20000
l24 20000
l25 20000
l26 20000
l27 20000
l28 20000/
;
cap ( l ) = cap ( l )/1000 ;
Parameter x ( l )
/ l 1 12.21372516
l 2 69.22912356
l 3 42.95031339
l 4 28.25678513
l 5 25.43110662
l 6 33.0604386
l 7 50.01450968
l 8 29.10448868
l 9 61.03465588
l10 41.82004199
l11 34.19071
l12 31.08246364
l13 55.38329885
l14 45.2108562
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l 15 156.4776426
l16 22.22867097
l17 27.12651372
l18 38.24945533
l19 11.4748366
l20 41.30941176
l21 45.8993464
l22 45.8993464
l23 45.8993464
l24 45.8993464
l25 45.8993464
l26 45.8993464
l27 45.8993464
l28 45.8993464/
;
Table Inc idence ( l , n )
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8
l 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1
l 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
l 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 4 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
l 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 6 0 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0
l 7 0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0
l 8 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0
l 9 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0
l10 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
l11 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0
l12 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0 0
l13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
l14 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
l15 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
l16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
l22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
l23 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
l24 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
l25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
l26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l27 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l28 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n9 n10 n11 n12 n13 n14 n15
l 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 2 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 3 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0
l 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 5 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0
l 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l13 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
l14 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
l15 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
l16 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0
l17 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0
l18 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1
l19 0 0 −1 0 0 0 1
l20 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
l21 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
l22 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
l23 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
l24 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
l25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l26 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
l27 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
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l 28 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
;
Parameter H, B;
H( l , n ) = 1/X( l ) ∗ Inc idence ( l , n ) ;
B(n , nn) = SUM( l , Inc idence ( l , n ) ∗ H( l , nn ) ) ;
Parameter Slack (n) Slack bus
/n1 1/
;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Generat ion c a p a c i t per t ype and f i rm
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
Table gen max (n , f , u )
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
n1 . j1 20340.000 21153.000 28964.000 7758.000 10656.000
n2 . s1 58288.000 580.000 15822.000 124.000
n3 . j1 2713.000 2474.000 350.000 575.000
n4 . j1 449.000 3968.000 249.000 4872.000
n5 . j1 253.000 1510.000
n6 . j1 2618.000 1134.000 810.000 1432.000
n7 . j1 1705.000 2768.000
n1 . j1 u6 u7 u8
n2 . s1 5752.000 1271.000 5954.000
n3 . j1 11130.000 14381.000 3408.000
n4 . j1 560.000 1308.000
n5 . j1 111.000
n6 . j1
n7 . j 1 1865.000
;
gen max (n , f , u ) = round ( gen max (n , f , u )/1000 ) ;
Parameters gen bar (n , s , u , i ) ;
gen bar (n , s , u , ’ i1 ’ ) = 0 ;
loop ( ( n , s , u , i ) $ (ord ( i ) l e gen max (n , s , u ) ) ,
gen bar (n , s , u , i +1) = gen bar (n , s , u , i ) + 1 ; ) ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Generat ion c o s t s per f u e l t ype and l o c a t i o n
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
table uc (n , u) Erzeugungskosten der Kraftwerkstypen
∗ Nuc Lig Coal CCGT Gas Oi l Hydro Pump
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8
n1 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
n2 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
n3 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
n4 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
n5 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
n6 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
n7 10 20 22 30 45 60 0 35
;
parameter c (n , f , u ) ;
loop ( ( n , f , u ) $gen max (n , f , u ) , c (n , f , u ) = uc (n , u ) ) ;
display c ;
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
∗ Reference demand ( l i n e a r demand f u cn t i o n p = a + m∗q )
∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗
parameter q r e f (n) Average demand
/ n1 58380
n2 54474
n3 2850
n4 5925
n5 6240
n6 2385
n7 3021
/
;
q r e f (n) = q r e f (n )/1000 ;
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q r e f (n) = round ( q r e f (n ) ) ;
q r e f ( ’ n8 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
q r e f ( ’ n9 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
q r e f ( ’ n10 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
q r e f ( ’ n11 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
q r e f ( ’ n12 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
q r e f ( ’ n13 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
q r e f ( ’ n14 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
q r e f ( ’ n15 ’ ) = 0 . 1 ;
parameter s l p (n) Slope o f demand func t i on ;
s l p (n) $ q r e f (n) = p r e f /( ep s i l o n ∗ l o ad f a c t o r ∗ q r e f (n ) ) ;
parameter i c e p t (n) In t e r c ep t o f demand func t i on ;
i c ep t (n) $ q r e f (n) = p re f−l o ad f a c t o r ∗ q r e f (n)∗ s l p (n ) ;
s l p (n) = Abs( s l p (n ) ) ;
i c ep t (n) = Abs( i c ep t (n ) ) ;
Scalars K1 /10000/ , K2 /10000/ , K3 /10000/ , K4 /10000/ ,
K5 /10000/ , Kl /10000/ , Kv /10000/;
Variables
du engy (n) dual energy balance cons t ra in t ,
Delta (nn) vo l tage angle at node nn ,
du de l (nn) dual r e f e r e n c e bus cons t ra in t ,
obj ;
Positive Variables
cons (n) consumption at node n ,
gen (n , f , u ) genera t i on at node n o f f i rm f ,
du fpos ( l ) dual l i n e f low l im i t forward d i r e c t i on ,
du fneg ( l ) dual l i n e f low l im i t backward d i r e c t i on ,
du capf (n , j , u ) dual genera t i on capac i ty l im i t ,
du cap (n , f , u ) , v (n , s , u , i ) ;
Binary Variables
r1 (n) BV f o r KKT Cons ,
r2 (n , j , u ) BV f o r KKT Genf ,
r3 ( l ) BV f o r KKT Fpos ,
r4 ( l ) BV f o r KKT Fneg ,
r5 (n , j , u ) BV f o r KKT Capf ,
q l (n ) , qv (n , s , u , i ) , qq (n , s , u , i ) ;
Equations OF, DISJ Cons , DISJ Cons2 , DISJ Cons3 , DISJ Genf , DISJ Genf2 ,
DISJ Genf3 , DISJ Delta , DISJ Engy , DISJ Fpos , DISJ Fpos2 ,
DISJ Fpos3 , DISJ Fneg , DISJ Fneg2 , DISJ Fneg3 , DISJ Capf ,
DISJ Capf2 , DISJ Capf3 , DISJ Slack , New Con1 , New Con2 ,
New Con3 , New Con4 , New Con5 , New Con6 , New Con7 ,
New Con8 , New Con9 , New Con10 ;
∗================================================================================
∗Pe r f e c t c ompe t i t i on pre−run
∗================================================================================
Equations PC Cons , PC Gen , PC Delta , PC Engy , PC Fpos , PC Fneg , PC Cap , PC Slack ;
PC Cons (n ) . . −i c e p t (n) + ( s l p (n)∗ cons (n ) ) + du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
PC Gen(n , f , u ) . . c (n , f , u ) − du engy (n) + du cap (n , f , u ) =g= 0 ;
PC Delta (nn ) . . −SUM(n ,B(n , nn)∗ du engy (n ) ) + SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fpos ( l ) )
− SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fneg ( l ) ) + ( du de l (nn)∗ s l a ck (nn ) ) =e= 0 ;
PC Engy(n ) . . cons (n) − SUM(( f , u ) , gen (n , f , u ) )
− SUM(nn ,B(n , nn)∗ de l t a (nn ) ) =e= 0 ;
PC Fpos ( l ) . . cap ( l ) − SUM(n , H( l , n ) ∗ Delta (n ) ) =g= 0 ;
PC Fneg ( l ) . . cap ( l ) + SUM(n , H( l , n ) ∗ Delta (n ) ) =g= 0 ;
PC Cap(n , f , u ) . . gen max (n , f , u ) − gen (n , f , u ) =g= 0 ;
PC Slack (n ) . . s l a ck (n)∗ de l t a (n) =e= 0 ;
Model PC mcp
/PC Cons . cons , PC Gen . gen , PC Delta . de l ta , PC Engy . du engy , PC Fpos . du fpos ,
PC Fneg . du fneg , PC Cap . du cap , PC Slack . du de l /
;
PC mcp . o p t f i l e =0;
Solve PC mcp us ing mcp ;
parameter pro f i t comp ( f ) , pr ices comp , gen comp , flow comp ;
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pro f i t comp ( f ) = sum(( n , u ) , gen . l (n , f , u)∗ du engy . l (n)−gen . l (n , f , u)∗ c (n , f , u ) ) ;
pr ices comp (n) = du engy . l (n ) ;
gen comp (n , f , u ) = gen . l (n , f , u ) ;
flow comp ( l ) = SUM(n , H( l , n ) ∗ Delta . l (n ) ) ;
display flow comp , gen comp , prices comp , pro f i t comp ;
∗===============================================================================
∗MIP
∗===============================================================================
OF. . obj =e= SUM((n , s , u ) , ( c (n , s , u)∗ gen (n , s , u))−SUM( i , v (n , s , u , i ) ) ) ;
DISJ Cons (n ) . . −i c e p t (n) + ( s l p (n)∗ cons (n ) ) + du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Cons2 (n ) . . K1∗ r1 (n) + i c ep t (n) − ( s l p (n)∗ cons (n ) ) − du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Cons3 (n ) . . K1∗(1− r1 (n ) ) − cons (n) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Genf (n , j , u ) . . c (n , j , u ) − du engy (n) + du capf (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Genf2 (n , j , u ) . . K2∗ r2 (n , j , u ) − c (n , j , u ) + du engy (n) − du capf (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Genf3 (n , j , u ) . . K2∗(1− r2 (n , j , u ) ) − gen (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Slack (nn ) . . (−1)∗ s l a ck (nn)∗ de l t a (nn) =e= 0 ;
DISJ Engy (n ) . . cons (n) + SUM(nn ,B(n , nn)∗ de l t a (nn ) )
− SUM(( f , u ) , gen (n , f , u ) ) =e= 0 ;
DISJ Delta (nn ) . . SUM(n ,B(n , nn)∗ du engy (n ) ) + SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fpos ( l ) )
− SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fneg ( l ) ) − ( du de l (nn)∗ s l a ck (nn ) ) =e= 0 ;
DISJ Fpos ( l ) . . cap ( l ) − SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Fpos2 ( l ) . . K3∗ r3 ( l ) − cap ( l ) + SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Fpos3 ( l ) . . K3∗(1− r3 ( l ) ) − du fpos ( l ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Fneg ( l ) . . cap ( l ) + SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Fneg2 ( l ) . . K4∗ r4 ( l ) − cap ( l ) − SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Fneg3 ( l ) . . K4∗(1− r4 ( l ) ) − du fneg ( l ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Capf (n , j , u ) . . −gen (n , j , u ) + gen max (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Capf2 (n , j , u ) . . K5∗ r5 (n , j , u ) + gen (n , j , u ) − gen max (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
DISJ Capf3 (n , j , u ) . . K5∗(1− r5 (n , j , u ) ) − du capf (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
New Con1(n ) . . Kl∗ q l (n) − du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
New Con2(n , s , u ) . . gen (n , s , u ) − SUM( i , qq (n , s , u , i )∗ gen bar (n , s , u , i ) ) =e= 0 ;
New Con3(n , s , u ) . . SUM( i , qq (n , s , u , i ) ) − 1 =e= 0 ;
New Con4(n , s , u , i ) . . q l (n) − qv (n , s , u , i ) =g= 0 ;
New Con5(n , s , u , i ) . . qq (n , s , u , i ) − qv (n , s , u , i ) =g= 0 ;
New Con6(n , s , u , i ) . . qv (n , s , u , i ) − qq (n , s , u , i ) − q l (n) + 1 =g= 0 ;
New Con7(n , s , u , i ) . . gen bar (n , s , u , i )∗ du engy (n) − v (n , s , u , i ) =g= 0 ;
New Con8(n , s , u , i ) . . Kv∗qv (n , s , u , i ) − v (n , s , u , i ) =g= 0 ;
New Con9(n ) . . du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
New Con10 (n , s , u , i ) . . 1 − qv (n , s , u , i ) =g= 0 ;
Model mpec mip1
/ OF, DISJ Cons , DISJ Cons2 , DISJ Cons3 , DISJ Genf , DISJ Genf2 ,
DISJ Genf3 , DISJ Delta , DISJ Engy , DISJ Fpos , DISJ Fpos2 ,
DISJ Fpos3 , DISJ Fneg , DISJ Fneg2 , DISJ Fneg3 , DISJ Capf ,
DISJ Capf2 , DISJ Capf3 , DISJ Slack , New Con1 , New Con2 , New Con3 ,
New Con4 , New Con5 , New Con6 , New Con7 ,
New Con8 , New Con9 , New Con10/
;
mpec mip1 . r e s l im = 1000000;
mpec mip1 .OptCR = 0 ;
mpec mip1 . o p t f i l e = 1 ;
Solve mpec mip1 us ing mip minimizing obj ;
parameter f l ow s t r a t ( l ) , p r o f i t s t r a t ( f ) , g en s t r a t (n , f , u ) , p r i c e s s t r a t ;
f l ow s t r a t ( l ) = SUM(n , H( l , n ) ∗ Delta . l (n ) ) ;
p r o f i t s t r a t ( f ) = SUM((n , u ) , ( du engy . l (n)−c (n , f , u ) )∗ gen . l (n , f , u ) ) ;
g en s t r a t (n , f , u ) $gen . l (n , f , u ) = gen . l (n , f , u ) ;
p r i c e s s t r a t (n) = du engy . l (n ) ;
display flow comp , f l ow s t r a t , gen comp , gen s t ra t , pr ices comp , p r i c e s s t r a t ,
prof i t comp , p r o f i t s t r a t , DISJ Fpos2 .m;
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D.4 GAMS Code for Chapter 6
Sets
r rows output f i l e /SubMIPv , SubNLPv , MPv zlo , zup , z d i f f , ogens1 , ogens2 ,
ogensf , conn3 , profsg1 , profsg2 , p ro f f , pr icen1 ,
pr icen2 , pr icen3 , MPstat , SPstat ,m1,m2/
n nodes /n1∗n3/
l l i n e s / l 1 ∗ l 3 /
u un i t s /u1∗u3/
f f i rms /s1 , f 1 /
s ( f ) / s1 /
j ( f ) / f1 /
i t i t e r a t i o n / i t 1 ∗ i t 3 0 /
i t e r ( i t )
i t e r 2 ( i t )
;
Alias (n , nn ) , ( i t , i t 1 ) ;
Table Inc idence ( l , n )
n1 n2 n3
l 1 1 −1 0
l 2 0 1 −1
l 3 1 0 −1
;
Parameter s l a ck (n)
/n1 1/
;
Parameter Reactance ( l )
/ l 1 1
l 2 1
l 3 1/
;
Parameter Res i s tance ( l )
/ l 1 0 .1
l 2 0 .1
l 3 0 .1/
;
Parameter cap ( l )
/ l 1 10
l 2 10
l 3 10/
;
Parameter i c e p t (n)
/ n1 1
n2 1
n3 10/
;
Parameter s l p (n) Slope o f demand func t i on s ;
s l p (n) = 1 ;
Parameter BVector Susceptance vector ,
H Network t r a n s f e r matrix ,
B Network suceptance matrix ;
BVector ( l ) = Reactance ( l ) / (SQR( Reactance ( l ))+SQR( Res i s tance ( l ) ) ) ;
H( l , n ) = BVector ( l ) ∗ Inc idence ( l , n ) ;
B(n , nn) = SUM( l , Inc idence ( l , n ) ∗ H( l , nn ) ) ;
Parameter c (n , f , u ) marginal co s t o f product ion
/ n1 . s1 . u1 2
n2 . s1 . u2 1
n2 . f 1 . u3 3/
;
Parameter gen max (n , f , u ) maximum generat i on capac i ty
/n1 . s1 . u1 15
n2 . s1 . u2 15
n2 . f 1 . u3 15/
;
Scalars K1 /100/ , K2 /100/ , K3 /100/ , K4 /100/ , K5 /100/ ,
a lpha d /−1E5/ , ep /1E−5/, e r r /1/ ;
Parameters g en f i x (n , s , u ) , gen o ld ( i t , n , s , u ) , subv ( i t ) , du f i x ( i t , n , s , u ) ,
z lo , zup , r f1 , r f2 , r f3 , r f4 , r f 5 ;
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Variables
du engy (n) dual energy balance cons t ra in t ,
Delta (nn) vo l tage angle at node nn ,
du de l (nn) dual r e f e r e n c e bus cons t ra in t ,
sub mip , sub nlp , ma, alpha ;
Positive Variables
cons (n) consumption at node n ,
gen (n , f , u ) genera t i on at node n o f f i rm f , genf ,
du fpos ( l ) dual l i n e f low l im i t positive d i r e c t i on ,
du fneg ( l ) dual l i n e f low l im i t negat ive d i r e c t i on ,
du capf (n , j , u ) dual genera t i on capac i ty l im i t ;
Binary Variables
r1 (n) binary variables f o r KKT Cons ,
r2 (n , j , u ) binary variables f o r KKT Genf ,
r3 ( l ) binary variables f o r KKT Fpos ,
r4 ( l ) binary variables f o r KKT Fneg ,
r5 (n , j , u ) binary variables f o r KKT Capf ;
Equations MIP Cons , MIP Cons2 , MIP Cons3 , MIP Genf , MIP Genf2 , MIP Genf3 ,
MIP Delta , MIP Engy , MIP Fpos , MIP Fpos2 , MIP Fpos3 , MIP Fneg ,
MIP Fneg2 , MIP Fneg3 , MIP Capf , MIP Capf2 , MIP Capf3 , MIP Slack ,
MIP Obj , NLP Cons , NLP Cons2 , NLP Cons3 , NLP Genf , NLP Genf2 ,
NLP Genf3 , NLP Delta , NLP Engy , NLP Fpos , NLP Fpos2 , NLP Fpos3 ,
NLP Fneg , NLP Fneg2 , NLP Fneg3 , NLP Capf , NLP Capf2 , NLP Capf3 ,
NLP Slack , NLP Obj , Fix , MP Obj , MP Cap , MP alpha , MP Cuts ;
MP Obj . . ma =e= SUM((n , s , u ) , gen (n , s , u)∗ c (n , s , u ) ) + alpha ;
MP Cap(n , s , u ) . . gen (n , s , u) − gen max (n , s , u ) =l= 0 ;
MP alpha . . alpha =g= alpha d ;
MP Cuts ( i t e r ) . . alpha =g= subv ( i t e r ) + SUM((n , s , u ) , du f i x ( i t e r , n , s , u )
∗( gen (n , s , u)−gen o ld ( i t e r , n , s , u ) ) ) ;
MIP Obj . . sub mip =e= −SUM((n , s , u ) , g e n f i x (n , s , u)∗ du engy (n ) ) ;
MIP Cons (n ) . . −i c e p t (n) + ( s l p (n)∗ cons (n ) ) + du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
MIP Cons2 (n ) . . K1∗ r1 (n) + i c ep t (n) − ( s l p (n)∗ cons (n ) ) − du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
MIP Cons3 (n ) . . K1∗(1− r1 (n ) ) − cons (n) =g= 0 ;
MIP Genf (n , j , u ) . . c (n , j , u ) − du engy (n) + du capf (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Genf2 (n , j , u ) . . K2∗ r2 (n , j , u ) − c (n , j , u ) + du engy (n) − du capf (n , j , u )
=g= 0 ;
MIP Genf3 (n , j , u ) . . K2∗(1− r2 (n , j , u ) ) − gen (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Slack (nn ) . . (−1)∗ s l a ck (nn)∗ de l t a (nn) =e= 0 ;
MIP Engy(n ) . . cons (n) + SUM(nn ,B(n , nn)∗ de l t a (nn ) ) − SUM(( j , u ) , gen (n , j , u ) )
− SUM(( s , u ) , g e n f i x (n , s , u ) ) =e= 0 ;
MIP Delta (nn ) . . SUM(n ,B(n , nn)∗ du engy (n ) ) + SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fpos ( l ) )
− SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fneg ( l ) ) − ( du de l (nn)∗ s l a ck (nn ) ) =e= 0 ;
MIP Fpos ( l ) . . cap ( l ) − SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Fpos2 ( l ) . . K3∗ r3 ( l ) − cap ( l ) + SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Fpos3 ( l ) . . K3∗(1− r3 ( l ) ) − du fpos ( l ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Fneg ( l ) . . cap ( l ) + SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Fneg2 ( l ) . . K4∗ r4 ( l ) − cap ( l ) − SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Fneg3 ( l ) . . K4∗(1− r4 ( l ) ) − du fneg ( l ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Capf (n , j , u ) . . −gen (n , j , u ) + gen max (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Capf2 (n , j , u ) . . K5∗ r5 (n , j , u ) + gen (n , j , u ) − gen max (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
MIP Capf3 (n , j , u ) . . K5∗(1− r5 (n , j , u ) ) − du capf (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Obj . . sub nlp =e= −SUM((n , s , u ) , gen (n , s , u)∗ du engy (n ) ) ;
NLP Cons (n ) . . −i c e p t (n) + ( s l p (n)∗ cons (n ) ) + du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
NLP Cons2 (n ) . . K1∗ r f 1 (n) + i c ep t (n) − ( s l p (n)∗ cons (n ) ) − du engy (n) =g= 0 ;
NLP Cons3 (n ) . . K1∗(1− r f 1 (n ) ) − cons (n) =g= 0 ;
NLP Genf (n , j , u ) . . c (n , j , u ) − du engy (n) + du capf (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Genf2 (n , j , u ) . . K2∗ r f 2 (n , j , u ) − c (n , j , u ) + du engy (n) − du capf (n , j , u )
=g= 0 ;
NLP Genf3 (n , j , u ) . . K2∗(1− r f 2 (n , j , u ) ) − gen (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Slack (nn ) . . (−1)∗ s l a ck (nn)∗ de l t a (nn) =e= 0 ;
NLP Engy(n ) . . cons (n) + SUM(nn ,B(n , nn)∗ de l t a (nn ) ) − SUM(( f , u ) , gen (n , f , u ) )
=e= 0 ;
NLP Delta (nn ) . . SUM(n ,B(n , nn)∗ du engy (n ) ) + SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fpos ( l ) )
− SUM( l ,H( l , nn)∗ du fneg ( l ) ) − ( du de l (nn)∗ s l a ck (nn ) ) =e= 0 ;
NLP Fpos ( l ) . . cap ( l ) − SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Fpos2 ( l ) . . K3∗ r f 3 ( l ) − cap ( l ) + SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Fpos3 ( l ) . . K3∗(1− r f 3 ( l ) ) − du fpos ( l ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Fneg( l ) . . cap ( l ) + SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Fneg2 ( l ) . . K4∗ r f 4 ( l ) − cap ( l ) − SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta (nn ) ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Fneg3 ( l ) . . K4∗(1− r f 4 ( l ) ) − du fneg ( l ) =g= 0 ;
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NLP Capf (n , j , u ) . . −gen (n , j , u ) + gen max (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Capf2 (n , j , u ) . . K5∗ r f 5 (n , j , u ) + gen (n , j , u ) − gen max (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
NLP Capf3 (n , j , u ) . . K5∗(1− r f 5 (n , j , u ) ) − du capf (n , j , u ) =g= 0 ;
Fix (n , s , u ) . . gen (n , s , u ) =e= gen f i x (n , s , u ) ;
Model SP MIP
/MIP Cons , MIP Cons2 , MIP Cons3 , MIP Genf , MIP Genf2 , MIP Genf3 ,
MIP Delta , MIP Engy , MIP Fpos , MIP Fpos2 , MIP Fpos3 , MIP Fneg , MIP Fneg2 ,
MIP Fneg3 , MIP Capf , MIP Capf2 , MIP Capf3 , MIP Slack , MIP Obj / ;
Model SP NLP
/NLP Cons , NLP Cons2 , NLP Cons3 , NLP Genf , NLP Genf2 , NLP Genf3 ,
NLP Delta , NLP Engy , NLP Fpos , NLP Fpos2 , NLP Fpos3 , NLP Fneg , NLP Fneg2 ,
NLP Fneg3 , NLP Capf , NLP Capf2 , NLP Capf3 , NLP Slack , NLP Obj , Fix / ;
Model MP
/MP Obj , MP Cap , MP alpha , MP Cuts / ;
Model MP1
/MP Obj , MP Cap , MP alpha / ;
parameter i t e r a t i o n , z d i f f , ogens1 , ogens2 , ogenf , conn3 , profsg1 ,
profsg2 , p ro f f , outprim , outsec , s tatus sp mip ,
s t a tu s sp n lp , status mp ;
i t e r ( i t ) = no ;
So lve MP1 minimizing ma us ing lp ;
z l o = ma. l ;
g e n f i x (n , s , u ) = gen . l (n , s , u ) ;
Loop( i t $ ( e r r ge ep ) ,
Solve SP MIP minimizing sub mip us ing mip ;
r f 1 (n)=r1 . l (n ) ;
r f 2 (n , j , u)=r2 . l (n , j , u ) ;
r f 3 ( l )=r3 . l ( l ) ;
r f 4 ( l )=r4 . l ( l ) ;
r f 5 (n , j , u)=r5 . l (n , j , u ) ;
zup = sub mip . l + SUM((n , s , u ) , g e n f i x (n , s , u)∗ c (n , s , u ) ) ;
subv ( i t ) = sub mip . l ;
gen o ld ( i t , n , s , u ) = g en f i x (n , s , u ) ;
Solve SP NLP minimizing sub nlp us ing nlp ;
du f i x ( i t , n , s , u ) = Fix .m(n , s , u ) ;
e r r = Abs( zup − z l o ) ;
$ inc lude [ d i r e c t o r y ]∖ outputcommands . gms
display z lo , zup , i t e r a t i o n ;
i t e r ( i t ) = yes ;
So lve MP minimizing ma us ing lp ;
z l o = ma. l ;
g e n f i x (n , s , u ) = gen . l (n , s , u ) ;
) ;
parameter f low , ni , p r o f i t ;
f low ( l ) = SUM(nn , H( l , nn ) ∗ Delta . l (nn ) ) ;
n i (n) = SUM(nn ,B(n , nn)∗ de l t a . l (nn ) ) ;
p r o f i t ( f ) = sum(( n , u ) , gen . l (n , f , u )∗ ( −c (n , f , u ) + du engy . l (n ) ) ) ;
display f low , ni , p r o f i t , outprim , outsec ;
